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ABSTRACT 
As China is undergoing a great social transformation, urbanization 
has brought millions of domestic migrants into Beijing. After the 2008 
Olympics, long term Beijingers have started to express their hostility to the 
overwhelming population of domestic migrants. This thesis seeks to 
enlarge our understanding of the nature and dynamics of this local 
hostility in Beijing, as a case study of the construction of prejudice that 
results from social change. It is illustrated under a combined framework of 
Durkheim’s theories of social change and anomie, Allport’s theorizing 
about prejudice, and Elias’s writings on insiders and outsiders. In order to 
answer how and why local hostility happened recently in Beijing, I located 
my ethnographic research on a grassroots organization consisting of long 
term Beijingers. There are three main findings. First, social change 
provides the invention of new traditions and norms that long term 
Beijingers were able to adopt before migrants came and had the chance to 
get settled. This enabled long term Beijingers to express their hostility by 
claiming that the migrants were “uncivilized”. Second, urbanization and a 
 x 
 
series of urban reforms not only brought migrants into the city, but also 
disturbed the existing lifestyles of the long term Beijingers and made them 
feel relatively deprived. Nostalgic sentiments aroused among long term 
Beijingers blamed outsiders for their perceived deprivation. Thirdly, the 
civic participation that the grassroots organization encouraged did not 
significantly reduce their prejudice against outsiders. Instead, local 
hostility was veiled by active participation and was believed to be 
legitimate because of the support of the local power structure, the 
mainstream media, and by other government policies. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: BEIJING IN TRANSITION 
Having spent almost eighteen hours on Flight AA187, I was finally told 
by the pilot that the plane would be landing at Beijing Capital 
International Airport in about thirty minutes. As I was only mindful of 
“back HOME”, not hard to be noticed from the airport’s name, the city of 
Beijing is the capital—one of the national central cities, and the political, 
cultural, and international communication center of the country to which 
it belongs. 
However, Beijing’s term of service as a state capital did not just begin 
with the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The 
historical lineage of its being a capital dates back to the Seventh Century 
BC, and it was not until the year 1153 that the city resumed the status 
and maintained it for another seven hundred years until 1928. The 
political and administrative significance of the city was bound to engender 
population changes, and therefore the opportunity for the introduction of 
new cultures, and further, cultural exchange and social integration (Meyer, 
1991; Li, 1995; Elder, 1997; Naquin, 2000; Dong, 2003; Zhao, 2007; Yu, 
2013). Linguistic examinations alone reveal traces of influence on the 
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Beijing dialect by people of various ethnicities and from surrounding 
regions (Sun, 1995; Wadley, 1996; Gao, 2003; Zhang, 2007; Guan, 2008; 
Chen, 2009; Mende, 2015).  
Although Beijing historically shared similar transitions with cities in 
the West in terms of population movements, Weber (1968) incisively 
pointed out that cities in China differed from the rest because political 
autonomy and self-government there were absent. This characteristic of 
China’s cities was maintained in the People’s Republic. Deviating from 
urban sociologists’ theorizing that urbanization is the spatial form of 
industrialization and modernization (Sjoberg, 1960; Smailes, 1967; 
Castells, 1978; Castells, 1983), cities in Mao’s regime played a less 
important role in the country’s economic system because financial 
resources were controlled by the industrial system instead of the 
municipal government, which resulted in “industrialization while 
minimalizing urbanization” (Naughton, 1995, p. 67). The state adopted the 
idea of “anti-urbanism”, in order to construct the city as a place for 
production, rather than consumption; urban resurgence did not occur 
until the end of the 1980s (Kirkby, 1985). In practice, the ideology was 
translated into a tight control of population mobility and domicile 
3 
 
 
nationwide, especially in traditional urban centers (ibid). 
Owing to the strict population policy such as hukou1, the one-child 
policy2, and Regulations on Resident Identification Cards3, population 
mobility and domicile in Beijing was fairly stable from 1949 to 1994. 
Especially from 1958 to 1970, more than 2.5 million people left the city, 
outnumbering the migrant population. The term for extraneous 
population (wailai renkou) came into being in 1982, measuring people 
                                                             
1 The Hukou system, or residential permits, adopted into law in 1958, was originally set 
up to avoid overwhelming the cities with uncontrolled in-migration. Under this system all 
Chinese received a document that classified them as people of either “rural” or “urban” 
households. Since the end of the Mao era, this system is regarded by some as an obstacle 
to the development of China’s cities. On the other hand, many of the more privileged 
urbanites see it as their entitlement and a protection of their living standard in the face of 
mass and potentially destabilizing urban growth. Nonetheless, officially the system is 
being gradually phased out as urban populations tend more and more to be influenced by 
the “socialist-market economy” in China’s cities (Foggin, 2005).  
2 The One-child policy, an official program initiated in the late 1970s and early ’80s by 
the central government of China, the purpose of which was to limit the great majority of 
family units in the country to one child each. The rationale for implementing the policy 
was to reduce the growth rate of China’s enormous population. It was announced in late 
2015 that the program was to end in early 2016 (One-Child Policy, 2016).  
3 Regulations on Resident Identification Cards (RICs) started to be implemented in 1986. 
The Regulations were revised in 1991 and 1997, and the Detailed Rules of 
Implementation were amended in 1999. In compliance with legislation regulations, the 
items on the Resident ID Card shall include name, gender, nationality, date of birth, the 
address of the permanent residential place, the number of the Resident ID Card, the 
photo of the cardholder, the period of validity and the organization that signed and issued 
the card. The Resident ID Card number is the one and only lifetime code for a citizen’s 
identity, compiled uniformly by the Public Security Bureau. The Resident ID Card and the 
identity code are mainly used for the identification of the status of the citizen, to 
safeguard a civilian's legal right and facilitate a civilian['s] ... conduct [of] social activities. 
In June 2003, China adopted the new Law of the PRC on Resident Identification Cards, 
effective 1 January 2004. Although the Regulations were repealed with the entry into 
force of the new law, RICs issued under the previous regulations will remain valid until 
their expiry date. [t]he Resident ID Card is a uniform legal document issued by the state 
to identify the status of the civilian (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 
2005).  
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without Beijing hukou living in the city longer than six months or one year 
(due to inconsistency of the data). Before that, the residential population 
consisted of the hukou population and the transient population (zanzhu 
renkou)—those without Beijing hukou who lived in Beijing longer than 
three days. Since 1982, the hukou population and extraneous population 
constitute a residential population. The introduction of the new 
measurement seemed to signify the permission from the city to 
accommodate long-term outsiders. Figure 1 provides us with a general 
population growth trend from 1959 to 1994. Although the amount of new 
comers kept growing, its proportion in comparison to hukou population 
was still at the margin. 
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Figure 1. Population in Beijing, 1959-1994 
(Population measured by ten thousand) 
Another change in 1982 was the General Urban Plan of Beijing by the 
State Council. The plan made clear that Beijing was by nature the national 
political and cultural center. Beijing was to develop in the following 
aspects a) social order and morality, b) cleanliness and hygiene, c) culture, 
technology and level of education, and d) economic prosperity, 
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convenience and stability. However, stringent population control was 
reaffirmed in this plan.  
In 1994, the population that either gained Beijing hukou before 1959 
or were born with Beijing hukou, which I would call them Beijingers, 
amounted to 75.6% of the total population in the city (Beijing Bureau of 
Statistics, 2015)4. People whose Beijing hukou were offered by their 
workplace or gained through their family members would not be regarded 
as Beijingers, but simply domestic migrants. Their children, and, of course, 
grandchildren, are instead defined as Beijingers in this paper5.  
                                                             
4 I start with the year 1959 because from 1949 to 1958, Beijing expanded its geographical 
area by including many counties that used to belong to surrounding provinces. By doing 
this, people who belonged to those counties automatically gained Beijing hukou.  
5 I regard outsiders as the sum of extraneous, transient, and cumulative in-migration 
increases since 1959. Public sources from Beijing Bureau of Statistics and Ma, Hu, and 
Yin’s Contemporary Beijing’s Population is where I mainly gather my data on Beijing’s 
population for this thesis. I also use the two sources for Figure 2, 3, and 5. However, I 
would like to present these data in charts, so as to take a glimpse of the population 
growth trend. 
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Figure 2. Population in Beijing, 1995-2014 
(Population measured by ten thousand) 
Despite the increase of hukou population6 through the 1990s being 
steady, the growth of the migrant population, or floating population used 
by many scholars, which is the combination of the extraneous population 
                                                             
6 Mechanical increase of hukou population refers to people who gain Beijing hukou by 
in-migration, instead of by birth. 
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and the transient population, was tremendous in this decade. The year 
1995 saw a critical point, with the extraneous population reaching 1.8 
million, or almost three times as much as it was in 1994 (i.e. 632,000). 
Additionally, the natural growth of the hukou population from 1995 to 
1999 was only 36,400, compared to the growth from migration in the same 
time period which was 312,600 (Beijing Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Since 
then, it is those domestic migrants, rather than existing Beijingers’ 
reproduction, that contributed to the increase in the hukou population. As 
we can see in Figure 2, the proportion of newcomers into Beijing climbs 
steadily and fast. In 2008, the amount of newcomers exceeded that of 
Beijingers. 
Figure 3. Population Density 2000-2014 
 (Density measured by person/km²) 
Figure 3 tracks the population density trends in Beijing with a special 
9 
 
 
focus on the time period from 2000 to 2014. While the 1982 General Urban 
Plan suggested the residential population by 2000 would be 13.2 million 
and by 2010 14.4 million, the latter had already been surpassed in 2003 
(i.e. 14.56 million). Within fourteen years, the population density almost 
doubled from 934.78 people per square km to 1845.247 people per square 
km (Beijing Bureau of Statistics, 2015). The news that twenty-three people 
were living in an apartment of 120 square meters should not be a surprise 
when an area of 90 square meters were shared by fifty-two people (Shen, 
Chen, & Wang, 2013). Take Beijing’s transportation system in 2013 as 
another example. According to the Beijing municipal traffic report, traffic 
congestion lasted one hour and fifty-five minutes on average that year (Hu, 
2014). On March 8th, the passenger volume in the subway system reached 
10.28 million within a day, breaking its historical record (Tang, 2013). 
Subway Line One, the oldest underground line that is parallel to the 
Chang’an Avenue—an avenue that connects the political, economic, and 
administrative center from east to west, carried more than 1.5 million 
passengers every day on average, with the shortest interval between two 
trains being 2 minutes (Luo, 2013). 
Together with all the inconvenience created by the soaring number of 
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domestic newcomers, an enormous anti-outsider sentiment among 
long-term Beijing residents was triggered after migration had been 
negligible for sixty years. The self-proclaimed Beijingers felt themselves 
being a “minority in their own city” (Dutton, Lo, and Wu, 2008, p. 146). 
Whereas Western societies often base prejudice and discrimination on 
race and ethnicity, the marker in China is more usually characterized by 
localism—defining people by their region of origin (Solinger, 1995). 
Language, especially dialectal pronunciation, becomes the most intuitive 
indicator of one’s hometown, before people present their household 
registration papers.  
Localism is aggravated by the hukou system in terms of education, 
employment, socio-economic status, social security, and social adaptation 
(Whyte & Parish, 1984; Cheng & Selden, 1994; Knight & Shi, 1996; 
Hannum, 1999; Zhang & Kanbur, 2005; Wei, 2007; Xia & Gao, 2009; 
Wang, 2010; Wu, 2010; Yang, 2011; Hao & Woo, 2012). These institutional 
advantages, in a predictable fashion, convert to “local snobbishness” at a 
personal level, which could evolve into xenophobia, prejudice, overt 
discrimination, and open hostility to all outsiders even if some have 
succeeded economically or elevated their social status (Solinger, 1995, p. 
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120). 
Open hostility is manifest and therefore can be easily tracked. Waidi bi, 
or “outside cunt” being its crude English translation, was invented by 
Beijingers around 2011 to originally address outsiders who criticized 
Beijing all the time but still chose to stay in the city instead of returning to 
their hometowns. Idioms such as lao waidi, or “the old outsider”, that did 
not explicitly convey negative attitudes gradually were reduced in their 
frequency of use. Beijingers condemned a dating TV show and applied the 
term waidi bi to its hostess who was an Inner Mongolian, holding that this 
show had intentionally been matching Beijingers with outsiders who could 
then stay in Beijing in an easier way (Baidu, 2015a). Social media has 
become the virtual space for Beijingers to identify these critical outsiders. 
Zhou Jieren, a successful journalist, posted on her social media account 
that “Beijing is wrecked because people need to wait for hours to be seated 
in a restaurant and Beijingers must be so inexperienced in their lives that 
they are eager to eat outside all the time”. Soon, Beijingers called her WDB, 
short for waidi bi in their replies to her. Some even appealed that 
Beijingers make phone calls to Zhou’s working place—the government 
news agency to complain (Baidu, 2015b).  
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Yet, the popularization of the term led to an over-generalization in a 
way that the “three-letter-word” can be referred to anyone who simply has 
a different accent (Tianya, 2012). More severely, verbal abuse was 
sometimes transformed into behavioral violence. Some Beijingers 
searched for basic information such as the home address and telephone 
number of outsiders with whom they were in conflict, threatened these 
outsiders and demanded that they apologize and retract their words. Some 
made an “appointment” with outsiders that they were in conflict with at a 
certain place and a particular time, and called other Beijingers to go with 
them and to help them fight. Using the slogan “The Netherlands for the 
Dutch”, Beijingers insisted that Beijing be deemed as their hometown 
before it was considered the nation’s capital and belonging to every 
Chinese citizen.  
The rise of these irrationally hostile phenomena in recent years made 
me interested in a series of questions: a) What makes these residents 
hostile? b) Given the fact that Beijing has become an international 
metropolis, how could residents cope with their identity crisis? c) How do 
group activities and organization affect their individual antagonism? 
Allport (1954) argues that “rapid social change in the prevailing social 
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situation” can produce riots which stem from group hostility (p. 59). From 
a macro-social perspective, anomie, or social disorder, occurs particularly 
in transforming societies where economic development and modernization 
clash with long-standing values and traditions. As Beijing has only 
recently become a city with skyrocketing development whose 
consequences have not yet been touched upon by existing literature, this 
thesis seeks to enlarge our understanding of the nature and dynamics of 
local hostility in Beijing as a case study of the development of prejudice 
resulting from social change. Specifically, I would like to confine my 
research to a single case study based on long term Beijingers who are 
members of a grassroots organization. Members of the sampled 
organization who called themselves “Traditional Beijingers” have been the 
most prejudiced and influential among the whole long term Beijingers 
population by far. Long term residents in this thesis refer to people whose 
grandparents were born or settled in Beijing, and whose parents and 
themselves were born and raised in Beijing. Although population increase 
became prominent as early as 1995, which I have previously noted, the 
study is limited to the time period from 2001 to 2015, in order to examine 
how the most recent trend of local hostility is related to major social 
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changes that did not occur in the past.  
The following chapters further develop my thesis. The second chapter 
reviews Durkheim’s analysis of anomie, Allport’s elaboration of the nature 
of prejudice, and Elias and Scotson’s formulation of the established and 
the outsiders. Methods and data collection are discussed in the third 
chapter. Chapters Four, Five, and Six examine how prejudice is nurtured 
by intertwining factors including macro-level structural changes, group 
mobilization and organization, and daily interactions between Beijingers 
and outsiders. These three chapters attempt to contextualize the 
development of prejudice in the processes of acquiring tradition, of 
perceiving relative deprivation, and of political opportunity changes. The 
last chapter summarizes the thesis employing a reflexive outlook and some 
workable suggestions.  
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CHAPTER TWO: ANOMIE, PREJUDICE, AND THE ESTABLISHED AND 
THE OUTSIDERS 
I would argue that “Traditional Beijingers” hostility against domestic 
migrants can be linked theoretically to the idea that prejudice emerges as 
one of the many common outcomes of anomie—a typical result of massive 
social change. First, I would like to discuss the causality of social change 
and anomie from a Durkheimian perspective. Then, Allport’s analysis of 
prejudice will be incorporated into the argument. Last but not least, Elias 
and Scotson’s analysis of the established and the outsiders will be 
reviewed. 
 
Primarily concerned with collective solidarity at a societal level, 
Durkheim (1984) proposes two types of solidarities, namely mechanical 
solidarity and organic solidarity, which characterize in pre-modern and 
modern societies respectively. The former type emphasizes collective 
consciousness and similarities that members of the society share in work 
and life experiences, while the latter characterizes the heterogeneity yet 
functional interdependence of social members with the development of the 
division of labor. Durkheim calls this the shift from mechanical solidarity 
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to organic solidarity. This is because as the division of labor intensifies, 
discrepancies in the forms of labor, lifestyles, and life experience among 
members enlarge, leading to the increasing awareness of individuals and 
the waning of collective consciousness.  
[T]he collective consciousness leaves uncovered a part of the 
individual consciousness, so that there may be established in it those 
special functions that it cannot regulate. The more extensive this free 
area is, the stronger the cohesion that arises from this solidarity. 
Indeed, on the one hand each one of us depends more intimately 
upon society the more labour is divided up, and on the other, the 
activity of each one of us is correspondingly more specialised, the 
more personal it is (Durkheim, 1984, p.85). 
The significance of the division of labor does not lie in its destructive effect 
on mechanical solidarity, nor essentially on its contribution to the growth 
of productivity, but on its constructive effort of introducing a higher level of 
social integration that is based on cooperative relationships, restitutive 
laws, and public opinion.  
But why social change? Or, in other words, why is there a division of 
labor in society? Durkheim again interprets the progress of the division of 
labor from a functionalist approach, by seeing it “in direct proportion to 
the moral or dynamic density of society”, rather than due to human 
happiness or to the enrichment of human knowledge (Durkheim, 1984, p. 
201). Durkheim points out that as the volume and density of a society 
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grows, competition for survival among its members seems inevitable. 
Pre-modern societies are mostly sparsely populated and have loosely 
communicated memberships, making competition for survival and the 
division of labor unnecessary. Yet, when a society becomes “regularly more 
dense and generally more voluminous”, existing resources and space 
available for human survival will become increasingly inadequate 
(Durkheim, 1984, p. 205).  
Under these circumstances, the demand for similar resources will lead 
to fiercer and more brutal competition among members who engage in 
similar occupations and/or have similar skills and goals. Thus, the 
division of labor, the necessity for, rather than the result of, well-being, 
provides new specializations for the majority population who if left in an 
inferior position could have failed the competition for survival. This makes 
people collaborate instead of engaging in conflict or oppressing one 
another. As Durkheim says, 
[I]t is easy to understand that any concentration in the social 
mass, particularly if accompanied by a growth in population, 
necessarily determines the progress of the division of labour 
(Durkheim, 1984, p. 210). 
In this way, the more population and concentration increase, the further 
the division of labor develops, leading to an industrialized society with an 
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intensive division of labor.  
The division of labor allows any society to absorb another society of the 
same kind. If one society is not able to stay independent from the other, 
which means the two societies may share similar functions, competitions 
between the two societies occur. It then becomes inappropriate for the 
people of this society to maintain any “exclusive form of patriotism” 
because such differentiations between themselves can become attributes 
that necessitate their cooperation (Durkheim, 1984, p. 222). 
To some extent, Durkheim also acknowledges that the greater the 
mechanical solidarity in a society, the harder and slower the individuals’ 
movement and the development of the division of labor. Furthermore, as 
the collective consciousness operates at various levels, the one at the local 
level can retain individuality and concreteness within the general or the 
more abstract collective conscious at a more transcendent level. Likewise, 
the more general the collective consciousness is, the more rational and 
logical its embedded civilization becomes, the less categorical and “less 
irksome to the free development of individual variations” (Durkheim, 1984, 
p. 233). 
Consequently, the division of labor in effect weakens traditions which 
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were popular in societies under mechanical solidarity. Durkheim argues 
that progress is primarily made in large towns and spreads to other 
regions because urban environments are the areas with least continuity of 
traditions (Durkheim, 1984, p. 237). Yet, he points out that the division of 
labor spontaneously creates a certain measure of social harmony that is 
“sufficient to maintain order generally” (Durkheim, 1984, p. 216). Besides, 
it is still individuality that is derived from the social collectivity, not the 
other way around. Although the “upgraded” organic solidarity values 
individuality and heterogeneity, no hint of the anti-social shall be found 
within individualistic societies. Thus, the division of labor itself should not 
be blamed for the loss of solidarity or for causing anomie. If so, what then 
is responsible for the generation of anomie in social change? 
Anomie, or normlessness, refers to the lack of sufficient and effective 
social norms which can provide directions and standards for social 
behavior. According to Merton (1957), “the degree of anomie in a social 
system is indicated by the extent to which there is a lack of consensus on 
norms judged to be legitimate, with its attendant uncertainty and 
insecurity in social relations” (pp. 266-267). When a society experiences 
change into one that appreciates heterogeneity and individuality through 
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the practice of the division of labor, morality and norms are often diversely 
and ambiguously expressed through public opinion.  
Functional diversity entails a moral diversity that nothing cannot 
prevent, and it is inevitable that the one should grow at the same time 
as the other… The collective sentiments thus become more and more 
powerless to contain the centrifugal tendencies that the division of 
labour is alleged to bring about; for, on the one hand, these 
tendencies increase as labour becomes increasingly divided up, and 
at the same time the collective sentiments grow weaker (Durkheim, 
1984, p. 298).  
Unlike rigid laws with established authority, public opinion is often 
tolerant of evasive and ambivalent obligations that members should obey. 
As a result, boundaries between just and unjust actions become blurred, 
while morality is often too equivocal to form strict discipline. Norms that 
are supposedly used to regulate the changing society and to create 
solidarity are incapable in most areas of collective life, leaving the society 
in chaos.  
    Not all aspects of the division of labor are anomic; the anomic division 
of labor is only one among several abnormal forms of the division of labor. 
In a situation of the anomic division of labor, stable and effective social 
norms that usually regulate participants’ behaviors, rights and obligations, 
are often invalid. The interdependent and interconnected relationships 
among participants are not able to secure a cooperative division of labor. 
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Participants have to settle on norms for their collaboration on each 
occasion. Otherwise, in order to regain equilibrium among themselves, 
they need to negotiate or even fight against each other, consequently 
turning solidarity into continual conflicts. Even the contract, proposed by 
Durkheim is merely a temporary truce that “suspends hostilities only for a 
while” (Durkheim, 1984, p. 302). However, Durkheim does not see these 
conflicts as unnecessary or something that can be completely eliminated 
under organic solidarity. Instead, solidarity moderates if not abolishes 
competition (ibid). 
Durkheim turns to micro-sociological levels of analysis to solve anomie, 
as he believes that these levels of analysis “best reveal the ongoing 
structural foundations of normative culture without the need to abstract 
either pole from its holistic context” (Marks, 1974, p. 331). Anomie is 
impossible when sufficient contacts among individuals are achieved. In 
fact, when a universal market comes into being, it is each industry that 
provides production for members all over the society.  
For each individual, the perception of anomie, derives from the 
uncertainty of knowing what to do when pursuing a goal (Gurr, 1970). 
Anomie will lead to deviant behaviors such as crime, suicide, and gang 
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behavior; alternative norms, or in other words “rebellion”, could also take 
place (Merton, 1957). Furthermore, the feeling of inferiority within 
ressentiment also sows extra-punitive seeds that could develop into 
prejudice (Greenfeld, 1992). Drawing from this, prejudice against 
out-groups could be one possible outcome of anomie. 
 
Allport offers a systematic and paradigmatic account of prejudice and 
intergroup relations, despite the fact that his work is originally engaged 
with racial tensions in the United States. He first points out that prejudice 
consists of two parts: 1) the affective attitude of either for or against, as is 
distinguished from merely feeling loyal; 2) a wholly or partially erroneous 
belief which the affective attitude is based on (Allport, 1960, pp. 220-221). 
Overgeneralization, or stereotyping, is one kind of erroneous belief, 
holding that every member of a given group must possess certain 
characteristics and these characteristics make every one of the group 
responsible for certain events. By blaming others, those who show 
prejudice will relieve their fear, anxiety, and irritation. Of course, these 
characteristics are often negatively and falsely alleged with insufficient 
warrant and irreversible stigmatization, while structural or impersonal 
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forces could have been given proportional concern to explain the events. 
With prejudice itself being a subjective construct, people possessing it will 
in return become irrationally and subjectively influenced by it, as 
prejudice “inflate[s] our perception out of all proportion to the facts” 
(Allport, 1960, p. 228). Ross (1977) later comes up with the term 
“fundamental attribution error” to account for the “tendency of people to 
attribute the inferior status of minority groups to these groups’ inner 
deficiencies rather than to circumstances beyond their control” (Katz, 
1991). 
Apart from psychological approaches that involve frustration, ego 
defense, and aggression, prejudice is also theorized historically as well as 
socio-culturally. Allport (1954) claims the function of prejudice lies 
significantly in the fact that it supports the subordination of the minority 
group under the prevailing social stratification. Similarly from a Marxist 
perspective, prejudice is employed by the ruling group as an ideological 
tool to justify and maintain their dominant status and exploitative 
relationship with the ruled. “The victims must not be known for what they 
were—involuntary slaves” (Allport, 1954, p. 209). Greed, in Marxist 
theorizing, replaces fear and insecurity, and becomes the root cause of 
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prejudice—the foundation of class differences (Cox, 1948). Prejudice, now 
in another fashion, rationalizes the self-interests of the dominant class. 
This explanation is especially adopted by DuBois (1990) in his studies of 
African Americans’ subordinate social status. 
The historical and sociocultural explanations of prejudice are 
combined into a community pattern theory of prejudice. This pattern 
emphasizes that individuals inherit their judgments, including prejudiced 
opinions, from their ancestors and take up values that are preferred by the 
individuals’ community. However, Allport seems optimistic about reducing 
this form of ethnocentrism as new generations, especially in the United 
States are always seeking new lifestyles that break away from the old ones. 
In terms of sociocultural laws of prejudice, Allport lists a series of 
social factors that trigger and aggravate prejudice. They are: a 
heterogeneous social structures, vertical social mobility, rapid social 
change, ignorance and barriers to communication, a relatively large size 
and high density of minority group populations, direct competition and 
realistic threats, exploitation that sustains interests within the community, 
sanctions given to aggression, traditions that legitimize ethnocentrism, 
and ignorance about assimilation or cultural pluralism. He elaborates the 
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causality between rapid social change and prejudice by pointing out that 
social change produces a feeling of uncertainty and a loss of predictability. 
Thus, anxiety increases, resulting in the action of scapegoating as an 
alternative explanation for the deteriorated situation (p. 224). It should be 
noted that anomie here does not have to concern factual disruptions, but 
only perceived disruptions that the majority believe to have taken place. 
Besides, it is also emphasized that the aforementioned factors in reality 
are interconnected with one another and they together pose a combined 
influence on prejudice in society; no single factor alone would necessarily 
lead to prejudice. 
As for how prejudice is acquired, several options are examined by 
Allport. First, prejudice results from factors along a spectrum that range 
from sheer conformity to the maximum degree of functional significance. 
To conform, one simultaneously chooses to accept an ethnocentric 
ideology of a particular culture. Only through conformity could individuals 
be accepted by the group, while at the same time solidarity is enhanced. Of 
course, apart from conforming to the group, individuals may also conform 
to a self-image, or ego, or frames of value that they believe they themselves 
should have. Second, people are influenced by their parents and their 
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families’ surrounding environment. Prejudice is acquired by involvement 
in an infected atmosphere as opposed to being inherited from parents. 
Children of less authoritarian parents show less prejudice against others. 
Thirdly, in a later period of learning, specifically in puberty and 
adolescence, traumatic conditioning that is emotionally violent and 
striking, ensures the later overgeneralization will take place.  
However, trauma in many cases only serves as a catalyst of prejudice, 
rather than a factor that creates new prejudice. For youths are sometimes 
prejudiced against by others, they often establish their own status, so as to 
enhance their self-esteem. According to Allport, such class distinctions are 
“cultural invitations to prejudice” (p. 322). Thus, prejudice is a social 
construct that needs to be acquired, instead of inherently ascribed, for the 
sake of satisfying people’s needs. The classroom for people to acquire 
prejudice is often the social environment where their personalities develop 
(p. 324).  
When talking about prejudiced personalities, Allport suggests that 
prejudiced people have a rigid demand for morality and are inclined to 
make moral judgements. These people would also like to be extra-punitive, 
to externalize their hostility, and to “think of things happening to him 
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rather than as caused by him” (p. 404). Additionally, prejudiced 
individuals are more attractive to institutions than tolerant people are, as 
the prejudiced ones believe institutions are likely to provide them with a 
sense of safety and definiteness. Last but not least, prejudiced people long 
for a powerful authority and for the employment of more discipline to 
exercise control over others. They distrust anyone else and assume others 
are evil by nature and dangerous.  
To reduce prejudice, Allport (1960) proposes 1) an individualistic and 
democratic-egalitarian perspective which tolerates differences among 
people of the same group; 2) the invalidity of justifying hostility simply 
based on group differences (p. 227). Allport also comes up with concrete 
approaches for prejudice reduction. They include 1) equal-status contact 
with common ends which indicates that closer acquaintance mitigates 
unfavorable stereotypes; 2) approaches through vicarious experience in 
educational programs, so that students can develop knowledge about 
members of other groups; 3) group retraining through which participants 
realize their biases and weaknesses; 4) religious exhortation emphasizing 
a common humanity; 5) individual psychotherapy; and 6) catharsis which 
allows for self-reflection after tensions have been relieved. 
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Prejudice can not be understood without applying it to paired groups: 
whether they are labelled insiders and outsiders, or the established and 
the newcomers, etc. Norbert Elias and John Scotson (1965) argue that it is 
the (im)balance of power between the two paired groups and the attempt to 
perpetuate their power that give rise to what appears on the surface, to be 
prejudice. They name the constituents of the pair: the established and the 
outsiders, which provide an “ideal type” of inter-group relationships. Their 
case selection is located at a suburban setting in the English Midlands 
called Winston Parva in 1959-1960. The locality had less than 5000 
inhabitants and had institutions such as churches and schools that could 
cater to the livelihood of the whole community.  
By comparing three zones in Winston Parva, Elias and Scotson argue 
that group characteristics of both the established and the outsiders are 
not confined to class, race, or ethnicity, when it comes to inequality groups. 
However, Winston Parva is an exception, since length of residence in this 
case is now an explanatory variable that causes power differences between 
the established long term residents and the outsiders. Some of them live in 
the Village Zone 1 and Zone 2, and the outsiders are clustered in the 
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Estate Zone 3, regardless of the fact that Zone 1 and Zone 2 differ in terms 
of class. Obviously, the power of the established exceeds that of the 
outsiders. 
Elias and Scotson believed that apart from assigning to institutional 
positions, another mechanism that is used by the established to dominate 
the outsiders is group charisma, as well as group disgrace. The concept of 
“group charisma” is an extension of Weber’s “clan charisma”, as the latter 
seems to be confined to exotic and theological societies, while the former is 
a fundamental and universal observation (Elias, Goudsblom, & Mennell, 
2008). In addition, the counterpart of the former, group disgrace, argued 
by Elias, should have been given attention.  
Group charisma allows the established group to obtain a sense of 
power superiority over the outsiders. Power superiority can be moral 
superiority, as the established believe that they themselves have human 
values and merits with “special grace of nature or gods”, and are more 
virtuous or even are a better species than the outsiders (Elias & Scotson, 
1994, p. xxii). According to Elias, this superiority is also applicable to a 
nationalist consciousness, because oftentimes a given national group will 
hold a common belief in their “unique national virtue and grace” with 
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which members of the group unite against outsiders (Elias & Scotson, 
1994, p. xli). Unfortunately, this mindset is often to a large extent 
internalized by the outsiders.  
Understood sociologically rather than from the moral aspect, power 
superiority is achieved and maintained through conforming to the 
established social norms. Whereas the established are always able to 
follow the norms that they have created, outsiders’ deviant behaviors show 
insiders that outsiders are untrustworthy, undisciplined, and lawless, or 
in other words exhibit anomie (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xxv). This 
elaboration can be well incorporated with Elias’s analysis of the “civilizing 
process”, as the civilized behavioral patterns would always be recognized 
as the norm within the civilized group and be used by them to show 
contempt to the uncivilized (Elias, Dunning, Goudsblom, & Mennell, 2000). 
Thus, what seems to concern the concrete forms of civilization essentially 
boils down to the power relations between the established and the 
outsiders.  
By conforming to norms, the established insiders strengthen their 
group charisma and their self-love, which in return forces insiders to stay 
aligned with their norms and standards. Contrarily, if any insiders disobey, 
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their self-status will be degraded; they will lose power within the group, so 
that the group charisma as a whole will be sustained. As Elias puts it, 
The self-enhancing quality of a high power ratio flatters the 
collective self-love which is also the reward for submission to 
group-specific norms, to patterns of affect restraint characteristic of 
that group and believed to be lacking in less powerful, “inferior” 
groups, outsiders and outcasts (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xlv). 
One of the mechanisms that enable the established to monopolize their 
superiority, according to Elias and Scotson, is cohesion. “Oldness” is 
defined by Elias and Scotson as “social relationships with properties of 
their own” (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. 155). Demonstrated in Winston 
Parva’s example, old residents in Zone 2 were more socially cohesive than 
newcomers in Zone 3, because the former shared “a stock of common 
memories” and had strong ties among one another, compared with the 
latter who were loosely made up of Londoners, Welsh, and Irish and hardly 
knew each other (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xxxviii). Cohesion not only 
helps the supervision of group members’ obedience to norms, but also 
lends a hand to the efficiency of stigmatizing the outsiders. When cohesive 
insiders were able to stigmatize and defame the outsiders, the outsiders, 
due to their inability to unite and to fight back, were like an open palm 
only to bear the force of the insiders’ clenched fist. 
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Elias and Scotson point out that gossip seems to be an effective 
practice that cohesion takes up. The amount of blame gossips spread 
among the established to stigmatize the outsiders was disproportionately 
significant compared to the actual percentage of ill-mannered outsiders in 
Zone 3. By blame-gossiping which is a concrete form of group disgrace, the 
group status of the outsiders will be maintained. On the other hand, praise 
gossip within the insiders allows the established to idealize their grace and 
virtuous image, so as to enhance group charisma. Since the established 
are more cohesive, both the blame and the praise gossip have a wider 
range, thus making the effect more successful, and the group itself more 
integrated, especially when the spread of the blame gossip reinforces the 
righteousness of the established group. During this process, children 
under the influence of the older generation would find it hard to reject 
gossip, prejudice, and discrimination, which proves Allport’s argument 
about children’s acquisition of prejudice. 
Analytically, the existence of the unequal power relations between the 
established and the outsider was based on the interdependence of the two 
groups. “If groups are not interdependent, there is no necessity for 
struggle over resources or even for interaction” (Hogenstijn, van 
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Middlekoop, & Terlouw, 2008, p. 148). Consequently, the stability of the 
interdependent relationship becomes crucial in terms of the intensity of 
stigmatization and gossip. For instance, when the established are prone to 
losing their group power, the credibility gap between gossip and truth will 
surely enlarge. When the established encounter changes, a fantasy shield 
of their imagined charisma is applied to cling to their superior position. As 
Elias remarks,  
[The established] may know of the change as a fact, while their 
belief in their special group charisma and attitudes, their behavior 
strategy which goes with it, persists unchanged as a fantasy shield, 
which prevents them from feeling the change and, therefore, from 
being able to adjust to the changed conditions of their group image 
and their group strategy…the emotional denial of the change, the 
tacit preservation of the beloved group charismatic image is 
self-defeating (Elias & Scotson, 1994, p. xlvi). 
Sometimes, the pursuit of the fantasy could engender destruction to both 
the established and the outsiders. Although Elias touches upon the 
change of power relations between the two groups, he and Scotson fail to 
invalidate the common phenomenon of group integration, leaving the 
relations between the established and the outsiders dynamic in their 
antagonism but static in their relative distance.  
    In this respect, Allport’s formulation of prejudice seems to be 
optimistic as he foresees the possibilities of its reconciliation. Both Elias 
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and Scotson’s and Allport’s views of prejudice and hostility can be 
complementary in the understanding of the “Traditional Beijingers”. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND DATA 
In order to provide an in-depth account of the issue of prejudice, I 
chose a grassroots group in Beijing as a case study to analyze the 
interactions of factors that produce such hostility. Instead of extrapolating 
a general and monolithic pattern of prejudice, this thesis seeks to 
understand how individuals’ perceptions of social change and group 
contact could motivate their negative attitudes and related behaviors 
(Harper, 1987; Blaikie, 1993; Neuman, 2011). Although this study may 
lack reliability, since the generation of prejudice is likely to be caused by 
other factors or factors in other forms, which could bear more statistical 
significance, a qualitative approach—or one-n case study that this thesis 
specifically adopts—aims at providing a possible explanation that expands 
and enriches our existing knowledge of prejudice (Burawoy, 1991; Small, 
2009).  
My site selection of Beijing and case selection of the “Traditional 
Beijingers” group are based on convenience sampling, as they are 
preliminarily concerned with personal interest, prior knowledge, and easy 
access. More than two years spent observing this group before beginning 
research on it has assured mutual trust between me and other group 
36 
 
 
members, especially core members. An ethnographic approach is 
employed, focusing on “situated knowledge” or contextual understanding 
of the group being investigated, in order to reveal the specificity of this case 
(Abbott, 1997; Abbott, 2004, p. 26). Ethnography also allows me to 
categorize and analyze “unstructured data” collected in the current setting 
that hasn’t been explored before (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 208). 
Through inductive conceptualization, this study serves as a case of the 
development of prejudice under the combined effects of social change and 
group influence. 
My fieldwork began in December 2012 when I learnt this group had 
protests every Thursday in front of the Beijing Municipal Education 
Bureau. I went there one Thursday and shouted with them. This overt 
behavior ensured my access to this group of people since I easily caught 
the attention of some leaders. Later that night, we started following each 
other on Weibo, a Chinese social media equivalent to Twitter. After that, I 
attended their in-group gatherings which were mostly dining and watching 
talk shows, re-twitted their posts concerning prejudice, and participated 
in other off-line activities such as cleaning posters in the subway. 
Participant observation of them cleaning illegal posters in the subway was 
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carried out bi-weekly from September 2013 to June 2014, and also from 
July to August 2015. The assumed social role of mine in the field was an 
alliance with the members (Harrington, 2003).  
In order to conform and to perform the role naturally, necessary verbal 
antagonism was carried out. During these observations, I particularly 
collected data on behavior and words that demonstrated a) how group 
leaders instructed and guided group members and the reaction of the 
latter; b) how group members interacted with outsiders and especially 
those unwelcome outsiders; and c) how group members interacted with 
themselves. Each specific action would be counted as a cultural domain 
for later analysis (Spradley, 1980, p. 101). I did not take notes in front of 
them, but I would do it whenever I had the chance to use my cellphone. My 
strategy wasn’t to establish equal distance with everyone in the group, but 
to be selectively closer with the leaders and some members who were more 
approachable. Through their introduction and network, I established 
further connections with other members in the group and gradually 
expanded my circle, in the hope of a natural and “unintentional” 
relationship with further group members. 
Twenty-six in-depth, semi-structured, and open-ended interviews 
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with two group leaders and twenty-four members were conducted, as an 
important source of data for this research and a window for more relevant 
secondary sources. I started my interviews with these members and 
leaders that I was familiar with and then ran other interviews through 
snowball sampling. Interviewees varied in length of membership to this 
group, age, occupation, education, sex, childhood experience, and so on.  
By August 2015, when interviews started to be conducted, sixteen had 
become members or followed the group’s official online account longer 
than a year. The other ten had been attached to the group less than one 
year. Since membership was only granted to adults, all of the interview 
participants were older than eighteen and younger than thirty-five. Seven 
interviewees were younger than twenty-five years old, meaning that they 
were born in or after the year 1990. Nineteen interviewees, who were born 
in the 1980s, were between twenty-five and thirty-five years old. Only 
three interviewees were studying for their Bachelor’s degree, while the rest 
had started working. Together with the three undergraduates, eighteen of 
them have a Bachelor’s degree. The other eight interview participants 
graduated from vocational schools. The sex ratio of men to women was 
fourteen to twelve. Six experienced housing relocation because their 
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previous community was destroyed. In-depth interviews were carried out 
to “achieve the same deep level of knowledge and understanding” of the 
interviewees by comprehending the meanings of their actions (Johnson, 
2002, p. 106).  
Questions posed to group members were about their purpose of 
participation in the group, their change of attitudes towards both 
outsiders and Beijingers, their relations with leaders and other group 
members, their local identity and idea of “home” in relation to joining this 
group, and their family and upbringing in forming their local identity. 
Apart from these questions, leaders were also asked to discuss issues 
including recruitment, management, organization, achievements, 
publicizing strategy, interaction with (municipal) government offices and 
policies. Interviews lasted around two hours on average with members and 
three hours with leaders.  
Adopting a holistic perspective as is required in ethnography 
(Fetterman, 1998), I also monitored “Traditional Beijingers’” Weibo posts 
and chats in social media especially when they replied to outsiders online. 
I was mainly engaged in analyzing a) what was written on the “Traditional 
Beijingers” official Weibo and how group members commented on these 
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posts, b) random online attacks between “Traditional Beijingers” and 
certain outsiders, and c) online interactions among group members. I have 
followed around a hundred members in social media and around thirty of 
them were highly active and outspoken. I’ve observed their posts since 
June 2013. Media reports of the “Traditional Beijingers” group were also 
gathered. 
Apart from this evidence, I also collected documents on housing 
policies, urban planning policies, “moral construction” regulations, and 
other municipal policies related to Beijing’s urban change. I also 
interviewed staff of the subway operating company, bus drivers and 
conductors, and elderly people who used to be volunteers for the Olympics. 
These data are employed as background knowledge to contextually 
understand prejudice among “Traditional Beijingers”. 
In terms of data analysis, grounded theory was applied to analyze 
reactive data with open coding, axial coding, and selective coding as the 
specific strategies. Narrative analysis is also employed since it is able to 
“address the issue of ‘who are we’ as individual people”, “link us to larger 
groups, communities, or nations”, and describe how social forces “act on 
us” (Neuman, 2011, p. 524). With the help of narrative analysis, the 
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construction of meanings of prejudice among the “Traditional Beijingers” 
can be explained by a process that is contextually embedded in a series of 
chronological events. The combination of path dependency and historical 
contingency, as tools of narrative analysis, are used to examine the 
contribution of macro factors to group level and individual level hostility. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF THE OLYMPICS IN GENERATING 
LOCAL HOSTILITY 
The legacy of the Deng economic "reforms" of the 1980s ensured 
China’s engagement in the capitalist world economy as a semi-peripheral 
country (Solinger, 1995). Theoretically, it is believed that peripheral and 
semi-peripheral countries assume their positions in the world system 
structure and achieve mobility through dependent development (Cardoso, 
1973; Evans, 1979). Urbanization patterns of peripheral and 
semi-peripheral countries are largely dependent on roles these countries 
play in the world system (Smith, 1996). In 2001, China’s National People’s 
Congress came up with the tenth five-year plan that required 
omnidirectional, multilevel, and wide-ranging opening-up. Beijing 
formulated its municipal five-year plan accordingly and made becoming a 
“modern international metropolis” its development goal.  
Despite the fact that “neo-liberal restructuring” occurs in certain 
areas around the world (Clarno, 2014, p. 1727), international stimuli for 
internal urban development are not confined to the sphere of the global 
market. Although Beijing represented China to host the 1990 Asian 
Games as a window for China to advance in the world, the image of Beijing 
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as a cosmopolitan city was far from reality (Brownell, 2001). After all, the 
state did not plan to turn Beijing into a metropolis in the 1990s. The 
Olympic Games then exemplified a powerful motivating force for 
modernization and advancement (Dong, 2001; Keating, 2001; Liu, 2002; 
Chen, 2003; Wang, 2005; Xu, 2008). As the Olympic Games were regarded 
as a crucial chance for China to further its active participation on the 
international stage by inviting foreign officials, media, as well as a 
worldwide audience to witness its competence in all aspects, Beijing, 
positioned as the socialist capital and China’s political and cultural center 
since 1983, took on the responsibility to successfully bid and host the 
2008 Olympics. Once again, the city showed that it never belongs to itself 
but to the whole state. On the domestic side, the national capital is 
expected to be a model for the whole nation in the long Chinese tradition. 
From a global perspective, Beijing is “the display window of contemporary 
Chinese material and cultural achievements, as well as the bridge for 
international political, economic, cultural and scientific exchanges” (Sit, 
1995, p. 321). 
With a mission too big to fail, Beijing’s preparation for the coming-out 
party penetrated each and every aspect of social life of almost all her 
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citizens. Renwen aoyun, or the people’s and cultural Olympics in English, 
was recognized by the authorities as the essence of 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
aiming at integrating Chinese culture into the participative spirit of the 
Olympics (Sun, 2001; Cheng, 2003; Xiao, 2006; Zheng, 2007; Xu, 2008).  
As a result, the city was instilled with a double 
consciousness—envisioning the image of a cosmopolis embodied in the 
Olympic spirit and exemplifying the country’s excellent values and social 
atmosphere, as well as “the leading ideology” (Sit, 1995, p. 199). Indeed, 
the city is partially defined as the conveyor of civilization and represents 
the highest achievements of humanity (Mayer, 1971). According to The 
Opinions on Implementation of The Program for Improving Civic Morality in 
2001, the primary goal of constructing civic morality in the capital, in 
order to host the Olympics, was to build Beijing into the top-ranking city of 
civilization and comity both of home and abroad. Thus, constructing 
“spiritual civilization” that included morality, ethics, and good manners, 
became one of the top-down tasks that Beijing citizens were assigned to 
accomplish.  
Indoctrinating the awareness of a better society seemed to be first and 
foremost. Propaganda banners such as “New Beijing, Great Olympics” (xin 
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Beijing, xin aoyun), “Welcome the Olympics, Improve Manners, and Foster 
New Attitudes” (ying aoyun, jiang wenming, shu xin feng), “Successfully 
Hold the Olympic Games, Build a Harmonious City” (juban chenggong 
aoyun, goujian hexie chengshi), and “Carry on the Olympic Spirit, Build A 
Better City”(chuancheng aoyu, cujin fazhan) permeated the city, seen on 
the iron fences of the street, on the sides of crossroads that faced the 
passing cars, and on bulletin boards of communities and neighborhoods. 
These propaganda banners contributed to city branding and served as a 
bonus for assessing the civilization of cities (Parkerson & Saunders, 2005; 
Cartier, 2014). 
Such propaganda was rapidly transformed into massive social actions. 
The Beijing Olympic Games Training Work Coordination Group was 
established in April 2005, with Olympic education training sessions being 
carried out at multiple levels. More than 4.3 million households in Beijing 
received Popularized Readings on Civility. Publicizing activities concerning 
civic education were held in over 5000 schools and rural cultural centers, 
with audiences amounting to five million. In about 200 elementary and 
middle schools, courses concerning the Olympic culture, Chinese civility, 
and Peking traditions were designed and taught. Some elementary schools 
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assigned homework on writing about how to welcome the Olympics with 
proper courtesy.  
Research showed that due to civic instruction held by schools, from 
2005 to 2008, elementary and middle school students made significant 
behavioral improvements as far as singing the national anthem, respecting 
teachers, actively greeting others, and throwing trash in the dustbin rather 
than littering the floor; frequencies of spitting on the ground, running the 
red lights, stepping on the grass, scribbling in public places, and other 
ill-mannered behaviors among students decreased dramatically; “attached 
with the Olympics, stay close civility” (qingxi aoyun, wenming liyi ban wo 
xing) was the guiding slogan that instructed students and teachers on how 
to behave (Guo, 2009). Elementary and middle schools also held activities 
such as picking up trash on the street, and tearing down advertisements 
that were plastered on the walls, in the hope that students could set an 
example for their parents and neighbors.  
Some participants in the current research recalled that these specific 
behaviors had a tremendous impact on them in their later life, when they 
could think of doing something to actually and symbolically “protect” and 
“preserve” Beijing. They in the past either joined these activities as 
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elementary students, or were informed by TV programs and bulletins that 
litters and scribbles as a matter of incivility must be eliminated. These 
past experiences contributed to the later involvement in the “Traditional 
Beijingers” group. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), invented 
traditions were always intensified and normalized values and behaviors 
that had a legacy in the historic past. 
In 2006, nine Beijing-based universities, together with eleven 
universities located in different regions in China, participated in the “2006 
National University Student Competition of Olympic Knowledge and 
Civility”. Developed from the “National University Student Competition of 
Diplomatic Etiquette” and continuously held for another two years, this 
competition focused on the spread of civility. All contestants were to 
impart behavioral manners to a certain target audience of people who by 
the choices of the contestants turned out to be students who listened to 
university broadcasts, staff and visitors of Beijing’s World Park, 
commuters, traffic police, crowds in the downtown area, and kindergarten 
kids. Contestants were also asked judgment questions. For instance, 
should two parties should keep each other at a distance of half a meter 
while talking? Should men initiate the action of hand-shaking? This 
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particular type of judgment question also appeared at a prize quiz on a TV 
program called To 2008 which was held by Beijing Television Station. The 
Capital University Student Internet Civilization Convention was launched 
on April 5th, 2007, encouraging university students who were internet 
users to avoid unlawful acts, maintain social order, spread advanced 
cultures and public virtues, and build a harmonious society online.  
Proposed by the secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party committee 
Liu Qi, Olympic spirits evolved into five specific themes, namely patriotism, 
sacrifice, professional ethics, creativity, and team-work. These themes 
were promoted first among the frontline of Olympic construction works 
and then expanded to grassroots level work places. Employees 
habitualized these virtues and turned against outsiders who lacked these 
particular traits at work. Interviewees complained that outsiders did not 
sacrifice themselves to their companies especially when outsiders were 
permitted to go back to their hometowns one or two days before the 
Chinese New Year holiday officially started, while it was the Beijingers that 
were required to work until the last minute. Interviewees blamed their 
workplaces that institutionally allowed outsiders to do so, but they were 
more inclined to express contempt for outsiders who were able to shirk 
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their duty “above board”. 
 
As formal institutions such as schools and work places that residents 
belonged to assured the inculcation of civility, good manners in public 
spaces became demonstrations of “civilization” as well as tools to maintain 
public order. Compared with parks, squares and other types of public 
space, public transportation was the worthiest of examination in terms of 
the significance of disciplined behaviors. Almost everyone in the city is 
involved in public transportation which underwent development in the 
most dramatic way.  
Amongst all public transportations, the Beijing subway seemed to be 
the foremost representative in this regard. The Beijing Urban 
Comprehensive Plan (2004-2020) proposed that the city was to spatially 
expand towards suburban areas. Besides, it was estimated in 2003 that 
the number of automobiles would surpass three million by May 2007 and 
over eight million people, together with 500 thousand foreigners, would 
attend the Games. With the emerging problems of traffic congestion and 
air pollution, advancing rail transit was the cure for all the troubles. From 
2002 to 2008, another six lines were built. By July 2008, there were 
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altogether eight lines under operation, with operation mileage reaching 
200 kilometers and stations amounting to 123. The basic formation of the 
subway network, supplemented with the reduced ticket prices (to only two 
yuan, equivalent to around thirty cents USD) beginning in 2007, paved the 
way for a gigantic passenger flow of subway commuting.  
Having foreseen the colossal utilization of subway transportation, the 
Subway Company as requested by the Capital Office of Spiritual 
Civilization Construction and Beijing Municipal Party Committee 
Propaganda Department, launched a series of campaigns as early as 2001, 
to arouse commuters’ awareness of civility. The slogan “civilized 
commuting starts from me” (wenming chengche, cong wo zuoqi) was put up 
in 2001, setting up the agenda for implementing specific objectives in the 
years to come. In 2002, the way in which people in developed countries 
took escalators was introduced to the Beijing subway. Yet, a spontaneous 
habitualization of the practice would be undesirably time consuming. 
Aiming at efficient cultivation, yellow lines were drawn in the middle of 
every escalator stair, in order to make an obvious division between the left 
walking section and the right standing section. Passengers saw all forms of 
instructions, such as broadcasting tutorials, putting up notice boards that 
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directed people, and recruiting volunteers to channel the passenger flow.  
This behavior made a huge impact on Beijingers at that time who later 
joined the “Traditional Beijingers” organization. A lot of time after 
volunteering in the subway, group members would find a restaurant on 
the surface and have a late lunch together. When they took the escalator 
upstairs to exit the subway station, the one leading the whole group stood 
automatically at the right side of the escalator. Then, everyone else formed 
a line and went on the escalator one by one, staying to the right side. No 
one taught another where to stand, as if they were material elements on 
the assembly line. Often times, their line was not compact enough to 
exclude other passengers who also took the escalator. Once, three 
passengers got themselves in the middle of their line and randomly stood 
at the left side of the escalator. Suddenly, one member behind these 
passengers turned his head backward and downward and said, “How 
come these people are so stupid that they can’t tell right from left?” Having 
heard that, other members started laughing. Some parroted this sentence 
to others and the laughter spread, until the three passengers left the 
escalator. I asked the one member closest to me who the three passengers 
were. “Outsiders, they must be,” answered the instant interviewee, 
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“Beijingers will never behave like that. We facilitate others. We know we 
should leave room for someone who might need to walk in a hurry. We 
don’t block others’ way.” 
In 2005, the Subway Company carried out another campaign that 
emphasized the chronological sequence of getting on and off the train. 
Those who wanted to get on the train should wait for all passengers who 
wished to alight from the train to get off before they themselves could 
board. Though having been an informal rule7 for decades, it wasn’t until 
2005 that this action was openly required. On the platform edges of Line 1 
and 2, yellow tapes in pairs vertical to the train were adhered to the floor 
every few meters, with arrows surrounding each pair. In the middle of the 
two lines was a big arrow parallel to the lines. On either outer side of the 
two lines was a smaller arrow pointing to the tip of the line. When the train 
arrived, passengers would first get off the train from the middle of the door 
and walk onto the area with the big arrow, while those who wanted to get 
on waited at the areas with the smaller areas. As soon as no more 
passengers got off, those who waited would get on the train from both sides 
                                                             
7 The rule was firstly written in the 25th Article of Method of Safety Operation Management 
of Urban Rail Transit in Beijing in 2004. This particular rule was later changed to Article 
34 in 2009. 
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of the doors.  
This order was established to save boarding time: since passengers 
had their routes respectively, they would be less likely to bump into one 
another or block others’ way. Similar facilities were also found at the 
platforms at Chicago O’Hare International Airport, particularly where 
people wait for shuttle buses. Authority with the Subway Company, as I 
interviewed, stated that the yellow directions in Line 1 and 2 came finally 
into existence due to the standardization of subway trains. Before 2005, 
trains were of various models, with different lengths of intervals between 
each door. Thus, it had been impossible to draw lines. Since 2005, all 
trains in Line 1 and Line 2 were of the same model. Furthermore, all 
platforms of other subway lines built after 2008 automatically installed the 
three arrows as signals telling passengers where to stand and to wait and 
where to stay clear of.  
The custom of security checks was also established in 2008 for safety 
during the Games and routinized into a compulsory procedure in the 
post-Olympic period. Any passenger carrying any bags would be required 
to put their bags onto the security machine. Some stations such as Xidan, 
Tian’anmen East and Tian’anmen West in the downtown area also 
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included a body search. In order to avoid liquid explosives and caustics, 
water which was found stored in water bottles had to be proven safe by its 
owner being made to take a sip of it. Toilet water, nail remover, and other 
liquid cosmetics were prohibited on the subway. According to the 32nd 
Article of The Method of Safety Operation Management of Urban Rail 
Transit in Beijing, which was hung on the pillars in many subway stations, 
passengers who refused to go through security checks and violated public 
order would be punished by the police according to related laws. In 2009, 
the 33rd article was added, regulating that security check personnel 
should respect passengers under security check and report to the police 
whenever forbidden items were found.  
Prejudice against outsiders broke out during security checks, yet this 
time from an unexpected direction. In December 2012, innocent women 
passengers were stabbed by a male randomly. In August 2013, a male 
passenger was stabbed by another male passenger whose girlfriend 
believed herself to be harassed, after the three had a fierce quarrel. As 
journalists reported that security check personnel would find themselves 
helpless if passengers hid knives in their pockets instead of in bags, 
members of the “Traditional Beijingers” group proclaimed in social media 
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that it was because most of the personnel were outsiders that caused these 
tragedies. Indeed, news revealed at the end of 2012 that the majority of the 
personnel did not have Beijing hukou, and an average age of 20 years old 
(Zhang & Liu, 2012). Some online advertisement that recruited people for 
this position did state clearly that only people without Beijing hukou would 
be accepted. A post hoc announcement in April 2015 by the Beijing 
Human Resources and Social Security Bureau pointed out that more than 
95% of the security check personnel were people without Beijing hukou 
(Liu, 2015). However, it was believed by the “Traditional Beijingers” that 
outsider security personnel lacked work ethics, paid no attention to their 
supposed duty, and had a terrible attitude, which altogether contributed 
to these accidents.  
They only cared about the form. One morning during rush hour, I 
went into the subway with a small shoulder bag. The staff stopped me 
and ordered me to put it into the machine. I did. But when I was 
about to pick up my bag on the other end of the machine, I saw the 
staff who should watch the monitor screen was playing with his 
cellphone. He didn’t even glimpse at the screen. How could I not 
swear at them? How could I not think it is their problem when these 
accidents occur? 
Some interviewees were treated differently going through the security 
check, which disgusted them.  
I walked into different stations with the same bag. Sometimes, I 
was asked to put the bag in the security machine; sometimes they 
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didn’t check it. Sometimes I couldn’t enter because I was carrying 
some small tools, while migrant workers were allowed to enter with 
their shovels. No wonder they failed to prevent these things from 
happening. 
These interviewees seemed to over-generalize the behavior of those 
irresponsible staff to how every non-Beijingese security staff would act. 
Another example of over-generalization was found when one interviewee 
said,  
The inspectors are irresponsible which is true. But they should 
know—I mean every passenger should know—it is the outsiders, not 
Beijingers, who constitute the vast majority of all commuters. The 
inspectors should then understand that by being reckless, they harm 
their own ‘fellow-villagers’, not us Beijingers. Shouldn’t they be 
responsible for themselves? Oh. And those violators who took 
forbidden items were often times their ‘fellow-villagers’ too. See, 
‘fellow-villagers’ help ‘fellow-villagers’ harm ‘fellow-villagers’. Isn’t it 
funny? 
Among all the online comments on this matter, one virtual dialogue caught 
my attention. 
Lhj: We should cooperate with the security check. But can the 
subway hire those early retired Beijingers? These people are prudent, 
and have a good attitude. Passengers would like to cooperate with 
them. Hiring them can also reduce the number of outsiders who come 
into Beijing for job opportunities. 
Shuang: These machines are radioactive. Do you want your 
parents to work with them? 
Lhj: I don’t like the way you think. My mother used to work in the 
radiology department in her hospital. 
Yika: Reply to Shuang: At least I won’t let my family members 
work there. 
This mindset corresponded with the literature on migrants and migrants’ 
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occupational status in their recipient societies. Migrants tended to lessen 
the unemployment rate instead of stealing jobs from the natives (Pope and 
Withers, 1993). Newly arrived migrants were more likely than native or 
local workers to take up low paid, entry-level, and labor-intensive jobs, or 
simply menial jobs (Piore, 1979; Briggs, 1993; Appelbaum, Bernhardt, & 
Murnane, 2003; Stacey, 2005; Bauder, 2008; Salverda, 2008; Boyd & Yiu, 
2009; Fisher & Kang, 2013). They were more tolerant and complained less 
about bad working conditions than native or local workers (Appelbaum, 
2010). In the Beijing Subway, working as a security checker was also 
regarded as menial because it was seen as a threat to employees’ health.  
Thus, Beijingers intentionally avoided taking the job themselves. 
Although the detriment to health was identical to every employee, or even 
to everyone who would need to walk past the security check machine, 
Beijingers did not believe that outsiders could also receive injury through 
this job. They obviously did not think outsiders should work as security 
check inspectors which was an unfavorable occupation, but neither did 
they argue that outsiders should be protected from the same harm that 
they themselves could also suffer. Their prejudice was conspicuously 
revealed by the assumed differentiations of rights that they thought locals 
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and outsiders were entitled to. 
Members of the “Traditional Beijingers” started to attack passengers 
with ill-mannered behaviors online. To them, ill-mannered behavior 
included taking off one’s shoes and putting one’s feet on the seat, lying on 
the train seats that could be shared by more than one person, helping 
one’s own child peeing in the carriage, and eating and drinking in the 
carriage. Whenever behaviors as such came, members would secretly take 
a photo of the exact person and post it on social media with such 
commentary as “look at these WDBs,” “go back to your hometown,” “the 
WDB’s are destroying our home,” “fXXk the WDB,” and so on. Other 
members would re-tweet these posts with similar comments of their own 
added. The faces in the photos were not blurred or processed, which the 
members did on purpose, so that everyone who saw the post would know 
who the person was.  
In addition to WDB, other slang was created and used extensively. 
Jianshe zhe, meaning constructor or erector, referred by the mainstream 
media to outsiders who worked in Beijing for a noble cause, namely to 
enhance the prosperity of the city. Cleverly enough, members in this group 
came up with homonyms but with different Chinese characters. The new 
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jian she zhe literally meant “a sprayer of filth”. It was originally used by 
long term Shanghaiese to address outsiders and was very soon picked up 
by members of the “Traditional Beijingers”. Whereas Dutton, Lo, and Wu 
(2008) depicted migrants in Beijing as “Bohemians” who had no place to 
take refuge in the chaotic world and “belong[ed] nowhere and [were] met 
with everywhere” (p. 179), migrants in the view of the long term residents 
were people who splashed their urine and excrement everywhere in the 
city, as they would do in their hometown.  
These sprayers want us to tolerate them! They do not know by 
shitting everywhere, they can be fined 500 US dollars if they do that 
in the United States; they can be flogged in Singapore! [the icon of an 
lighting candle] 
Lighting up a candle traditionally implied that people were expressing their 
condolence and praying for others. This icon was most often used online to 
comfort people who were suffering from natural disasters or unavoidable 
mishaps. Here, it is used ironically to lament the outsiders as if they were 
in countries such as the United States or Singapore. The author of the post 
did not expect that the outsiders would go to these countries, but he 
assumed that they should be punished as severely as something that 
deserved a mourning candle.  
The sprayers cannot survive in their hometown, so they leave 
their home and rob us of food. They maliciously make up the lie that 
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they are here to contribute to Beijing. What a fantastic story! You 
have your own territory right in front of you but you don’t construct. 
Instead, you enter someone else’s home to please and flatter others. 
And you want this and that from us? You want us to take care of you? 
Dare you question the stupid official of your hometown who makes 
you a homeless stray dog? Coward! 
Some interviewees made an analogy of these “sprayers” to historical 
traitors who helped the Japanese invaders to take over the Mainland. They 
claimed that the sprayers were even worse than the traitors. “On the one 
hand they say they contribute to and build the city; on the other hand they 
do whatever things that are evil when they come inside the city”, said an 
interviewee, “If the society becomes unstable, they will be the main force of 
looting and vandalism.” According to Allport’s circle of inclusion (1954), 
the circle of city has a smaller radius than the circle of nation in the 
concentric circles that describe the dilution of a person’s identity as the 
circle grows larger (p. 43). People, suggested by this model, are supposed 
to have a stronger municipal identity than a national identity. This 
interviewee here seemed to imply the other way around—it was the 
belonging to a city that should catch up with the belonging to a nation. 
Committing treason, in his worldview, was highly reprehensible, as he was 
brought up in the ideology that the country’s sovereignty and unity 
deserved the utmost protection and defense. Thus, when he compared 
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outsiders with traitors or invaders, he assumed that the importance of his 
local identity was amplified to or even beyond his national identity.  
In addition to comparing outsiders to Japanese invaders and traitors 
as a way to distance themselves from outsiders as much as possible, 
Beijingers borrowed jargon used in places other than Mainland China to 
provide a universalized justification for their local hostility. The most 
well-known word that was borrowed was “locust”, or huangchong, a kind of 
pest that Hong Kong locals used to refer to Chinese Mainlanders who 
“converge[d] in their millions on their territory to stock up on everything 
from jewellery to milk powder” (Tsang, 2015), or simply who took 
advantage of facilities, policies, and resources that were accessible to Hong 
Kong locals alone (Chow, 2012; Hayoun, 2014; Tiezzi, 2015). “Traditional 
Beijingers” started to quote the term on their social media posts 
individually and to verbally utter it during underground gatherings. Until 
November 2013, a mini blog was published by the official Weibo of the 
Beijing subway, together with a photo taken by an individual social media 
user that showed posters and trash scattered everywhere in the train: 
#Civility by your side# [Let’s talk about civil behavior in the 
subway.] After “locusts” pass, carriages in Line 10 became a mess… 
Beijing, the capital, is being praised for her tolerance, but too much 
tolerance will turn out to be a denouncement. For those who destroy 
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Beijing the capital viciously, “we do not welcome you” is the only thing 
we want to say. 
Thousands of social media users debated the controversy that was 
triggered by this post. Obviously on the one hand, this statement was 
inappropriate, aggressive, and humiliating, particularly in terms of its 
implication of local hostility, as claimed by some online users and 
university professors (Zhou, 2013). On the other hand, “Traditional 
Beijingers” demonstrated that they hardly felt that it was improper to 
address people with uncivilized behaviors in that way, which had nothing 
to do with their origin. Although this official blog was soon deleted, conflict 
over the legitimacy of the words continued. 
If malfeasants can be called moths metaphorically, why can’t 
locust represent people who damage the environment? Some people 
say “locust” is not an appropriate word. Fine. Then let’s use “animal” 
or “brute” instead.  
Of course, these words were not specifically applied to any region. However, 
calling someone an “animal” or “brute” was even more offensive compared 
to “locust”. This comment was proposed by Xiao, a graphic designer in his 
early thirties. He was also the second boss and the manager of a Western 
pizza restaurant which was run by his father. Owing to both occupations, 
Xiao had more exposure to Western advertisements and posters than 
other Beijingers. To insist on the suitability of “locust”, he found electronic 
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versions of posters in the Paris Subway that drew misbehaving passengers 
with animal heads. For instance, a woman who talked all the time had a 
hen head; a man who pushed others to get into the train in a hurry had an 
ox head. He re-tweeted these pictures. Xiao argued that locust did not 
contribute to the stigmatization of Mainlanders, since similar situations 
also happened in other cultures and other societies, where Donald Trump, 
the most notorious candidate for US president in the 2016 presidential 
election, called Mexicans criminals, drug dealers, and rapists (Lee, 2015). 
Just as Xiao, “Traditional Beijingers” associated themselves with Hong 
Kong locals or other places’ long term residents who acquired a higher 
level of civility. Firstly, by resorting to the similar experiences of others, 
they conveyed the idea that it was not a peculiarity for Beijing to feel 
hostility against outsiders. In places elsewhere, local hostility also broke 
out against outsiders who often behaved badly. Common occurrence as it 
was, local hostility in Beijing should be understandable and reasonable, 
which was believed by the “Traditional Beijingers”, especially when fault 
lay in those outsiders who disobeyed norms of practices “in the first place”. 
Secondly, borrowing similar experiences from Hong Kong, for instance, did 
somehow estrange the “Traditional Beijingers” from other Mainlanders, 
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both of which belonged to the same group of people, namely the species of 
locust, in the eyes of the Hong Kong folks. Invented traditions could be 
employed as a type of social control and a practice of exclusiveness to 
create and spread prejudice against another group that was new to these 
traditions (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). At this point, the nationalist 
collective solidarity intentionally rendered by the Olympics (Economy and 
Segal, 2008; Brady, 2009; Brownell, 2009; Law, 2010; Nyíri, Zhang, 
&Varrall, 2010; Chong, 2013) turned out to be Beijingers’ alienation from 
the vast majority of the Mainland. By calling outsiders locusts, however, 
Beijingers developed the sensation that they were no longer locusts and 
were at the same “civilized” level with the Hong Kong locals. As a matter of 
fact, this illusion was neither proven by Hong Kong locals, nor outsiders 
coming into Beijing. With all the traditions and habits learned, Beijingers 
were presumably able to raise their group position in the global order.  
 
There were no restrictions on eating and drinking in the carriages 
before September 2009. In the late September 2009, subway Line 4 was 
put into operation. As a joint venture between corporations in Beijing and 
Hong Kong Railway Corporation Limited, it emulated the subway systems 
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in Hong Kong in terms of hardware facility, construction design, and 
service. The line also incorporated customs that had been normalized in 
Hong Kong, which included the restriction of eating and drinking. Above 
each door of the carriage, an icon with a red prohibition sign crossing out a 
fast food bottle and a hamburger and with words of qingwu yinshi and its 
English version “no eating & drinking” was pasted along with the sign of no 
smoking, and the route map of Line 4. Yang Cen, the spokesperson of Line 
4 said in an interview in November 2009 that this regulation was intended 
to avoid the diffusing of strong food odors and to prevent spilling when 
people were drinking water during train shaking (Liu, 2009). However, she 
did not acknowledge this regulation as a compulsory rule, but rather 
simply a suggestion.  
Attempts were made to punish passengers who ate or drank on the 
trains. From February to March 2014, a draft of The Regulations of Beijing 
Municipality on Operational Safety of Rail Transportation was proposed and 
published on www.beijing.gov.cn, Beijing’s municipal government website 
portal, in order to collect comments and suggestions for its finalized 
version. The preliminary draft propounded that repeated behaviors of 
eating or drinking in the carriage, pathways, escalators, and stairways in 
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the subway system, after being dissuaded by the subway staff, would 
result in a disciplinary warning or a fine ranging from 50 to 500 yuan. This 
potential clause, however, was left out in the later version which was to be 
viewed by the standing committee of the municipal people’s congress in 
May. While the measure was not ratified, the discipline remained as moral 
and ethical guidance for commuters. 
Yet, the good intention of advocacy was codified by the Beijingers into 
a rigid requirement that should be followed by everyone. Otherwise, 
Beijingers would call whoever committed the moral crimes WDB. It was 
more likely to see passengers took food that they bought from the street 
vendors with them on the subway during morning rush hours. Some of 
them ate the food on the subway while others held the food in their hands 
all the way. Beijingers complained that neither behaviors were 
permissible.  
Getting up ten minutes earlier and preparing some simple 
breakfast aren’t hard to do. You can buy milk and bread the night 
before. You don’t even have to cook. It is disgusting to see some of the 
WDBs eating in the train with a bowl in their hands. Some of them 
drink porridge. This is too much. This is overdoing it. They must do it 
deliberately, on purpose. They think it is convenient and time-saving 
to buy food before getting the train and eat it along the way. This is 
the typical WDB way of life. They only do things that are comfortable 
for themselves. They never think of other passengers who are sharing 
the same space.  
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As my participant observation included picking up illegal posters with 
other members of the “Traditional Beijingers” on the train, I overheard a 
conversation between two male senior members during a break in the 
group work. 
-Where do you want to eat after we finish? I’m already hungry.  
-I don’t know. Let’s see where others decide to go. Didn’t you have 
your breakfast? 
-No. Did you? 
-I had half. I bought a pancake. I thought I had the time to eat it 
at the vendor. But I didn’t finish it because I was afraid of being late. 
The remaining half is in my backpack. I’ll eat that up when we finish 
the work.  
- (Grinning). Your backpack will be full of its smell. 
-I know. But that’s overall better than finishing it in the train. I’m 
not WDB. 
And then they laughed.  
Both of them were senior members in the group. Indeed, it was for the 
purpose of distinguishing them from the disgusting outsiders as clearly as 
possible that the practice of “no eating or drinking”, as well as any other 
habits, was strictly followed. Yet, their position within the organization 
accounted for this level of strictness. Due to their membership seniority, 
age, and sturdy physical appearance, they were appointed by the 
organization founders to take turns to walk in front of every other member. 
Feeling protected and led by them, other members could then follow them 
and collect posters scattered on the floor. Once being the guide and being 
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recognized as persons of significance in the group, the two “brothers” 
quickly internalized their expected role as the constant example for the 
whole organization and conformed to this “reputed” role (Moreno, 1953; 
Park, 1955).  
Population fluctuations, either increasing or decreasing manner in 
size, leads to structural changes in interpersonal relations and to a 
corresponding alteration of the organizational system (Elias, Dunning, 
Goudsblom, & Mennell, 2000). The emergence of rigid social control such 
as police ordinances derived from massive rural-urban migrations which 
made the existing social order difficult to sustain (Oestreich, 1982; van 
Krieken, 2014). Likewise, setting up rules and regulations for passengers 
to follow became especially necessary in the over-crowded subway in 
Beijing since a slight misbehavior could cause great discomfort to a large 
number of other passengers and hence was more detrimental than when 
passengers were far fewer in the past. Although the establishment of some 
rules had a rational basis, the majority of the customs were solidified and 
strengthened through self-discipline whose primary intention was to not 
embarrass others during human interaction (Elias, Dunning, Goudsblom, 
& Mennell, 2000). “Traditional Beijingers” expected their “home”, or the 
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subway in this context, to be a place where no disorder occurred. As a 
result, from their viewpoint, disobeying any desirable practices, even the 
suggested ones, let alone the compulsory ones, should be severely 
condemned by attributing it to the bad actions of outsiders. 
 
The existence and normalization of certain practices were 
accompanied by the popularization of technological advancement which 
was a dimension of modernization. Behavioral patterns were often 
affiliated with the implementation of the updated technologies. Starting 
from June 2001, a smart card system was applied with the reading 
machine installed in 422 Beijing buses on more than 20 routes. 
Commuters would charge the card beforehand and swipe the card 
whenever they got on and/or off the bus, according to the charges of 
different buses, so that the machine would subtract money from the card. 
The prevalence of card use would surely reduce if not totally ban buying 
tickets from the conductor, which could be bothersome during rush hour 
commuting, or unfortunately when both the passenger and the conductor 
lacked enough change. Using the smart cards, or IC card, was meant to 
enhance bus operation efficiency, to reduce traffic pressure, and to 
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improve the city’s image (Gao, 2007).  
However by the end of 2005, only 210,000 IC cards were used, making 
the expected issuance of eight million by 2008 a mirage. To accomplish the 
task, IC cards replaced monthly passes and became available on all buses 
and in subway stations on May 10th, 2006. As more than eighteen 
thousand buses altogether were faced with a daily flow of about some 
eleven million passengers by then, the bus company learned from the 
experience of developed countries and immediately required passengers to 
get on the bus from the front door and get off from the rear door. 
Particularly since January 2007 when commuters were only charged fort 
percent of the original ticket price by using IC cards, the potential of an 
increasing number of commuters warranted the requirement of an 
organized and efficient way of commuting. By carrying out this practice, 
the authority envisioned less time spent picking up and dropping off 
passengers. For buses with three doors, passengers should board from the 
door in the middle and leave from either the front or the rear door.  
As queues formed in the station before the buses arrived, paired white 
lines with bus route numbers in between were drawn on the ground of 
each station. This information told commuters that they should find the 
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painted number of the bus they wanted to get on and stand between the 
two lines that framed the number and behind anyone who was already 
there. With pair of lines reaching the edge of the station at one end, buses 
of the exact route number stopped and opened their front doors that were 
positioned exactly at spaces between the paired lines. Then, people in the 
queue could get on the bus one by one. To prevent outliners from getting 
on the bus which might prolong the time of boarding, metal fences were 
erected between neighboring paired lines along the edge of the station. 
According to a clarification from the IC card company, the front door 
rule was not invented to facilitate the usage of IC card (Bmac, 2013). On 
the contrary, passengers were able to swipe their card at either/any 
machine on the bus without obeying the boarding practice. The purpose of 
setting up the rule simultaneously with the operation of the IC card system 
was to cultivate an orderly commuting habit. In this explanation, 
technology did not need the assistance of new forms of regulated behavior. 
Rather, technology allowed for the possibility of an orderly way of traveling 
practices. This corresponds with Elias’s argument that the progress of 
technology requires participants to keep up with it and to develop a high 
discipline and standard of self-regulation (Elias, Goudsblom, & Mennell, 
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1998, p. 213). 
Other measures were taken to enforce these rules. On May 10th, 2006, 
four thousand “Civilization Supervisors” were hired by the bus company to 
work at certain crowded bus stations every day from 6:45 to 9:45 and from 
16:30 to 19:30, organizing people into queues, instructing passengers to 
get on buses in queues, and answering question on the IC card. Apart from 
the four thousand, the Capital Office of Spiritual Civilization Construction 
recruited another 3300 volunteers to assist the supervisors in maintaining 
order at the station. Most of the supervisors and volunteers were local 
Beijingers aging from 45 to 58, wearing yellow or blue uniforms and 
armbands when on duty. They were equipped with small red flags and 
sometimes portable microphones, with which they could make their words 
heard and their instructions effective. The presence of the two offices 
which have lasted even until today through constant hiring and recruiting 
consolidated the “Traditional Beijingers’” image of themselves as civilized 
people who gave behavioral guidance to outsiders in a routinized manner.  
Some interviewees compared these elderly supervisors and volunteers 
with the security personnel most of whom were young adults in the 
subway mentioned above. In their opinion, these supervisors and 
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volunteers worked in a harsher environment which was outside in the 
open air without air conditioning, but were more devoted to their work. As 
I asked why they thought there would be this gap, they said, “because 
these uncles and aunties are our Beijing locals.” By acknowledging the 
supervisors and volunteers as Beijing locals, interviewees did not suggest 
that the elder generation had as strong sense of love and dedication to 
make Beijing a better place as they themselves did, although they firmly 
believed that those outsider security personnel absolutely did not love the 
city at all. Instead, they thought that the reason why these uncles and 
aunties could have such natural work ethics was because it was a 
character inherited by Beijingers in their upbringing and culture. They 
admitted that Beijingers were generally hospitable and considerate which 
enabled them to help and communicate with passengers easily.  
Since February 11th, 2007, the eleventh day of each month became the 
“Line Up Day” in the city. This day was set on the eleventh because the 
two-digit number “11” morphologically symbolized people standing in 
order. Commuters “celebrated” it once a month by conscientiously getting 
on buses in queues. Preliminarily aiming at an organized environment for 
the Olympics, the tradition of the “Line Up Day” has been preserved even 
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until today in the post-Olympic era. 
More than eight years of education and adaptation from 2006 to 2014 
saw a dramatic development of bus boarding behaviors among Beijingers. 
Members of the “Traditional Beijingers” during the interviews asserted that 
they were able to act perfectly according to what had been promoted. Fan, 
a 24-year-old woman who started working last year said that whenever she 
did not know where to stand, she would automatically seek for the 
supervisors or volunteers and ask them for direction. Members made a 
judgment that those who jumped queues must be outsiders, or WDBs to 
be specific, just like those who stood and waited at the wrong section in the 
subway platform.  
However, interviewees seemed to forget that before May 10th, 2006, 
Beijingers did get on and off from the door that was the closest. They 
denied that they behaved in a disorganized manner before 2006. Neither 
did they agree with the fact reported in a newspaper that Beijingers back 
then felt disturbed by and were dissatisfied with the fussy new rule (Zhang, 
2006). Likewise, when asked about how they picked up the specific ways of 
taking escalators and avoiding eating and drinking in the interviews, 
members in the organization seemed to deny that these practices were 
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cultivated by the subway environment. Instead, a lot of them insisted that 
they were granted with the ability to keep order for their collective. 
We line up in bus station in the very beginning. This is not 
something taught by the government. We don’t want the authorities 
to teach us. If they want to, we will be reluctant to obey. It is not what 
they let us do; it is what we always know we should do. We always 
know that we should stay in line in order to get things. We always 
know we should keep in order… If I must tell you who taught me 
behaving, they may be my parents, and grandparents. I think I’m 
influenced by them more. 
As Cui, a 26-year-old young male member in the group responded as such, 
his girlfriend Xing, another group member who met him after they both 
joined the group and participated in months of activities, agreed strongly 
and immediately with this response when I group-interviewed them. They 
opined that it wasn’t the rules which were established for the Olympics 
and the future Beijing that perfected their manners and comity; they 
claimed that the awareness of civility was already installed in their minds 
in the first place long before any of the advocated practices were 
introduced. In other words, instead of owing all the instructions to 
undertaking of the modernizing society, this couple, as well as many other 
interviewees, believed that efforts were built upon their Beijingese culture 
and in a micro sense their family upbringing. This seemed to be “pathetic”, 
as Yue (2007) wrote, “‘incompletely educated’, we are often too ignorantly 
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boastful to realize that each of the so-called acquired ‘knowledge’ is merely 
well-designed trap and bait” (p. 302).  
 
Since prejudice against outsiders was partially reflected in terms of 
manners and behavioral patterns, this section discusses how the 
consequences of Beijing hosting the 2008 Olympics strayed from its 
original intentions. First, the collective and harmonious image of the 
nation state turned out in Beijing to be local hostility against newcomers 
in the next few years. To welcome the world with a civilized appearance, 
propaganda and behavioral patterns in public spaces were established 
which empowered the local Beijingers, who had acquired the awareness 
and behavioral habits in advance, to express prejudice against newcomers 
after 2008 who hadn’t yet been exposed to these changes. Local hostility 
was raised to a national level, as Beijingers were so eager to differentiate 
themselves from the outsiders. Moreover, this local hostility also implied 
the spread of national consciousness. Long term Beijingers found dignity 
in their home city Beijing—a successful modernization product of China. 
Yet the growing dignity and pride was strongly contradicted by the 
migrants’ ill-mannered behaviors which embarrassed and ashamed long 
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term Beijingers in return (Greenfeld, 1992). Secondly, empirical processes 
of obtaining behavioral knowledge seemed to be negated by the actors 
themselves, as they credited their standard practices to their cultural 
background and heritage. 
But why and how would Beijingers value influences from their family 
or community over that from the larger social environment? The following 
section continues to explore this paradox in an analytical manner.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: A NOSTALGIC FEELING FOR THE FORMER PEKING 
It was in the late afternoon of Friday, May, 3rd, 2013, when two of the 
organizers, three active members, and I spontaneously agreed to have a 
casual dinner at a time-honored local restaurant famous for its Beijing folk 
cuisine. It was only then realized something was about to happen. The 
restaurant was on the Outer Street of Deshengmen, the Archery Tower 
which was one of the remaining three gate towers that, unlike the other 
thirteen sets of gates and the surrounding walls, still stood. Most of the 
time, just like this one, they would pick traditional Beijing restaurants, 
especially those that were small, down-to-earth, and very local. After 
phoning them several times to make sure about directions, I arrived at the 
restaurant ten minutes early.  
The manager in his late twenties greeted me in a strong Beijing accent. 
I told him that I was waiting for some of my friends. He asked me if I was 
waiting for Huizi, who was one of the organizers and also a well-known 
social media blogger, as Huizi told him earlier that day that he would come 
to his restaurant with some friends. I said yes. He told me that Huizi was a 
frequent customer and they knew each other well. He invited me to sit 
anywhere I felt comfortable, brought me a cup of tea, and asked if we could 
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mutually friend each other online. Soon, others arrived. With everyone 
seated, the two male organizers took the initiative by ordering boiled pig 
giblets, fried bread made of mung bean flour, and Arctic Ocean Mandarin 
Orange Soda whose large sizes could generally meet everyone’s need.  
Ordering these dishes and the drink was nothing unexpected, since 
the former two dishes were food that had been consumed by common 
Beijingers for over a hundred years, while the mandarin flavored soda, 
though a modern invention, was the most popular drink in Beijing 
throughout the 1980s. Until 1996 it was the “dream beverage” of every 
Beijinger whoever at that time was re-living his childhood, teenage, or 
young adulthood (Zhang, 2012). In November 2011, this glass bottled soda, 
with the familiar big polar bear logo reappeared in small shops and local 
restaurants, after fifteen years of absence. Cheaper, healthier, and more 
emotionally satisfying, the product has won more favor than Coca-cola or 
Pepsi among long term Beijingers (Yang, 2014).  
As we began eating, Wei, one of the organizers asked, “How do you like 
it this time? Do you think the thickness of the line is better? ,” handing his 
phone to Huizi, the other organizer there. Huizi’s eyes lingered on the 
screen for about ten seconds as he took the phone, and he replied, “Yeah, 
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I like it this time.” Passing the phone to the rest of us, he said, “Guys, help 
us by having a look at it. We are designing wristbands for the organization. 
This is one of the samples. Let us know if you like it or not.” There were two 
sketches, one in sapphire blue and the other in bumblebee yellow. 
Although the main colors were different in the sketches, the overall style 
remained the same in each design. Patterns of the “propitious cloud”, as a 
traditional Chinese design, were depicted on either side of the band. Words 
such as “old time Beijingers” were written in the middle of the wristband. 
The rest of us all liked the design, except for the probability that it might be 
a little too broad on our wrist.  
The wristbands themselves never went public, but the designing 
career persisted and so did their nostalgic style. Still in the same month, 
May, an old friend of the organizers and graphic designer at a private 
company, Jiayidie, became the “official” designer of the organization. In 
June, two of Jiayidie’s classical T-shirts were worn by the organizers and 
other members on public occasions and sold generally through 
www.makexw.com, a website created by the “Traditional Beijingers” 
organizers in order to sell their designed products. “Makexw” would make 
sense in Chinese, being understood as “made in Xuanwu” which was one 
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of the four central and oldest districts in Beijing, originally known as “the 
Western Chinese City” in foreigner-authored books and tourist guides 
(Odile & Fodor, 1972; Aldrich, 2006; Arlington & Lewisohn, 2015). The 
district was also home to Jiayidie himself whose ethnic Hui family have 
lived in the traditional Muslim enclave Oxen Street community for 
generations.  
Back on June 28th, 2010, the State Council approved The Instruction 
on the Adjustment of Administrative Divisions of the Capital Function Core 
Area upon the request by the Beijing municipal government. This merged 
the neighboring Xuanwu District and Xicheng District into a “New Xicheng 
District”. Also combined were Chongwen District which was geographically 
symmetrical to Xuanwu District on the east and its northern neighbor 
Dongcheng District, and hence established a “New Dongcheng District”. 
The integration was intended to reduce the administrative costs of the 
municipality and to concentrate resources in expectation of a balanced 
economic level between the north (where Xicheng and Dongcheng Districts 
lay) and the south (which included the Chongwen and Xuanwu Districts) 
and an overall preservation of cultural and historical relics (Sun, 2010). 
Although the adjustment did not affect administrative services that 
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residents were entitled to as claimed by the government of Xicheng District 
(Jiang, 2010), the nominal extinction of the fifty-eight-year-old Chongwen 
and Xuanwu Districts ignited anger and a feeling of loss among their long 
term residents. Locals were worried that the administrative regional 
integration would render Xuanwu no longer independent from urban 
planning schemes that regarded Beijing as a whole. Being reconstructed 
into a municipally integrative urban unit with spatial specialization in 
different functions, the city abandoned its original forms of communities 
and neighborhoods that could provide goods and services on their own 
(Gaubatz, 1995). In the rap song Xuanwu yongcun or The Everlasting 
Xuanwu, which became popular a month later in August, the local band 
mourned Xuanwu’s demise, stressing that Xicheng District represented 
the capital of a state with national ambitions, while Xuanwu was the heart 
and soul of the common people of Beijing.  
Inspired by the song and his childhood memories, Jiayidie designed 
his first two white T-shirts with the words yongcun Xuanwu and yongcun 
Chongwen translated respectively as the everlasting Xuanwu and the 
everlasting Chongwen, on the back of either T-shirt, and surrounded by 
the traditional propitious clouds. The T-shirt was officially launched by the 
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organization in June 2013 through both the website and their Weibo 
account. Xuanwu and Chongwen were in the middle and in a larger word 
size than yongcun on the left. Clouds were red for the Xuanwu T-shirt and 
yellow for Chongwen. The word tuzhu, equivalent to native or aboriginal 
was printed on the right side of Xuanwu and Chongwen. Under tuzhu were 
a series of numbers 110103, which were the first six digits of Chongwen 
hukou residents’ ID number, and 110104, the counterpart of Xuanwu 
residents. On top of the design was the logo “made in Xuanwu”, as if that 
was the brand. In the front was the word “Beijing” in red and the number 
110 that identified any Beijinger.  
 
A sample T-shirt displaying “the Everlasting Chongwen” 
Revised and later versions of T-shirts, cellphone screen pictures, and 
stickers with a focus on Beijing characteristics were issued now and then. 
At first, only the keenest members bought the T-shirts and wore them 
84 
 
 
casually during the summer time in 2013. Occasionally, ordinary 
members would agree on wearing those T-shirts together for a dinner 
gathering or a soccer game. There were times when they were caught on 
the street or in restaurants and were asked where their T-shirts were 
bought. In response, they said, “Search for ‘made in Xuanwu’ online and 
you will find the purchasing website.” Gradually, the popularity kept 
increasing as non-members would also purchase products from the 
website. Some members bought T-shirts and other accessories for their 
parents who were in their fifties or sixties and were more than happy to put 
them on. Female social media users also wore those T-shirts not caring 
about the fact that their outfits were originally designed for men alone.  
The website encouraged buyers to take a photo of themselves wearing 
the purchased products, and to post the photo on Weibo together with 
their order number. Buyers were told that by doing this, they would have 
the possibility of winning a small present from the website. Many of them 
followed the suggestion. Ninety-two posts of this kind were retweeted by 
the official Weibo within two months from June to the end of July 2013. 
One post that included a picture of nineteen people wearing these T-shirts 
and holding the scarves has been retweeted for sixty-two times.  
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Although organizers were confronted with constant suspicion and 
criticism because of the potential of hype and commercialism from some 
other long term Beijingers, most of the buyers rigorously expressed their 
excitement and gratitude on their Weibo when first receiving the T-shirts 
and tried them on without conveying any critical thoughts. They claimed 
that their T-shirts “uplifted their spirits” and made them proud. They 
would cherish the outfit forever. More frequently remarks, such as “my big 
Xuanwu will last forever”, explicitly connected the reason for buying the 
T-shirt with solidary with their local identity. Not only the printed contents 
on the products were symbols of local identity, the efforts that the 
organizers displayed were also recognized as the spirit of Beijing, since it 
was not hard to come to the conclusion that the founders were Beijingers. 
One person wrote on Weibo: 
Order Number 2013062695022. Both the quality and the design 
are appreciated. No one elsewhere does business as honestly and 
considerately as us Beijingers. @MadeinXuanwu @#MadeinXuanwu 
photo for prize draw# 
There were a certain number of consumers who were Beijingers living 
outside Beijing, including London, Washington D.C., and San Francisco. 
They expressed how much they missed their hometown and were eager to 
distinguish themselves from other Chinese in their country of residence. 
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More importantly, they were inclined to display the old Beijing with plenty 
of traditional characteristics, rather than the most recent modernized 
Beijing, to the world.  
 
“Traditional Beijingers” gathered at a soccer game with the T-shirt they 
bought from Teng and Jiayidie. (Source: Yang Yang) 
Beijing being the most frequently used word, Jiayidie preferred the 
term Peking as well, especially associating it with the Forbidden City and 
stone gate piers in front of siheyuan, the traditional Chinese courtyard. 
The Peking romanization would evoke the most idiomatic nostalgia among 
“Traditional Beijingers”. While the use of “Beijing” enjoys wide recognition 
in nearly all aspects of the social world today, appellations such as “Peking 
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Duck”, “Peking Opera”, and “Peking University” are still used and imply 
originality and history. Peking first appeared in the eighteenth century, 
and was used for postal purposes by Westerners in 1906 and remained as 
the usual English name of the city even though the city’s Chinese name 
was switched back and forth between Beijing and Beiping. In 1958, the 
People’s Republic began to adopt Beijing as the official translation at home 
and, in 1979, Peking was substituted for Beijing abroad. Interestingly, 
these two time-points coincided with two major political and social events 
in Chinese history that Beijing was coercively involved in. 
 
In January 1958, Chairman Mao declared during the Fourteenth 
Supreme State Affairs meeting that all the old houses in Beijing and 
another ancient city should better be replaced by new ones. In March, he 
made another remark that Beijing should learn from Tianjin and Shanghai 
about pulling down old city walls, since he firmly believed that the old city 
walls were built by emperors to protect them from peasant rebellions and 
no longer would have any use. With Beijing playing as “a kind of Vatican 
City for the Maoist dogma” (Cail & Fodor, 1972, p. ix), The Explanations on 
the Master Plan of Beijing’s Urban Construction, launched in August 1958, 
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also revealed that in order to forsake the low productivity it had in the 
feudal period and to accomplish the socialist vision, the old city should be 
regenerated into an industrialized, garden-like, and modern capital of a 
socialist society (Wang, 2011, p. 320).  
The Explanations were in line with the Great Leap Forward which was 
proclaimed earlier in May that year. According to The Explanations, all the 
city walls and outer walls must be torn down and upon the foundation of 
the city walls and the moat, the second ring road was to be built (ibid). 
Cultural and architectural relics, including more than 500 tons of 5381 
pieces of metal works, were dismantled and re-cycled for industrial 
development and construction. By the end of the Great Leap Forward 
Movement in 1960, outer city walls amounting to 39.75 km in total length, 
averaging 10 m in thickness had been demolished and only half of the 
inner city walls remained standing (Wang, 2011, p. 352). 
Together with the preparation for potential international wars that 
demanded the broadening of the previously 15-meter-wide Chang’an 
Avenue into a possible airport of 120 meters’ width, hutongs, enclosed 
courtyards, historical streets and zones were designated for demolition. In 
late 1958, Vice Mayor Feng Jiping approved the demolition and removal of 
89 
 
 
10,129 houses in one month alone to ensure that the Tian’anmen Square 
expansion project would start on time (Wang, 2011, p. 382).  
Described in Wang Jun’s book Beijing Record: A Physical and Political 
History of Planning Modern Beijing, properly resettling those displaced 
people in a timely fashion was hard to achieve under the economic 
conditions of the time, and thus a considerable number of displaced 
residents were forced to move into make-shift bungalows, mostly around 
Chongwen and Xuanwu District, and were only able to acquire permanent 
housing in the middle and the late 1980s (ibid). Courtyards that catered to 
these people soon became over-crowded with many families. Before being 
translated into Japanese and English, Wang Jun’s book was first written 
in Chinese under the title Cheng Ji. However, the original title of the 
Chinese version wasn’t the current Ji that means “record” but another Ji 
that meant “condolences”. By 1965, all inner city walls were destroyed. 
And by 1969, most of the gate towers and arrow towers were dismantled to 
make way for the construction of subway transportation.  
Many interviewees expressed sadness for the vanishing old city. They 
mostly recalled the rejection of an urban planning proposal in 1950 by two 
famous Chinese architects, Liang Sicheng and Chen Zhanxiang, who 
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wanted to leave the old city unchanged and to set up the new government 
in the western suburbs. “Had the proposal been implemented in the first 
place, there would have hardly been any concern about the subsequent 
destruction,” as most interviewees explained. Yet, interviewees deviated 
from the architects in terms of the motivation for preservation. In the 
proposal, the old Peking City was preserved as an antique, or a museum of 
an ancient Oriental capital. Liang even regarded the city walls as national 
treasures. While both the proposal and the de facto regeneration targeted 
Beijing as a city belonging to the country, members of the “Traditional 
Beijingers” held that preservation must be carried out because the oldness 
the antiquity of the city was a symbol of its heritage. Members did not 
consider the city as a capital now, nor ever in the past. Instead, they 
thought walls, hutongs, and other architecture were Beijing specific—not 
on a national basis but in a way that belonged solely to themselves. Chao 
argued that all the city walls and gate towers were the legacy of his past 
ancestors. The city walls should have been inherited by all Beijingers but 
somehow were gone forever. 
The city survived during war times but didn’t make it through the 
peace. Even the Japanese invaders and the Kuomintang reactionaries 
were consciously protecting it; it was then deliberately ruined by the 
presupposed savior. What an irony! Why did it have to be pulled down 
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only for the sake of being a capital? Do you know why those 
high-ranking officials were so eager to raze everything? Because none 
of them were Beijingers! So they don’t think from our side. They were 
all waidi bi. They destroyed what should belong to us! They didn’t 
care. 
In his early thirties, Chao was a descendent of Qing’s bannermen living in 
the northeastern part of Beijing inside the Third Ring Road with his single 
mother. They lived on the rent of one of their houses, his mother’s pension, 
and some random part-time job payments. Chao valued his ancestry 
deeply, as he talked to me with pride that his grandparents used to 
possess a handsome treasure that was handed down onto his parents, 
although he never dared to dream of himself being a prince which could 
have been the case under the Manchus’ reign. Of course, Chao’s stance, as 
it was with others of today’s Manchus, did not step beyond reminiscence 
and the fury it irrationally engendered. Oldness implied “an asset, as a 
matter of pride and satisfaction can be observed in many different social 
settings” (Elias & Scotson, 1965, p. 149).  
Indeed, the distinctiveness of the old Peking derived from it being an 
imperial capital whose “consolidated history helped create (and 
substantiate) a local identity that would be compatible with a place in the 
new nation” (Naquin, 2000, p. 691). As argued by Li, Dray-Novey, and 
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Kong (2007), localism in Beijing originated in the Qing Dynasty as the 
organization of the banner system allowed bannermen in Beijing to stay 
within a certain region to which they later became attached. Local identity 
among Manchu bannermen was also strengthened as they were hired as 
police or military guards taking charge of issues inside of the city during 
the Republic of China. Beijing’s “independent urban identity” was further 
rooted in the institutional establishment of a separate administrative 
entity from the central government, such as the Municipal Office, the 
Police Board, and the Peace Preservation Brigade (ibid, p. 4).  
It was not only Manchu bannermen that were identified as true 
Beijingers, as those whose previous generations managed to stay in Beijing 
since the 1950s would also claim affiliation with the city by calling 
themselves Beijingers. Li, Dray-Novey, and Kong (2007) believed that 
residents who were mostly cadres and intellectuals living in dayuan 
housing, or in large newly built residential and office complexes, felt 
themselves superior to those local commoners living in hutongs. Might 
this be the case for the first and second generation of new Beijingers living 
in community clusters with considerable resources? My engagement with 
interviewees who were later generation dayuan residents somehow 
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demonstrated the opposite. Members in their young adulthood, whose 
parents were raised in the privileged communities, were not preoccupied 
with pride and superiority in terms of their social status in comparison to 
those who were common residents. Instead, some of them acknowledged 
that the originality and distinctiveness of the city lay in the pre-modern old 
Peking and even expressed their admiration for descendents of the 
common Beijingers who consisted of the offspring of the ethnic Manchu 
imperial families. Xing, a 23-year-old woman who just graduated last year 
and started working in a private company said to me, 
If you want to know what represents Beijing most, I would 
definitely think of the old things in the city, like the old city walls, the 
hutongs, and the courtyards. My parents did not grow up in this kind 
of environment but in residential complexes provided for people in the 
military. I did not think being a Beijinger was important until I joined 
an exchange program in my junior year in South Korea where most of 
the Chinese international students were from elsewhere other than 
Beijing. Understanding the importance of where I come from, I then 
started to come to the realization that the environment that brought 
me up did not truly represent Beijing. Then I started to buy and read 
books on the history, traditions, and architecture of the old Peking. 
Now I feel I am more like a true Beijinger because I have more 
knowledge of the place I call home and my lifestyle and the way that I 
handle interpersonal relationships are more or less influenced by the 
traditional Beijing style.  
Xing also told me that the reason she liked Cui and decided to be his 
girlfriend was because he had a typical Pekingese lifestyle and was 
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passionate about the city as well. Sharing experiences with Xing and Cui 
were Xiao Zhou and Yun Er who were both college undergraduates in their 
earlier twenties. Xiao Zhou and Yun Er were attracted to each other by 
their similar sets of values and ways of life, such as being loyal to friends 
and being confident both qualities highly respected in the Pekingese 
culture.  
Apart from the descendent of the privileged Beijingers, common 
Beijingers, who grew up in districts including Haidian and Fengtai that 
were outside of the former city walls, also drew themselves close to being 
authentic by learning the history, arts, and even daily practices of the true 
Beijingers. Yuan Bo, a married man in his early thirties, developed a hobby 
of wandering in Xuanwu District in his spare time with his Nikon single 
lens reflex camera. Whenever he encountered things of historical value, he 
would record them with his camera and search for their stories later on. 
He loathed the extinction of the old Beijing, calling it the death of his home, 
although he had no direct experience of what the old Beijing was like from 
his circle beyond the “Traditional Beijingers”. Zong Jing, whose home used 
to be a village in Chaoyang District, was obsessively interested in the 
urban planning history and customs of the city inside the old walls, rather 
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than that of her own changing village. During the interview, she mentioned 
some books related to those topics and told me that her feelings towards 
her home were aroused mainly by these books, 
I know the courtyards and city walls are not my home. The place 
that I was born and raised was considered as the countryside in the 
past and still the suburb until perhaps the 1990s. But I do not see 
huge differences between the old city and where I live. People inside 
the old Peking and I eat the same thing. We speak the same dialect. 
We both value relations such as kinship and friendship. We treat 
people in more or less the same way—putting ourselves into others’ 
shoes, unlike those selfish outsiders. I think more importantly, it is 
because Beijing now is referred to the whole municipal region that 
includes Beijingers both inside and outside the city walls. Besides, 
the dramatic changes inside the city walls were too apparent. I 
empathize with people living there as my village suffered from a 
similar process. Our experiences bind us together. But when it comes 
to what represent Beijing the best, I would prefer the old Peking 
region, which is more historically and architecturally rich, to the 
current entity.  
The reason why Zong Jing impressed me wasn’t confined to her responses 
in the two-hour interview. Since it occurred to her that I was somehow 
interested in Beijing, she constantly referred me to books, re-tweeted news 
and information, and reported her current feelings even until the moment 
that I was busy typing her story. Snapshots of the heavy snow in late 
November were sent to me through her cellphone along with her comments 
“snow retrieves the old Peking”. Like Xing, Yuan Bo, and Zong Jing, long 
term Beijingers who were not native residents surrounded by the city walls 
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or the later Second Ring Road were inclined to identify themselves 
emotionally as Beijingers. By learning the historical heritage inside the 
walls, the group boundary between different long term Beijingers that used 
to be as concrete as the city walls themselves were blurring. 
Zukin (2010) defines “authenticity” as the “moral right to the city that 
enables people to put down roots (and establish the) right to inhabit a 
space” (p. 6); the concept also implies a feeling of social righteousness to 
stand with the least empowered. Like the recollection of the old Peking, 
authenticity can be changeless, since “cultural images of a specific 
historical period” can be used as the criterion for people’s urban 
experience (Zukin, 2010, p. 29). The phenomenon being discussed here 
resonated with early gentrifiers who established nostalgic feelings about 
the community’s original appearance and identified themselves as the 
symbolic owners of the community to protest against “inauthenticity” 
(Deener, 2007; Brown-Saracino, 2010; Ocejo, 2011). 
Drawing a contrast with the vanishing traditional architecture, 
lifestyles and value systems with Peking characteristics, seen as 
encapulating the essence of the old imperial city, “Traditional Beijingers” 
were fortunately able to be passed down and preserced these qualities 
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until today. Evidence for this could be found from interviews with Xing and 
Zong Jing, as well as the foundation of romantic relationships between 
some other young adult members. In November 2011, the municipal 
government announced the “Beijing Spirit”—“Patriotism, Innovation, 
Inclusiveness, and Virtue”—as the spiritual and cultural pursuit of 
residents in the capital and a basic requirement for a Socialist core value 
system. Engaging scholars and experts from more than 20 universities 
and institutes and more than 3 million voters on five candidate plans, the 
final launch however received fierce criticism and opposition among long 
term Beijingers.  
A counterattack by Beijingers occurred on March 28 2012, when a 
sports journalist reported the fourth round of the China Basketball 
Association’s final between the Beijing Ducks and the Guangdong Tigers. 
The game ended up with 107-98, or 3-1 in rounds, making Beijing 
reaching its match point of the championship. In his concluding remarks, 
the journalist Hao wrote, 
 “Beijing Spirit” is supposed to be “Patriotism, Innovation, 
Inclusiveness, and Virtue”. Yet in today’s Wukesong Venue, Beijing 
basketball fans professed “Beijing Spirit” as juqi (loyalty to friends), 
you mian’er (civility and dignity), houdao (virtue), and jiangjiu 
(fastidiousness) (Hao, 2012). 
98 
 
 
Four months later, in July, a revision adapted from Hao’s version was put 
forward by Beijing Internet users. This new version consisting of juqi 
(loyalty to friends), houdao (honesty and kindness), niubi (bravo), and hou 
mian’er (civility and dignity) soon won unprecedented approval and 
acceptance among long term Beijingers. Quite a few members picked up 
these four words during the interviews. “They are what truly represent 
Beijing”, said Zi Fengmiao, a descendent of a Manchu bannerman, “When 
I say Beijing, I mean Beijing itself. I do not mean Beijing as any sort of 
capital.” Interviewees more or less all believed that the official version of 
“Beijing Spirit” was an ideology imposed by the city government, an 
ideology which featured the core of the state with hardly any degree of 
municipal autonomy.  
Since recent inculcations from the government were intended to 
convert local Beijingers to citizens of the capital, the “Traditional Beijingers” 
detested acknowledging that they had been influenced by the government 
even to a minimal extent. Rather, they said, “These true Beijing Spirits are 
inherited from the old Peking,” or “These true ones are what my parents 
and grandparents taught me since I was small and are what I learned from 
uncles and aunties in my neighborhood.” A few interviewees remembered 
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that when they were taught some specific practices and habits, their 
parents would say, “You need to obey these rules because these are what 
we Beijingers do.” Hearing that, they intuitively made a connection 
between unquestionable practices of certain manners which were 
demanded by their parents, and the subconscious reinforcement of their 
Beijingers identity.  
Gu, a freelancer who used to work at McDonald’s recalled his 
experience and revenge on an outsider. He told me he was taught by his 
mother that a polite Beijinger should start saying things using people’s 
titles.  
You call people “brother,” “sister,” “uncle,” “aunt” before you start 
to ask them anything. If you don’t know how to call them, you can 
start with a ninhao (equivalent to hello but calling someone whom 
you regard as a superior). But you know what, WDBs don’t do this. 
Their parents never told them about it. The McDonald’s that I worked 
in was very close to the Beijing West Railway Station, where 99% of 
the diners were WDBs. Once there was a woman WDB who ordered a 
cup of coke. I took her money and walked to the beverage machine. 
She started shouting, “Hey, hey, hey, no ice, no ice!” Who is “hey?” Is 
she insulting me? She didn’t use the proper form of address; who 
knows to whom she was talking to? So I turned my back on her, spat 
on the coke secretly, and put more ice in her cup. As I handed the cup 
to her, I said, “shut up idiot” ferociously, and she ran away at once.  
Zi Fengmiao explained to me why he thought family and community 
neighbors were more influential on him than advocacies from the 
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government, 
In the old days (before 1949), true Beijingers lived outside of the 
Imperial City but inside the walled city. The location provided long 
term residents many opportunities to be exposed to grand things, or 
big historical events, right in front of their eyes. These things 
broadened Beijingers’ horizons, thus making them different from 
peasants in the countryside who only cared about their petite things 
and did not know how to behave properly. Then, attitudes and values 
were passed down from generation to generation, along with the 
occurrence of more significant events. The current government does 
not exert much effort. Beijingers like to learn morality and manners 
as if they were inherited.   
Indeed, behavior displaying interpersonal civilities in the ancient 
dynasties could result in social mobility, and the specialization and 
sophistication of manners thus became crucial (Chen, 1996). To such 
significance, the transmission of manners depends on all types of 
institutions including the family and the school. Despite what the 
“Traditional Beijingers” firmly believed, a compulsory and important 
channel of moral education, apart from the Olympics, was courses taught 
at elementary schools. A course called Morality and Society, which used to 
be labeled Ideology and Morality during the years of most interviewees’ 
primary education, and texts required in Chinese Language Classes 
contained contents through which students were able to acquire a love 
and sense of belonging for their own community and neighborhood. They 
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also focused on imperial history and the folk traditions of the old Beijing, 
as well as fundamental principles and virtues of humanity. Yet from the 
interviewees’ side, the messages that the courses delivered did not seem to 
be valid or legitimate. 
The disavowal of government authority and the nostalgia for their 
childhood environment enabled the “Traditional Beijingers” to solidify and 
secure the legacy of their Peking spirit as a sentiment from the past in 
fighting against the identity of “capital citizen”. Some interviewees, in their 
most irrational mood, spoke out that their true Beijing spirit was not learnt, 
but somehow was given at their birth.  
As Peking lifestyles and spirits were deemed as something genetic and 
inherent, a sense of superiority by nature was claimed. Some interviewees 
admitted that when seeing outsiders being caught committing crimes such 
as robbery, they, on the one hand taunted them as WDBs, while, on the 
other hand were proud of themselves claiming themselves would never 
behave in that way. This partially explains what has been illustrated in the 
previous chapter. Apart from the current research, non-fiction and classic 
fiction about everyday life in Beijing depicted a dignified, well-mannered 
but superior image of Beijingers (Lao & Howard-Gibbon, 1980; Lao, 2002; 
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Liu, 2003; Liu, 2006; Lu, 2011).  
Unfortunately, the ambivalent fusion of a local identity and a capital 
identity in these works failed to account for the mushrooming hostility of 
today. This unsuccessful attempt was not hard to understand since the 
capital in their writings referred not to the current Beijing but to a past 
Peking. For “Traditional Beijingers”, it was exactly the good old Peking 
whose revival was what they were passionate about that made up their 
current local identity. Although they wanted their old Peking back to take 
over the current capital city, “Traditional Beijingers” nonetheless neglected 
the fact that Beijing in the past was no less than a capital with substantial 
functions, however imperial or socialist the states it was serving. Their 
dilemma was not at all about accepting their home as a common city or as 
a capital city. It was in essence concerned only that the capital at its 
present stage estranged long-term Beijingers from what they would like to 
call home. 
 
Changing the title that was used abroad in 1979 coincided with the 
start of the Reform and Opening-up Policy which was not formally 
implemented until 1992, when the socialist market economic system was 
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officially established. The genesis of the combination of the two seemingly 
paradoxical systems—socialist economy and market economy—increased 
the salience of a non-public economy and assured that the market would 
become the fundamental resource distributing mechanism (The 
Communist Party of China, 1992). However, the thriving private sector and 
market economy neither owed nor gave rise to a democratic political 
transformation, but was again a top-down product of the Party’s decision 
(Liew, 1995; Burns, 2000; Zhang, 2000; Gallagher, 2002; Lam, 2009).  
Theoretically, the disembeddedness of the economy, or market, is only 
a capitalist invention created by the interference and even coercion of the 
government (Polanyi, 1957). Analyzed by Arrighi (2007), China’s 
development fits Smith’s model of a “natural” economic path on which a 
large national market is used as “an effective instrument” by the strong 
centralized government (p. 43). The glorious pursuit of wealth, a 
mischievous ideology that subtly evaded who the pursuers were in this 
transformative epoch, brought about enormous inequality, corruption, 
and the erosion of social morality (Qian, 1996; Liu & Link, 1998; Ding, 
2000; Lee & Selden, 2007; Arrighi, 2007). 
This dark side can be observed through a series of systematic reforms 
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that included housing, education, and so on. From the end of 1980s, 
housing, under the legal justifications of the central government8, 
appeared to be another market commodity that gradually drew the 
attention and favor of real estate developers and the municipal and district 
authorities in the 1990s. As residents only had the usage right, not the 
ownership of their lands, municipal and district authorities were able to 
sell the usage right of residents’ land. Then residents’ houses were defined 
as “dangerous and dilapidated” according to certain standards, defined by 
                                                             
8 The Constitution proclaimed in 1982 that all urban land is owned by the state. In 
December 1988, the Ministry of Construction and the Housing Reform Leading Group of 
the State Council announced The Notice on Strengthening the Regulation of the Selling 
Price of State-owned Housing (No. 375), and required the implementation of this notice at 
all levels of the country. Meanwhile, the state-owned Housing Sale Price Reporting 
System and Real Estate Price Appraisal Agency were established.  
  The Constitutional Amendment in 1988 claimed that the usufruct of land could be 
transferred according to the law. Thus, usufruct of land became an independent civil 
right—property right, and this right was able to be separated from land property rights. In 
1992, Beijing started to implement The Interim Regulation on the Assignment and Transfer 
of Usufruct of State-owned Land in Cities and Towns which was carried out by the state in 
1990. This regulation allowed pricing land through assigning and transferring land 
usufruct.  
  In 1994, The Decision of the State Council on Deepening the Reform of the Urban Housing 
System started to be implemented. The Housing Accumulation Fund System was widely 
established. Under this system, housing welfare was given to the employees in monetary 
form, together with their salaries; employees were no longer directly given houses. The 
Decision triggered the commercialization of urban housing. It also signified the 
comprehensive marketization reform of housing, since (the usufruct) of state-owned land 
is saleable. In July 1998, the State Council issued The Notice of the State Council on 
Further Deepening the Reform of the Urban Housing System and Speeding up Housing 
Construction, which repealed the physical distribution of housing.  
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real estate developers. Especially after September 1993, this policy 
empowered governments, at both municipal and district levels, to 
deliberately appropriate land for real estate development, making 
residents’ housing destiny more subject to manipulation. Furthermore, 
the standard for labeling “dangerous and dilapidated buildings”, a project 
initiated in Beijing since the 1970s that originally aimed at improving 
housing conditions for Beijingers, was lowered. This was to make way for 
real estate developers to claim that more not-that-dangerous housing 
needed to be renovated. This pulled more residents and households into 
the renovation project.  
By studying another developing country India, Schumacher (1975) 
proposed that urban planning should adopt a human scale of production, 
namely being small and prioritizing the well-being of people. Critics argued 
that large-scale renewal was in fact an unsustainable development and 
that in urban settings, or particularly in Beijing’s case, economic growth 
should not necessarily override economic development, nor the 
development of human society (Fang, 2000). Nearly 20% of the Beijing 
municipal government revenue was gained by selling land usage rights to 
developers in the 1990s, at the average of 361 million yuan each year 
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(Meyer, 2008, p. 39). Two hundred and twenty-one sites including 986,300 
Beijing residents were affected by the renovation projects in 1993 (ibid). 
Indeed, such massive planning would make architects, politicians, and 
real estate developers rich at the sacrifice of the mass population. 
Urban planning in the 1990s shared similarities with the demolition 
during the 1950s and 1960s, in terms of the vanishing traditional 
architecture, as the number of hutongs were reduced from 3000 in the 
early 1980s to 1600 in 2003 (Shi, 2006). Some statistics indicated that 
361 hutongs were razed within the single month of September 2007 (Wei, 
2015). Following Liang and Chen in the 1950s, scholars today called for 
the preservation of the traditional architecture by appreciating the 
aesthetic and practical values of courtyards and hutongs (Kuang, 2008; 
Wang, 2009; Dai, 2012; Zheng, 2012). 
Yet, the recent wave of urban renewal in the 1990s seemed to be more 
destructive compared to those in the previous decades. Hua Xinmin, an 
active protectionist of Beijing’s hutongs yet the granddaughter of the 
architecture and civil engineer Hua Nangui who stood for modernizing the 
once walled city, firmly believed that preserving the old city should start 
from “protecting the fundamental rights of residents living in the old city” 
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(Hua, 2009, p. 210). Most of the so-called restoration projects turned out 
to be commercial real estate development deals (Fang, 2000). Unlike the 
original plan that ensured that residents could move back to their 
renovated homes, profit-maximizing real estate developers built 
commercial centers, office towers, and fancy apartments that had more 
than 70% of the residents unable or without sufficient subsidy or 
compensation to move back (Fang, 2000).  
To make the demolition happen, shameless measures were taken by 
the real estate units including using fake urban planning maps to deceive 
residents, terrorizing residents, throwing stones and pouring rubbish into 
residents’ homes. In order to reduce the cost of their investments, real 
estate developers did not provide displaced residents with minimum 
compensation which was required by law; for those residents who received 
replacement from the real estate agents, due to the lack of rigid regulation, 
their resettlement places were poorly equipped and had defective 
sanitation, lacking good property management and were mostly located in 
the suburbs, or the greater Beijing area. Their newly assigned homes were 
so far away that it took them three or four hours to commute to and from 
work. Some residents who were self-employed small businessmen lost 
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their businesses since their old customers could no longer find them 
(Jiang, 2006; Wang, 2011).  
Although 25 historical and cultural protection areas were named by 
the municipal government in 1990 to be preserved and renewed, and were 
later approved in 2002 with minor changes, nearly all these 25 areas were 
essentially cultural relics instead of residential areas which in fact only 
amounted to 1.9 square miles (Johnson, 2004; Meyer, 2008). In total, 
118,000 residents were required to relocate, or 41% of the total population 
within these 25 areas (Li, Dray-Novey, & Kong, 2007). It was estimated 
that more than half a million households were relocated from 1991 to 2003 
(Menon, 2010). 
What was even more of a loss, affecting residents in Beijing was 
disenfranchised at an institutional level. According to The Opinions on 
Several Issues Concerning the Trial and Enforcement of Administrative 
Cases of Housing Demolition, which was passed in April, 1995 by the 
Beijing Municipal Higher People's Court, people’s courts would not accept 
for law suits that included: 
a. litigation against decisions about regional constructions made 
by the people’s governments; 
b. litigation against people’s governments’ decisions that those 
whose households are to be relocated shall move out within the time 
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limit and that relevant departments shall carry out compulsory 
demolition which are made in cases where those who shall move out 
within the time limit set by court verdicts refuse to do as ruled 
without justifiable reasons; 
c. litigations against demolition notices issued by departments in 
charge of demolition about those who shall be relocated, the extent of 
demolition, time limit of demolitions, etc. . 
Residents were not only forbidden to legitimize their dissatisfaction, but 
also restricted from other options such as privatizing their houses (Ian, 
2004, p. 148). It did not even occur to most of them that they had other 
choices apart from those claimed by the developers. Compared with cases 
where public participation was protected and in effect in preserving 
communities (Amundsen, 1982; Castells, 1983; Arnstein, 1995), most 
re-located Beijingers were not able to make themselves heard by litigation 
(Lu, 2013; Xie et al., 2013). 
Among “Traditional Beijingers”, the majority of those who were born in 
the 1980s experienced resettlement during their elementary or middle 
school days. Unlike their parents’ generation who were from the beginning 
unwilling to move as described in previous sections and in these last 
paragraphs, interviewees had an emotional transition in terms of their 
attitudes towards relocation before and afterwards. When they first heard 
that they would be living in apartment buildings, they were looking 
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forward to it with overwhelming excitement. They admitted that they 
couldn’t help imagining themselves getting rid of the bungalow-like 
conditions of their upbringing. As a teenager, privacy seemed to be their 
primary concern, although they acknowledged that they also appreciated 
facilities such as an efficient heating system. Many of the interviewees 
longed for living in their own rooms as they reached puberty, so that they 
could decorate their walls freely with posters of sports and music stars, 
and do things that their parents wouldn’t see.  
However, members told me that they soon regretted moving out of 
their bungalows. Xiong, a member in his early thirties, was the respondent 
who had the worst relocation experience. His family was initially forced to 
move from Xuanwu District to Haidian District when he was in fourth 
grade. Later he again moved from Zhongguancun, China’s Silicon Valley in 
the Haidian District to Qinghe, a town in the greater Beijing suburban area 
during his middle school period. This double experience, recalled by Xiong, 
stripped him of his friendship ties in his Xuanwu circle. 
Nobody knew what was going to happen and could happen. By 
the time we realized what was really happening around us, it was 
already too late. Many classmates of mine just moved and then 
switched to schools that were then closest to them. My classmates’ 
family and my family didn’t own a telephone at that time, so we 
couldn’t exchange contacts. And since we could apply for a telephone 
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in the relocation place only after we were resettled, no one could know 
what our addresses or phone numbers would be. Above all, we never 
thought it could be such a long and absolute parting. We thought 
since we would still live in the same city, we would not be far from 
each other after all. But we were so inexperienced. We ended up 
losing contact. My best friend, with whom I shared a table at school, 
was nowhere to be found. We used to sit together and play soccer in 
our hutong after school every day. There were many other friends of 
mine with whom I studied at the same school and lived in the same 
neighborhood, but I felt closest with that guy. You don’t know what 
friendship means to people with no siblings! He was like a brother to 
me, always. But I’ve never seen him again. I tried to find him but there 
was not even a clue. Friendship with some other classmates were 
regained by chance, as we registered for the same department in the 
same university—that was ten years later. What if there had been no 
such coincidence? If I had only known, I would have not felt happy 
and excited about moving out! How come I felt excited? How could I 
expect to leave my brother? If I could make choices, I would rather 
stay with him than live a comfortable life. Who cares about a larger 
size apartment? I wanted him.  
Xiong was not alone in this regard. To members of the “Traditional 
Beijingers”, the fateful but helpless grief called a halt to an onward vision. 
“There’s always a place for outsiders to go back and live in, a place they 
call their hometown. If they don’t want to work or stay in Beijing any longer, 
there is a home that extends its arms embracing their return. But is there 
a place like that for us? The home where we truly belonged is destroyed 
and forever gone.” They conveyed how much they missed their childhood 
experience in the overcrowded courtyards. In their interpretation, 
overcrowding meant a sense of closeness between themselves and their 
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neighbors who would always be genial, considerate, and ready to provide 
small but timely help.  
On the contrary, new neighbors in the resettlements were mean and 
enjoyed taking advantage of others. Fa-ke complained to me, “where I used 
to live was very crowded but everyone was humble and polite. Now, despite 
the public area in my apartment building being spacious, everyone wants 
to occupy these public spaces by putting their own stuff in the corridor.”  
When studying urban sociology, researchers were not confined to 
people as individuals, but also shed light upon the neighborhood that 
individuals resided in as a whole. Herbert Gans (1962), in his discussion of 
the relatively long term residents in Boston’s West End, revealed that 
dismantlement destroyed a holistic sense of community and organized 
neighborhood relations. Indeed, as a form of public spaces, hutongs 
functioned in a similar fashion as sidewalks in American cities, creating 
encounters and connections between neighbors (Jacobs, 1961). 
Soon, the sorrow of long term residents’ being driven away from home 
translated into outrage and resentment when they saw large numbers of 
outsiders moving into areas where their original homes were located. The 
sharp rise in population density could be explained in part by the 
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mushrooming of luxury apartments, commercial complexes, and office 
buildings which attracted outsiders of various occupations into the old city. 
Estimated in 1994, the gross population density in the old city amounted 
to 500 to 600 people per hectare; but in areas under official renewal or real 
estate development, most of these areas had a population density of 700 to 
800 people per hectare, with a few exceptions only reaching 100 people per 
hectare (Chen, 1994). Figure 4 shows the several-fold boosts of plot ratios 
of twenty typical Renovation Projects in Beijing from 1987 to 1998, which 
made it possible to accommodate the growth in the size of population 
(Fang, 2000, p. 68). 
 
Figure 4. Plot Ratio Change of 20 Typical Urban Renovation Projects in 
Beijing (1987-1998) 
(Fang, 2000, p. 68) 
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On the other hand after 2003, the loosened migration policy that was 
designed to promote economic development was also responsible for the 
large influx of the migrant population. Municipal policies were carried out 
to attract qualified people to work in Beijing. These elite outsiders were not 
only allowed residency for at least three years, but also given abundant 
rights (Ma, Hu, & Yin, 2014, p. 140). In addition, enrollment increased in 
Beijing-based universities which contributed to the population increase, 
since university students who were outsiders were given Beijing hukou as 
if the universities they attended were their registered households (ibid). 
Also in 2003, The Measures on Custody and Repatriation of City Vagrants 
was repealed nationwide. From 2002-2005, restrictions on outsiders in 
terms of housing rentals, business, labor work, housekeeping occupations, 
health and epidemic prevention, have been phased out (Ma, Hu, & Yin, 
2014, p. 512). Unlike migrants returning to their hometowns in the past, 
migrants after 2003, who were neither Beijingers nor those with residency 
permission preferred not to leave Beijing and tried to stay (ibid, p. 159). 
This resulted not only in the fact that Beijing hosted an increasing number 
of migrants, but also that compared with previous migrations, when only 
the elites were able to stay, Beijing became open to people from all social 
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backgrounds, from everywhere in the country, and with various family and 
education backgrounds (ibid, p. 513).  
In July 2013, a news report suggested that from 2005 to 2011, a 
reduction of 72,000 Beijingers in the four center districts were substituted 
by an influx of 170,000 migrants (Fan, 2013). Many long term Beijingers 
said they would go to hell rather than pay a visit to where they used to live, 
even though some of their old neighborhoods were the most flourishing 
recreational centers in Beijing. Their disgust and loathing, according to 
some interviewees, did not boil down to the destruction of their homes 
alone, but also because their homes were full of their most haunting 
memories and were now occupied by outsiders. The idea that long term 
residents had to make room for outsiders resulted in mass local 
dissatisfaction and hostility. “Traditional Beijingers” said they hated 
WDBs because it was clear that they had stolen their homes from them. 
“Take a look at the remaining hutongs, you will find those playing soccer 
are not Beijing kids anymore. They are all bastards of WDBs; they are 
WDB youth.” While for some people, the development of these feeling 
started from sadness and ended up with anger, others detested the 
newcomers first and then sought to base this hatred on the losses that 
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they themselves or other members had suffered. A typical narrative goes 
as follows, 
All WDBs say the same sentence, ‘Beijing belongs to every 
Chinese, instead of Beijingers themselves’. This sounds as if we owe 
them anything. Or as if we don’t deserve to live in Beijing, our home 
city, but they do! New York is the wildest metropolis in the world. If 
Beijing is everyone’s, New York should belong to every world citizen, 
not the Americans, not even the New Yorkers. Doesn’t it make sense? 
Why don’t they strive to go to New York? Why do they end up lingering 
in Beijing? 
In addition to these allegations, expressed in various forms, Traditional 
Beijingers pointed to the sacrifices they had made for their city. Oftentimes, 
the dominant discourse in the nation acknowledged the accomplishments 
achieved by outsiders, but Beijingers refuted this perspective by providing 
evidence that their dedication had been largely ignored.  
One of the common arguments was the strict implementation of the 
One-Child Policy for families in Beijing, but too frequently violated by 
outsiders. As a result, a strong feeling of injustice pervailed among 
“Traditional Beijingers”, who were often the only child in their families.  
-The good lives, beautiful home…everything that the only child in 
Beijing enjoys today is at the expense of the lives of their siblings. 
That is a debt of blood. Each of our families is no different from 
families of martyrs—we are all sacrificing our family members for the 
country. But the outsiders sacrifice nothing!  
-If you see WDBs having two or three children, don’t make a fuss. 
It’s common to see a family with five children, sometimes even with 
seven. Women don’t give birth as humans do. What they do is 
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whelping.  
-Every child outside the population plan who entered the city and 
plundered the fruits of city residents’ labor owes those urban families 
with a single child. 
More specifically regarding the One-Child Policy, “Traditional Beijingers” 
questioned the supply of beds for pregnant women in Beijing’s hospitals. 
They emphasized that pregnant women Beijingers who deliver their first 
child should enjoy hospital beds and other facilities, prior to other 
pregnant women in Beijing.  
Perceived inequality generated by the implementation gap of the 
One-Child Policy also extended to the field of education. In 2012 
non-Beijing students from 1st to 9th grades reached 419,000, amounting to 
40.9% of the total elementary and middle school student population in 
Beijing. More than one billion yuan (approximately 159 million dollars) 
was invested by the municipal government to secure equal education 
among outsider students from the 1st to 9th grades. Long term Beijingers 
complained that the majority of students in their children’s classes were 
made up of less disciplined outsiders. Teachers spent more time 
inculcating proper behavior to the whole class than teaching substantial 
knowledge. “I can’t imagine what it will be like one day if the 
single-children of Beijing are assimilated by these disgusting kids”, wrote 
118 
 
 
one of the bloggers.  
In November 2013, news came out that more than 400 twelfth grade 
outsiders applied to take the college entrance exams in Beijing. Despite 
stringent procedures, the approval of these applications indicated that 
such students would be able to take exams and be admitted to vocational 
schools in June 2014. The policy soon triggered objections among 
“Traditional Beijingers”. While outsiders believed that this move paved the 
way for education equality, “Traditional Beijingers” were enraged by it, 
claiming that it was nonsense for children outside of the population plan 
to demand equal right with children whose parents followed the law 
obediently. In response to this news, some “Traditional Beijingers” wrote in 
their Weibo as follows, 
-Shameless bitch! What they mean by equality is in reality taking 
others’ opportunities. 
-Now they can only go to vocational schools, but later they will be 
admitted to universities. Then they will find a job more easily than 
Beijingers. They shouldn’t be allowed in the first place, or they will 
always find ways to satisfy their greed.  
-Before they ask for education equality, they should first let die all 
that are not the first child in each of their families. Shit! 
As for the equality of college entrance, “Traditional Beijingers” learnt to the 
information that the chances of admission to top universities in Beijing, 
namely Peking University and Tsinghua University, were shrinking in 
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recent years and were far lower than the probability of candidates in 
Shanghai and Tianjin being admitted to top universities within their own 
provincial institutes of higher education (Baidu, 2015c). Just as the 
available places were diminishing, the High School affiliated to Minzu 
University of China was revealed to have consistently enlarged its high 
school enrollments from 2005 so that in 2015 six hundred and twenty 12th 
graders who were ethnic minority outsiders would take the college 
entrance exam and receive university admission at the same rate as 
twelfth grade Beijingers.  
The existence of this phenomenon in this particular high school was 
ensured by a directive which was issued by the Ministry of Education in 
20039. Long term Beijingers were stirred up, as they alleged that the 620 
students were using up the admission quota that exclusively belonged to 
twelfth grade Beijingers. In 2015, around 50 students from this “dark 
horse” high school were admitted to Peking University or Tsinghua 
University, constituting 14% of the total enrollment of Beijingers in the two 
institutes. According to parents of some Beijing twelfth graders, over 2000 
                                                             
9 The name of the directed is The Opinion of the General Office of the Ministry of Education 
on Proposed Agreement that Ethnic Minority Students of the High School Affiliated to Minzu 
University of China Shall Participate in both the College Entrance Examination and the 
Admission in Beijing.  
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local students could be impacted by these 620 students in terms of their 
college enrollment (Xu, 2015). It was also found out by these parents that 
when admitting students, this high school often had the lack of censorship 
on the students’ ethnic minority identifications (ibid).  
In July 2015, after four or five years of complaining online, a letter was 
written to the Ministry of Education by a group of Beijing local parents. It 
demanded 1) a separate college enrollment quota for ethnic minority 
students in the High School Affiliated to Minzu University of China, 2) a 
resumption of the high school’s reference-based enrollment of a hundred 
and forty students as was the case before 2003 and a stop to exam-based 
admission, and 3) consent from Beijingers and scrutiny and approval from 
the Beijing municipal government regarding the high school’s enrollment 
practices (Baidu, 2015d). From July to September, over a thousand Beijing 
parents gathered at the Ministry of Education and Beijing Bureau of 
Education, demonstrating in favor of their appeals. In August, the State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission promised that the high school would not keep 
expanding its enrollment, beyond which no further action would be taken. 
On the other hand, the State Ministry of Education and the Beijing 
Municipal Bureau of Education were passing the buck between each other. 
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In September, parents sued the state Ministry, demanding it would 
invalidate the 2003 Opinion. A month later, the plaintiffs were informed by 
the court that the lawsuit would not be processed (Wu, 2015). 
Another matter of contention was a comparison of the financial benefit 
between long term residents and newcomers and the disparity in rewards 
that this revealed. Illustrated by Jiu, a blogger revered by “Traditional 
Beijingers”, the self-reported contribution to taxation claimed by outsiders 
who used this to make it a justification for their foothold and deserved 
rights in the city. However, this amounted to no more than a drop in the 
bucket compared to the forty-six years of hard labor (from 1949 to 1995 
when a Two-day Weekend Policy was implemented) of Beijingers who 
received little compensation in return. Jiu alleged that taxes paid by 
newcomers only became significant after 2005 which was a mere decade 
ago.  
Jiu also believed that these taxes were negligible in contrast to all the 
benefits newcomers would gain by working in Beijing. “WDBs are like 
beggars who get numerous things for free while paying only a tiny amount 
for their ‘occupancy expenses’”, Jiu argued. Besides, Beijingers, as well as 
any urban citizens, were not proportionately compensated because from 
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an institutional standpoint, their efforts did not even allow them to acquire 
usage right of communal land as rural citizens did. According to Jiu, quite 
a few rural Beijingers were forced to convert to urban hukou, making them 
landless and deprived of the former land rights that they once held. On the 
other hand, outsiders were able to find jobs in Beijing and enjoy 
homestead entitlements at the same time.  
According to “Traditional Beijingers”, their insecurity derived not only 
from administrative policies and macro maneuvers that they felt helpless 
to control, but a constant threat also originated from their daily lives where 
antagonistic discourses against them prevailed. “Traditional Beijingers” 
argued that hostility was never emitted in one direction with Beijingers 
always being the sender and outsiders the recipient. Some respondents 
told me that their Beijing identity was not crystalized until 2012 when an 
extraordinary rainstorm hit Beijing on July the 21st. By August 6th, it was 
reported that more than 1.9 million residents city wide were affected by the 
storm with 79 fatalities (Ji, 2012). Fangshan, a district located in 
Southwest suburban Beijing, suffered the most severe impact—800,000 
people or more than 80% of the district population, were affected.  
My respondents said that they were anxiously concerned about every 
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Beijinger who could be in potential danger, until they saw outsiders’ online 
swear words hoping that Beijingers would be drowned. “I don’t understand 
why they hate us,” said Xiaoqi, a long term Beijinger living in Shijingshan 
District where the rainstorm had a destructive impact as well. “After the 
1998 flood, we donated; for the victims of the 2008 earthquake, we 
donated and mourned. Whenever something was happening in the 
country, we did everything on our part to help them. Do we deserve death 
in return?” Generally, “Traditional Beijingers” said the apathy and 
coldness that they received alienated them from outsiders who they used 
to see as no different from themselves. That the outsiders hoped that they 
would die dawned on them that solidarity must be created among 
Beijingers and a distance drawn between Beijingers and outsiders—in 
other words, a boundary between friends and enemies needed to be 
formed. 
Since the rainstorm curse incident, “Traditional Beijingers” saw 
themselves successively discriminated against in recreational centers and 
restaurants where preferential treatments were publically granted to 
outsiders. These places offered outsiders whose ID number started with 
any number other than 110 a special discount while they charged 
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Beijingers the original price.  
-I wonder who grumbles about Beijingers’ privileges all the time. 
Outsiders only spend ￥150 entry to the amusement park but it is 
￥185 for Beijingers. Now do you still think we are the privileged? Who 
do you think is really the privileged? 
-If these restaurants want to attract outsiders, they should have 
started their business at the hometowns of the outsiders. 
-The boss wants to benefit his folks. He should go back to his 
village where most of his folks reside. 
Also in workplaces, interviewees told me that they were discriminated 
against simply because they were Beijingers. Some said they had seen 
companies listing in their job requirements that only outsiders need apply. 
A man told me he wasn’t assigned to certain tasks because, as he 
overheard, his colleagues informed the staff who was giving out these 
tasks that he was a Beijinger. This respondent continued, 
The job required a lot of nightshifts. When we finished the work, it 
was often 1 or 2 am and there was no public transportation, so I had 
to drive back home. My parents bought me the car; I didn’t have that 
much money. There happened to be an outsider colleague who lived 
very close to me, so I offered him rides most of the time. I could have 
dropped him where our paths departed, but every time I sent him 
home first and then drove back to my own place. He never said thank 
you. Well, fine. But he took all of this for granted. He turned angry at 
times when I didn’t want to help him. He knew my family owned an 
apartment in Beijing which was worth millions of yuan today, while 
his family didn’t. He thought I was much richer than him. But the 
apartment is for me to live, not to sell. I don’t sell it, so no money is got 
out of it. What is the point of having that much money while staying 
homeless? Is this what he means by being rich? WDBs shared the 
same way of thinking and were convinced that Beijingers must be rich 
and have cars. And just because we were supposed to be rich enough 
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to have cars while they didn’t, he thought I was obliged to drive him 
home. Isn’t it ridiculous? Isn’t he an asshole? Together with many 
things like this, I couldn’t stand working there anymore. So I ended 
up quitting the job. 
Hong, a woman in her early thirties working in a private company told me 
that based on her information, some of her outsider colleagues earned a 
higher salary than she did. Privately, she asked her boss why this was the 
case. Her boss said in reply that their company needed to take the fact that 
outsiders needed money on housing into consideration. “I became furious 
when hearing that,” Hong said to me, “Salary is a reflection of an 
employee’s performance, not of a boss’s pity. Apart from the housing 
subsidy required by the government, my colleagues are also getting extra 
support. If they are incapable of staying here, they can leave and go 
somewhere else. No one should beg them to stay. But in reality, it is just 
the opposite.” As our conversation went on, Hong also pointed out that her 
outsider boss believed Beijingers had no need to buy their own housing 
and to live separately from their parents,  
My boss thinks that outsiders need to save money for renting or 
buying their housing here in Beijing. Of course, many outsiders have 
the dream of buying an apartment in Beijing and call it home. But on 
the other hand, she assumes that since we Beijingers now live with 
our parents, there is no need for us to buy our own. She believes that 
we can inherit housing from our parents because we are all 
single-children in our families. Why should we live with our parents? 
Why shouldn’t we buy our own? That’s their houses after all. How 
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come outsiders deserve to make their lives better while we end up 
being the boomerang kids? I have all these sentences for my defense, 
but in fact, I find myself unable to speak them aloud. That’s the way 
outsiders think, and their thinking is firmly fixed. As a Beijinger in an 
outsider dominated environment, I feel I am deeply discriminated 
against.  
For some, dissatisfaction was triggered not by the false assertion that 
Beijingers were privileged, but more precisely by the reversed reality that 
preferences were given to outsiders instead of to the locals. Beijingers were 
always assumed to be superior especially in terms of socio-economic 
status, which in fact brought them inferiority in their discursive power and 
other material treatment. It became incomprehensible for the “Traditional 
Beijingers” that it was the outsiders who should receive primary 
consideration. In their mindset which was similar to Merton’s concept of 
locals, locals should receive the most attention and support, regardless of 
whatever places people were local to (Merton, 1957). But Beijing turned 
out to be an exception.  
-Henanese say they are proud of being Henanese. Sichuanese say 
they are proud of being Sichuanese. But this sentence can’t be 
applied to Beijingers. If we say we are proud to be born and raised in 
Beijing, outsiders will reply that we imply prejudice against them. It’s 
like Whites are forbidden to say they are proud of being White in front 
of Blacks whom they will be considered racially prejudiced against. 
We are not able to express the most simple and innocent feeling of a 
love for our home. Aren’t we being discriminated against? 
-Public figures in the media and entertainment industries that 
have a predominant influence always hold the opinion that outsiders 
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contribute exceedingly more to metropolises than locals do. That’s too 
much! They say this because most of them are outsiders so they want 
to kick us out and bring their extended families in. The masses are 
easily manipulated and convinced. Some of them say that without 
them, Beijingers will all be starved to death. Really? Have we? Instead, 
when they go back home during the Chinese New Year holiday, we 
cook at home so there is less worry about food safety. The sky is 
brighter and the streets are cleaner. We don’t rely on them at all. In 
fact, it is them who rely on us, on Beijing! Without us, they would be 
starved to death. That’s why they scuttle back into the city every year 
even days before the holiday officially ends! 
To “Traditional Beijingers”, their city happened to be a special case that 
deviated from all the established norms of host and guest relations. The 
presupposed establishment of hosts and locals was nullified, as perceived 
by long term Beijingers. Indeed, while Beijing was viewed as merely 
providing home, the city itself also embodied a complex of intermingling 
social dynamics that produced interests and inequality. Demographically, 
most “Traditional Beijingers” have been from the lower- or working-class, 
experienced or witnessed relocation, and lacked in various kinds of 
leverage that could make their voice heard or plans changed for their sake. 
As a consequence, Beijingers of this socio-economic status became the 
least represented and the most marginalized category. Since 
countermeasures were not taken at a structural level, long term Beijingers 
blamed their unpleasant experiences on outsiders who have been the most 
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visible and superficial beneficiaries. Needless to say, top-down policies 
that promoted a grand urban transition merged outsiders with locals when 
they were subject to distinct administrative arrangements. These 
encounters created an environment for local hostility to take place.  
What was worse, this marginalization of long term Beijinger’s made 
outsiders blind to the real situation. Some outsiders believed that all 
relocated Beijingers must have made a fortune through reparations. In 
addition, outsiders misconceived “Traditional Beijingers” as no different 
from some other stake-holders or beneficiaries of Beijing’s urbanization, 
while in fact they had a completely different and negative set of 
experiences.  
 
Realizing that they were increasingly disadvantaged in many respects, 
“Traditional Beijingers” explored their own ways to legitimize and reaffirm 
their status in Beijing. Signs of exclusion began to demonstrate that 
“Traditional Beijingers” deemed outsiders the source of all recent urban 
problems which included air pollution, traffic congestion, and crime.  
-There was hardly any air pollution when I was small. But air 
pollution has become severe in recent years. This is because WDBs 
arrived and stayed. As everyone expects windy weather to blow the 
haze away, I also expect the Chinese New Year to come as fast as 
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possible. Air pollution is caused by WDBs. When they are all gone 
during the New Year holiday, the sky is so blue and clean. When they 
come back, the weather returns to something disgusting. They are 
here causing problems. 
-Traffic problems are caused by the outsiders. There are 170,000 
outsiders in the core area. No wonder the traffic is so crowded. They 
make Beijing dilapidated. They destroy Beijing on purpose. Now 
Beijing is ruined.  
-You shall notice how many crimes are committed in Beijing and 
see who those criminals are. Yes, they are all outsiders, WDBs. 
Whenever I turn on the TV and switch to legal programs hosted by the 
Beijing TV station, and I see crimes that are reported on TV are 
committed by migrants. I didn’t want to hate them. I didn’t hate them 
in the beginning—it is truly they themselves who ruin their own 
reputation and respect.  
-The news said that before 2005 when there were no WDBs, 
Beijing was one of the world cities that had the lowest crime rate, and 
death rate due to road traffic. By the end of 2010 after the WDBs 
arrived, 89.5% of the crimes were committed by outsiders! Outside 
cunts, fuck you! 
Furthermore, some long term residents also imposed nicknames on 
migrants from specific provinces. As they learned from TV programs that 
some thieves who stole manhole covers came from Henan, an agricultural 
and densely populated province, Beijingers addressed Henanese by the 
name “manhole cover stealer”. WDB, the abbreviation for waidi bi, used in 
another manner—wang debiao, without changing the meaning. The newly 
invented wang debiao can be understood in the Northeastern dialect as a 
typical name of people from the three Northeastern provinces. Although 
the three provinces did not together export the largest migrant populations, 
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long term residents complained that Northeastern migrants were most 
visible in terms of their unacceptance.  
Elias and Scotson (1965) argue that the success of gossip hinge upon 
the fact that the unit of prejudice is not aimed at individual’s, but at the 
individuals’ group. The individuals under attack, or the so-called WDBs in 
this case, failed to strike back because they were unable to “discard, not 
even in their own mind, the identification with the stigmatized group” even 
though individually they were “innocent of the accusations or reproaches” 
(ibid, p. 102).  
Long term Beijingers tended to unconditionally scapegoat outsiders 
for the root cause of all recent urban problems, ignoring how structural 
forces, especially state and municipal policies could generate antagonism. 
Yet over-simplification and ignorance varied from person to person among 
“Traditional Beijingers”. A large number of the “Traditional Beijingers” 
hovered at the superficial level without advancing to a deeper 
understanding. They were convinced that it was the wickedness and greed 
of outsiders that solely injured Beijing. Some were able to recognize the 
co-effect of a series of structural factors that divided Beijingers and 
outsiders socially and economically and made it possible for outsiders to 
131 
 
 
come and stay. But a majority of them still pointed fingers at the outsiders, 
instead of to the relevant policies and experts, politicians, and 
businesspersons who formulated and took advantage of these policies. 
These parties and systems, they thought, only served as an invitation to 
the massive unwanted influx.  
Other specific measures on a personal level were taken, in order to 
ultimately “defend the great Beijing”. “Traditional Beijingers” appealed for 
strict law enforcement on criminal charges and population control. An 
active member, who nicknamed himself “Bernard Shaw”, publicly 
advocated that a Repatriation System should be revived, so that criminals 
would be sent back to and kept in their registered residence (hukou), in the 
hope that crime rates and the probability of chaos would be greatly 
reduced. “People who work in the police system say that in Beijing and 
Shanghai, more than ninety percent of suspects in detention houses are 
migrants,” he continued, “are we exchanging our safety with the repeal of 
the system? If nothing is made to change the situation, Beijing and 
Shanghai will be no different from the countryside.”  
According to Bernard Shaw, a Repatriation System not only could 
keep bad aliens away from Beijing, but more importantly would be effective 
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in controlling fluid migrants who came and went totally at will and made 
the location and arrest of such people time consuming. Seemingly, he had 
a concern broader than just Beijing versus outsiders but more about 
general stability versus migration. Beijing’s problems were not exceptional; 
it was one among many administrations subject to the conflicting interests 
of heterogeneous populations. Bernard Shaw wrote the following in his 
Weibo, 
There is no need to be implicit and roundabout concerning local 
hostility. Migrants come to Beijing and Shanghai for personal 
interests, for a better livelihood and higher pay. In today’s overloaded 
Beijing and Shanghai, the one-way migration pattern migrants 
created has almost broken the city down, in terms of the allocation of 
social resources, as well as the supply of natural resources. And this 
is why xenophobia grows inside of me. You see, both me and the 
migrants are motivated by realistic self-interests. No one can tell 
whose pursuit is nobler.  
Bernard Shaw’s argument summarized many key points in the quarrels 
between “Traditional Beijingers” and outsiders. Indeed, a large proportion 
of debate topics that “Traditional Beijingers” were engaged in were related 
to realistic issues, about mostly materialistic issues. These issues touched 
upon marriage, education, and so on. 
Zheng, a long term Beijinger doing his doctoral studies in D.C., was 
native to the vanishing Chongwen District that literally meant “advocating 
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culture and education”. This engineering student also enjoyed ancient 
Chinese poems and verses. He once provided his perspective on The 
Deserted Wife, a poem in The Book of Songs that left readers in desolation 
and despair. Depicting a woman who married a man she loved but the 
husband later turned out to be deceptive and abusive, the poem was 
understood as an exemplar of gender inequality and the vulnerability of 
women in marital relationships. Yet in Zheng’s interpretation, the root of 
the woman’s suffering was simply due to the fact that her husband was an 
outsider. “A WDB” were the words he used, as he went through the scripts 
sorting evidence that supported his argument.  
As the husband obtained all the supposed advantages from this 
marriage, there was no need to show sympathy to her, according to Zheng. 
Zheng said he felt sorry for his school mates of either sex in Beijing’s 
leading high school and in China’s best university who ended up marrying 
domestic outsiders, as if the narrative of The Deserted Wife would more 
likely occur in these marriages. Remaining single in his early thirties with 
no prior romantic experiences, Zheng would stick to the principle of only 
marrying a long term Beijing woman. He regarded outsiders as guests who 
would never make an effort to be assimilated to the host culture but simply 
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steal resources and grab wealth. With these assumptions, Zheng said he 
would not risk giving any outsider the chance of reducing his passionate 
love to materialistic disputes which not only ruined his own life but might 
disrupt his parents’ life as well.  
In a similar argument with Zheng’s proposition, some Beijingers also 
advocated that Beijingers should not marry outsiders unless they enjoyed 
being taken advantage of. Some Beijingers shared stories about all the 
ways that an outsider might use to marry a Beijinger, including purposeful 
pregnancy, and when they proceeded to the preparation of marriage, 
outsiders began to show their real motivation by requiring an extremely 
high amount of dowry. Some would demand that housing that was bought 
by parents of the Beijingers be common property between the couple. After 
marriage, outsiders would bring his/her family members and relatives of 
his/her extended family to stay in the “common property”. A comment in 
Weibo goes, “Don’t marry outsiders unless you want to see your home and 
family become their embassy. This is a marriage between a human and a 
predator who is not here to love you, but to consume you”. 
Subsequently Weibo accounts emerged aimed at matching long term 
male Beijingers with long term female Beijingers. These websites were run 
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by long term Beijingers voluntarily. They would re-tweet posts long term 
Beijingers wrote with their photos attached. In the post, Beijingers should 
state clearly that they were long term Beijingers and were only looking for 
long term Beijingers. No other information was necessary for these 
accounts to help re-tweet, although some basic information was always 
crucial for individuals to find the perfect match. After one month of the 
first retweet, long term Beijingers could request a second retweet of their 
posts. Posts of some unattached “Traditional Beijingers” were retweeted by 
Weibo accounts of this kind as well as by other “Traditional Beijingers” 
who were happy to advertise for them. It was also common to see regular 
offline dinner parties that were organized by these Weibo accounts and 
plenty of long term Beijingers frequently attended them in order to seek 
potential relationships. However, the probability of marrying people that 
were known through this channel was not high.  
Individual resistance against outsiders manifested itself by targeting 
what long term Beijingers thought of as the source of the pro-outsider 
industrial chain. Gao Leilei, a Beijing native and former soccer player on 
the local team, was renowned for his charitable construction of elementary 
schools and “The 21 Field” for elementary school age children in the 
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countryside. The latter was named after his number while serving in 
Beijing Guo’an, the local football club from 1999 to 2006. Together with 
his excellent athletic performances, this philanthropic undertaking had 
received recognition among “Traditional Beijingers”. In January 2015, Gao 
expressed sympathy for migrant kids who could not stay with their 
parents in Beijing for elementary education but had to return to their 
hometown for schooling. He also appealed in his Weibo website that adults 
should do something to create a better livelihood and learning 
environment for these children.  
These lines infuriated “Traditional Beijingers” who immediately turned 
against Gao. Some Beijingers in their comments reasoned calmly on the 
impracticality of his wish, since the resources of the city were too limited to 
be shared by every Chinese citizen. “Beijingers also need jobs and earnings. 
Do you think it is fair to compete with outsiders inside our own home?” 
“Look how difficult it is for Beijingers to book an appointment with a 
physician and to find a job. See how crowded the subway is! I assume you 
are rich enough to send your son to a private school, so you have no 
knowledge about the livelihood of common Beijingers. If these kids come 
and stay according to your wish, what do you want us Beijingers to do?” 
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One blogger commented, “If migrant workers return home with their 
children, reunion is achieved. It is their home jurisdiction that should 
solve employment problems for them and education issues for their 
children.” After receiving more than 700 responses as such, Gao posted 
another Weibo, condemning Beijingers who without hardworking migrants 
could do nothing but “entertain pet birds”. 
This follow-up post incited online Beijingers to more emotional, radical, 
and aggressive responses, as they called Gao a “traitor” and told him to 
“get out of the city and help ‘your’ folks at ‘your’ home”. “Use your money to 
send these migrant children abroad!” “It is cruel of you to say that. Don’t 
you remember who watched your games and made you rich? Now you look 
down upon people who play with birds.” “Your daddy was playing with 
birds too! Now you turn yourself against your ancestor!” “You must be 
brainwashed by your outside cunt wife! You’d better go back to her 
hometown and stop ruining Beijing.” “I now realize you enjoy licking WDBs’ 
ass.” “Stupid bastard, son of the outsiders!” “From now on, Gao Leilei 
perishes from Beijing.” 
Less than a day after Gao’s follow-up post, more than 100 unfavorable 
reviews of Gao’s sushi restaurant appeared on dianping.com, China’s 
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most popular reviewing website equivalent to America’s Yelp.com. Reviews 
complained that the restaurant had stale food, horrible service, ridiculous 
prices, and a mean boss. “I’m the kind of bird-playing loafer who he 
despises. I’m not going to give him my money anymore.” “I swear I will 
never go to that restaurant from now on. My money is not to support those 
outsiders to stay in Beijing. I shouldn’t be writing here anymore. It’s time 
for me to take care of my pet birds.” According to Gao, 80% of the 
restaurant’s profit would be used for all his charitable causes. Regardless 
of his various accomplishments, Gao’s provocative words made him seem 
like an ungrateful hypocrite in the eyes of many long term Beijingers who 
had been in the past his premier supporters but were now unlikely to 
patronize his restaurant.  
Nonetheless, the bad reviews only amounted to less than 10% of the 
total reviews and were completely outnumbered by appreciative comments, 
while Gao’s restaurant started to earn a growing reputation among 
outsiders who became the restaurant’s major customers as they 
supported Gao’s charitable attitude towards migrant children. Thus, 
spontaneous group reactions ventilated long term residents’ discontent. 
This time, however, the target was someone other than the outsiders 
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themselves. 
 
In this chapter, Beijingers’ local identity is seen as a negotiating 
process strengthened by macro social changes both in history and in more 
recent times. So is the local hostility, a dynamic construct made by the 
particular historical context that could have been otherwise. As most of 
the changes either symbolically or realistically brought discomfort, 
degradations and coerced compliance, “Traditional Beijingers” created a 
nostalgic memory towards the good old days, even though some had not 
themselves experienced it. On the other hand, “Traditional Beijingers” 
blamed all the current social problems and their discontent on outsiders, 
with seemingly plausible arguments and practical exercises. By doing this, 
“Traditional Beijingers” cleverly evaded challenging structural problems 
that they felt impotent to modify since they were imposed from above by a 
top-down administrative system.  
Their goal was to kick the newcomers out, instead of confronting the 
authorities. In fact, it is exactly the authorities that long term Beijingers 
depended on, in order to accomplish their home defense. The next chapter 
will take a look at how “Traditional Beijingers” developed their hostility by 
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molding their focus of expression to stay aligned with the official position.  
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CHAPTER SIX: LEARNING TO BE A CITIZEN THROUGH CIVIC ACTION 
If men are to remain civilized, or to become so, the art of 
associating together must grow and improve, in step with the 
increasing equality of conditions (Tocqueville, Stone, & Mennell, 1980, 
p. 115).  
Tocqueville’s observation on how associations could maintain equality and 
freedom at the same time was incisive when he analyzed Anglo-American 
society almost two centuries ago. The source of association relied on the 
intellectual and moral establishment of civic awareness, which American 
society seemed to be endowed with if we set religious factors aside. In 
contrast, it can take other societies a considerable time to gain the ability 
to combine democracy and participation without sacrificing freedom. 
The noble cause of “Traditional Beijingers” evolved from purposes and 
activities no different from those of hooligans and gangs. As far as I have 
observed, the soccer arena was highly seen as the cradle of the “Traditional 
Beijingers”. The exceptional performance of the local team, especially since 
2009, was able to unite 30,000 Beijing sports-lovers once a week on 
average to feel their sense of place in their home city. The Workers’ 
Stadium, the home court of Beijing Guo’an, was often referred by soccer 
fans as “Beijing’s last siheyuan”.  
That the fans saw their local identity in the soccer arena was 
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reinforced by organizations that provided an encouraging atmosphere for 
fans to express their loyalties. By contextualizing local identity, Beijing 
fans not only celebrated Beijing’s values on the soccer field, but also 
attempted to declare themselves as the master of this particular urban 
space (Yang & He, 2013). During the game, cheer leaders set up by each 
fans’ organizations encouraged their members to participate in chanting, 
shouting, and sometimes dancing, through which local identity was 
symbolically manifested. Fans were as open, reckless, and outrageous as 
they pleased. For them a degree of freedom was secured as long as they 
followed the cheer leaders’ command and did nothing that undermined the 
organization’s solidarity.  
Fans in these organizations felt equal to one another and even to their 
leaders due to the fact that membership was voluntary and these groups 
were loosely organized. They did not mind following or not following the 
directions of the cheer leaders. Most of the time, fans in these 
organizations either very much liked the way the slogans were written, or 
chanted them without caring about their exact meaning. If they didn’t 
want to shout in the required way, they could just watch the game quietly 
sitting at back of the stand. The later organization formed by “Traditional 
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Beijingers” adopted a similar organizational pattern with the fan groups, in 
terms of the ultimate goal, voluntary participation, and equal status. 
According to Gilligan (1996), the honor of one’s group and community 
being a unique desire of humanity, the protection of it and the prevention 
of “being overwhelmed by the feeling of shame” might be resolved by 
violence (pp. 97-110). 
Apart from the organizational legacy left by these fan groups, what 
made them a more effective contributor to the formation of the “Traditional 
Beijingers” was the network effect they provided. Owing to their equal 
membership status, common dedication to Beijing, and constant 
interaction through social media, fans of the same organization were able 
to grow closer in friendship and to bind together in action. The founders of 
the “Traditional Beijingers” organization, Ting, Wei, Guo, and Huizi, as 
well as some other members, came to know each other as they all were 
members of a Guo’an fans organization that was founded in August 2011. 
As the severe rainstorm added to the anguish of defeat against Guo’an’s 
old enemy on July 21st, 2012, Guo and his wife drove their car on the 
street as soon as the game finished, doing their best to give detained 
strangers a ride home. Weibo connected fans, as fans communicated 
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online offering help and reporting where help was needed. As they 
consistently refreshed Weibo tweets for updated information on the 
disaster, at 2 a.m. the following day, after they just arrived home two 
hours later, this couple decided to drive to the airport and help the 
travelers there. Many other fans like the Guos spared no effort to offer help 
to those in need. Days later, the four joined other fans in a team that 
volunteered to buy and supply relief materials to the victims in Fangshan, 
Beijing.  
Ting, Wei, Guo, Huizi, and around ten other key figures also 
coordinated with each other in “counter-attacks” against parents of 
migrant children during the second half of 2012. Every Thursday morning, 
these migrant parents stood in front of the Municipal Education Bureau, 
held posters, and demanded that their children receive equal education 
rights as Beijing students. By doing this, these parents hoped that the 
bureaucrats would invite them inside and at least listen to their appeals. It 
appeared to the Beijingers in the middle of October that these parents did 
not propose calmly and rationally to the staff members, but started to 
irritate, to humiliate, and even to threaten a woman staff member after 
being invited into the office. “The official was doing her duty—whatever she 
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said was decent and under the law. We should support her,” Ting said to 
himself, hearing about the situation from those who were on spot, “The 
staff cannot do anything to the cunts. But we, Beijingers, are still alive. We 
should stop them because they are harming us. They shall not be fearless 
and shameless doing whatever they want. Humiliating a woman 
official—doing things that are illegal and immoral should not legitimize 
whatever they demand. If it happened, that would be unfair. We should 
help them know that we aren’t that tolerant. It’s time that Beijingers like 
us stepped forward, fought back, and gave them a lesson.”  
There were things that the staff on duty could not do but these Beijing 
Defenders could. Indignant as he was, Ting left his workplace right away 
and headed for the Bureau. He planned to resolve the situation into a good 
fight on his own. Failing to have Ting answer his phone, more Defenders at 
work were left no choice but to arrive at the Bureau as soon as possible 
only to support Ting. They agreed to call the police if necessary, so that the 
outsider protests could be wiped out immediately. They also reported the 
incident live via Weibo, as they expected more Beijingers might help out.  
From then on until the Spring of 2013, these four and other key 
Defenders were in front of the Bureau every Thursday as long as the 
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parents were there. When the parent representatives went into the 
building, they would follow them and watch them, playing the role of the 
reception staff’s bodyguards. Those Defenders, who did not follow the 
parent representatives into the office, would crowd together outside of the 
building on the opposite side of road where the parent protesters stood. 
When the parents shouted, the Defenders shouted back. The police would 
sometimes come and take control, while expressing gratitude for the 
Defenders’ maintaining social order and cooperating with the government. 
When journalists came and took videos at times, the Defenders would 
perform actively but calmly in front of the cameras and microphones, and 
tell the whole story from their standpoint.  
Despite solely aiming at protecting their own interests, the Defenders 
managed to make their actions seem to be a just campaign against 
anti-government and separationist sabotage10 and succeeded in gaining 
                                                             
10 As argued by the defenders, evidence was found that these migrant parents were 
organized and sponsored by the Open Constitution Initiative or Gongmeng, which was 
established in 2003 by a group of lawyers and political dissidents. Advocating for the rule 
of law, democracy, public interests, and social justice, Gongmeng actively annulled the 
Repatriation System, drafted 2005 China Human Rights Report, and suggested 
refinements to China’s Constitution. The organization started to get engaged in the 
education rights of migrant children in 2006. In 2009, the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau 
banned the organization. Gongmeng was charged with tax evasion and one of the 
founding members Xu Zhiyong was arrested for a while. The defenders believed the 
crackdown resulted from the fact that Gongmeng received 200,000 dollars of foreign aid 
from Yale University, which might imply their anti-government position. In August 2010, 
the case of Gongmeng’s tax evasion was withdrawn. In February 2013, Xu spread flyers in 
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the favor of the police. For the Defenders, the reception bureaucrats 
symbolized the supposed regional education disparity and the correctness 
of the state. By protecting the bureaucrats who were also Beijingers, the 
local Beijingers attempted to metaphorically defend their vested 
educational advantage over the migrants, as well as the correctness and 
sovereignty of the state. Recognized by the police, the Defenders avoided 
acting improperly, since they would follow the police’s directions and 
always turn to the police for help. It could be possible that the police 
somehow had an idea of where these migrant parents were coming from, 
which, as a result, aligned them with the Defenders. What the Beijingers 
learnt from the rectangular relations among the Education Bureau, the 
police, the migrant parents and their potential supporters, and themselves 
was that the only way for them to act safely was to stay in line with the 
authorities.  
A comparison between the volunteerism in the rainstorm and the 
protection of education rights indicates that the Beijingers involved 
strengthened their local identity through real action. Gradually, teasing 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the Beijing Subway, calling on migrants in Beijing to gather in front of the Beijing 
Municipal Education Bureau on the 28th of that month and to express their wish for equal 
education rights. Months later in July, he was held in custody for assembling the crowd 
and disturbing public order. In 2014, Xu was sentenced to 4 years of prison. 
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outsiders and expressing home-loving via Weibo comments and through 
cheer team participation did not qualify for their loyalty to Beijing. These 
Beijingers believed the best way to demonstrate their Beijing identity, was 
by helping or, in their words, “doing something substantial” to their fellow 
Beijingers—may they be those who suffered from the rainstorm or those 
who would become less competitive than the migrant children if they both 
had equal access to high school education. Apparently, helping the victims 
of the rainstorm disaster and the costs of reconstruction could not feasibly 
be provided by only a group of altruistic fans, and it wasn’t the Defenders 
who were entitled to policy making. Thus, what these Beijingers did and 
called for always involved more symbolic meaning than a practical one and 
in return contributed to the arousal of a collective awareness rather than 
an individual local pride.  
However, whether the ends justified the means in the two 
aforementioned events remained debatable. As discussed in the last 
paragraph, these long term Beijingers believed that in order to protect 
their life styles, something had to be done on their own. In fact, it seemed 
that hooligan acts and the practice of brotherhood values were the only 
elements in their repertoire. In the rainstorm incident as well as other 
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similar events, long term Beijingers resisted the outsiders’ obscenities on 
Weibo with massively abusive language in return. Once one Beijinger 
started the verbal combat and was very soon attacked back in return, all 
his online friends and relations proclaimed war against the “evil” outsiders, 
cursing them and hoping this response would silence them. The spirit of 
this way of defense persisted and further evolved from verbal into 
behavioral expression.  
Ting’s mob-like initiatives seemed to reveal that violence and unlawful 
behavior were the primary means which the collective used to achieve their 
goals. That the Defenders showed up at the Education Bureau was aimed 
at protecting their fellow Beijingese staff and more importantly their 
comrades. There is no use in trying to predict what would have happened 
without the police. Nevertheless, even if they were obedient to the police 
and did not resort to fighting, their weekly presence suggested that they 
did not trust anyone else, including the police, to protect their educational 
interests (which obviously was not the duty of the police in the first place). 
Although “Traditional Beijingers” planned primarily to crack down the 
migrant parents’ protests, gathering as many as possible at the Education 
Bureau was nothing but the pre-stage of street fights and gang wars.  
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Compared with the volunteering response to the rainstorm, the 
“counter-attack” campaign was more efficient in uniting long term 
Beijingers. In July, the proponents and opponents were still vaguely 
constituted as long term Beijingers and newcomers, partly because long 
term Beijingers did not start their plans to confront the outsiders. The 
former knew nothing beyond the news that some outsiders hated them, 
not even who these people were and how to effectively fight back apart 
from condemning outsiders through Weibo. Besides, long term Beijingers 
who actually drove their cars and sent supplies to the disaster area were 
outnumbered by those who supported the “counter-attack” campaign. 
Thus, the majority of long term Beijingers had a blurred impression of 
what was going on, or at best some names of those who called for support. 
Personal connections with these active supporters had yet to be formed.  
On the other hand, the weekly Education Bureau experience provided 
Beijingers with an operational vision of their foes and friends. It was clear 
to long term Beijingers that in real life, any migrant who would compete for 
education resources with them was nothing more than their enemy. As 
they could see parent migrants were directed by human right promoters 
and were given bottled water and boxed lunches; it became tangible and 
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the Defenders began to have a clear image of the real conspirators whom 
they should fight against. Restricting their scope of response to only a few 
targets would help them come up with focused and purposeful strategies.  
As for friends, they connected in personal forms, rather than merely 
through social media such as Weibo. Of course, Weibo and other 
web-blogs were the platforms for the general long term Beijingers scattered 
all over the city to communicate with each other and to learn what was 
going on in Beijing, but to most of the Defenders, especially to Ting, 
membership to his personal circle was not earned through friending each 
other online but rather through presenting oneself in front of the 
Education Bureau. “Everyone can fight with their tongues and keyboards, 
but we want everyone to actually do something.” To do, instead of to claim, 
loyalty to Beijing often meant giving up individual interests, including 
being absent from work every Thursday and risking one’s life and 
reputation. It did not require as much sacrifice from long term Beijingers 
to purchase supplies to help the rainstorm victims, in contrast to 
confronting the well-mobilized parent migrants and sometimes face the 
hostile media.  
Long term Beijingers felt reassured as they saw senior comrades 
152 
 
 
consistently coming each week and new Beijingers constantly joining them. 
However, among these Beijingers who were able to make their way to the 
Bureau almost every Thursday for five months, many were self-employed 
small business people and some were college undergraduates. People from 
these occupations enjoyed more flexible schedules. For those who were 
regular employees, it would only be possible to show up once or twice a 
month. On the other hand, their self-employed status also implied their 
economic disadvantage and insecurity Since Defenders have become 
personally linked, they invited one another to their vendors, shops, and 
restaurants at times. By doing this, long term Beijingers were able to 
entertain each other and to establish closer friendships. In return, 
Defenders would start bringing their own friends there and individually 
advertising for these businesses through Weibo. Although each Defender 
still lived on their own, the relationship amongst everyone was bound 
together. In other words, an interdependent yet autonomous social 
network among long term Beijing Defenders was developed. Thus, 
collective solidarity was built not only based upon the common local 
identity and educational interests, but also on personal connections 
through which everyone was able to benefit from others. According to 
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Hardin (1995), the formation of a group, or a group conflict does not 
necessarily hinge on an imagined group loyalty, but on the cooperation of 
each group member who could receive a share of the benefits. 
 
During a late lunch after the counter-attack defense on a Thursday in 
November 2012 had ended, Ting, Wei, and Guo came up with the idea of 
officially establishing an organization that would unite as many long term 
Beijingers as possible and facilitate more home-loving actions collectively. 
The inspiration of setting up a formal and registered organization came 
from their well-established relationships with the police and the 
bureaucracy. “To get registered is to be recognized by the government,” 
said Ting and Huizi together, “Government being the backup, things are 
always done more easily.”  
Soon, a website was launched by Ting, a computer science 
professional in his late twenties at the time. He named the website 
“Traditional Beijingers”, and made it an online forum that welcomed 
Beijingers to share their common stories, discuss Pekingese culture, and 
craiglist useful information and resources. Intended to involve as many 
long term Beijingers as possible, the forum was outperformed in 
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expanding networks by Weibo which seemed to incubate the former. Most 
of the forum users heard about “Traditional Beijingers” from their Weibo 
friends who spread the news on the site. As a system separate from Weibo, 
users had to be signed up and logged on before writing anything. Most of 
the forum users would continue using the nicknames they used on Weibo, 
so as to be identifiable among the circle. However, due to the popularity 
and technological advantages that Weibo enjoyed, this “grassroots” 
website was less efficient and thus far less frequently used. Nor did it 
effectively help long term Beijingers feel closer to each other. At that point, 
the website became increasingly unnecessary. 
As the website was named “Traditional Beijingers”, Ting also proposed 
a non-profit organization that they planned to establish under the same 
name. At first, they envisioned it as a volunteer organization that would be 
targeted at promoting Peking culture. Yet, according to Ting himself, as he 
applied for its registration in early 2013, the application was soon turned 
down since the projected mission of the organization was so vague and 
somehow overlapped with an existing volunteer organization (which was 
called Beijing City Volunteer Service Center) under the same supervision 
of the Beijing Municipal Commission of the China Communist Youth 
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League. Thus, functional redundancy prevented “Traditional Beijingers” 
from being officially registered or recognized.  
Nevertheless, any efforts that seemed unsuccessful on the surface 
were not at all in vain, in terms of the affirmation of the leadership of the 
movement. Especially within the Defenders’ circle, the names of Guo and 
Ting were widespread among long term Beijingers who admired them for 
their bravery and consistency. Ting was well known for his advocacy of a 
Pekingese brotherhood and his efforts to make this come true. As a lawyer, 
Guo had been particularly respected as an authority and the actual 
coordinator of the Defenders, since he would offer insightful 
understandings and professional solutions to each situation. When long 
term Beijingers began to contact someone already in the circle in order to 
know how to join the “counter-attack” campaign, the response they 
received was more or less a sentence that said, “Whenever you arrive, 
contact Master Guo, do whatever he asks you, and everything will be fine,” 
along with the address of the Education Bureau and Guo’s cellphone 
number.  
Long term Beijingers showed their support for the two, as well as Huizi 
and other “celebrities”, by following them on Weibo and fanatically 
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forwarding their posts along with their favorable comments. Huizi would 
follow every one of his followers as long as they were long term Beijingers, 
as he thought this could gather and network as many online Beijingers as 
possible, while Guo and Ting did not friend their followers unless they met 
them in person, which implied that at least they saw their true 
participation in the campaign. Plus the fact that he enjoyed listening to 
pop music and rock music and often shared pictures of his dishes on 
Weibo, was the way that Huizi projected himself as a teenager with a 
child-like character that made him a popular and welcoming figure among 
many long term Beijingers.  
In contrast, long term Beijingers saw Ting and Guo as their 
charismatic leaders whose concentric circles of supporters were believed 
to rank the followers according to their significance to the campaign. As a 
consequence, whether one was followed by Ting, Guo and also those who 
actively interacted with the two core leaders developed by and large into a 
measure of whether he or she was worth being followed (or followed back). 
Oftentimes, it was the new Defenders or the ones on the periphery of the 
online community who initiated friending acts. Though long term 
Beijingers were implicitly expected to friend each other, so as to enlarge 
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and consolidate the community, after noticing they were followed by 
peripheral Defenders, the semi-cored Beijingers had the psychological 
privilege of disregarding the signals of friend requests. As Ting and Guo 
consolidated their leadership, which paved the way for more effective 
collective actions in the months to come, a stratified system of roles fitted 
long term Beijingers based on their assumed significance and closeness to 
the key figures was established, notwithstanding personal connections 
formed individually that created equality and interdependence. As Tilly 
(2008) has argued, strong repertoires that take up contentious 
performances greatly narrow claim-making choices, unless political 
opportunities or other interactive factors have them transformed and 
evolved as campaigns develop. 
 
Though almost half a year was spent on the education disparity issue, 
long term Beijingers did not limit themselves to it alone but sought every 
opportunity which could be used to blame the outsiders to get them to 
leave Beijing. In the middle of April, 2013, a fifty-seven-year-old sanitation 
worker was reported to be beaten up by three young adults who were 
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plastering small advertisements11. In the news, Wang, the sanitation 
worker with stitches in his head said before being attacked, he had a 
quarrel with the three men, since his duty was to make sure his assigned 
area was free of litter and small advertisements (Zhan & Li, 2013). This 
piece of news shocked many long term Beijingers, who were provoked not 
only by the scattered mess made up of small advertisement in the city, but 
also by the outrageous acts of the three small advertisements distributers.  
They extended their support to Wang for his commitment to work and 
demanded that the three distributers should be severely punished. To long 
term Beijingers, Wang symbolized the safeguarding of the city, while the 
three were seen as bad aliens who invaded the city and even bullied the 
                                                             
11 Small advertisements, or often called “illegal posters”, are palm-sized commercials that 
either contain illegal contents such as pornography and fraud or are not authorized to be 
spread, or plastered on walls. Oftentimes, it is either an individual or company who has 
unregistered workshops producing these advertisements and pay other individuals to 
spread them. By so doing, all the three parties can make huge profits, as they shrewdly 
avoid government supervision and taxation. Apart from the illegality of their contents, 
small advertisements have long been considered as urban eye-sores, as the Forty-third 
Article of The Regulations of Beijing City Appearance and Environmental Sanitation, which 
was passed in 2002, declares that no one is allowed to spread, hang, plaster, and paint 
advertisements without the authorization of the municipal administrative departments. 
Violation of this regulation will result in the confiscation of unlawful earnings and a fine 
up to 500,000 yuan (80,000 dollars), which will be enforced by the Urban Administrative 
and Law Enforcement officers. The Article also claims that if the content of advertisement 
violates rules and regulations that concern industrial and commercial administration, 
health, and public security, the owner of the advertisement is told by the Urban 
Administrative and Law Enforcement officers to receive punishment from related 
authorities. Various parties are responsible for the cleanliness of their assigned areas and 
should make sure these areas are free from small-advertisements. For instance, sanitary 
units are responsible for the cleanness of city streets, underground passages, and 
pedestrian overpasses. A specific urban neighborhood office is responsible for the 
cleanliness of the residential area of which it takes charge. 
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protector in broad daylight. Responding in action, a few long term 
Beijingers started tearing off illegal posters whenever they saw there on 
their way to work or back home after a couple of days. Some wrote in their 
Weibo, 
Recently a sanitation worker was retaliated against and seriously 
wounded when he was cleaning up some illegal posters. I have a 
mixed feeling of grief and resentment! Our home is invaded and 
damaged. We can tolerate this no more. Being unconditionally 
inclusive is to appease! To hell with all the weakness, timidity, 
indifference, and invisibility! From now on, I will tear off small 
advertisements whenever and wherever I can. I will show the strength 
of Beijing whenever and wherever I can. Today, I tore off over 30 
pieces. 
These words and practices soon reached Ting, Wei, Guo, and Huizi 
through social media, as these long term Beijingers kept tearing off illegal 
posters and publicizing their deeds every day. The four planned to organize 
people to tear up illegal posters in a group.  
Their goals were twofold. One was to hope, at the most superficial level, 
that some quantities of posters would be torn up. The other, more 
essential than the first, was to get ready for a bloody street fight with 
anyone whom they caught plastering such small advertisements. “If they 
(who are paid to plaster the advertisements) see us ruining their work, they 
dare not do what they do to the old Wang because we outnumber them. 
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This is what we want to see. We want to intimidate them. We want to let 
them know who really has the say in the city.” Ting said to his followers 
privately. Ting and Guo did not attempt to take revenge on the three young 
adults but to declare war on everyone in the illegal poster industry. But 
again, their defense of the city was backed up by their fists and physical 
strength, though arbitrarily and opportunistically packaged in the 
poster-tearing context. 
 
This photo pictures a common occurrence of the mushroom of small 
advertisements in Beijing. They are all over the two bus station posts. (Guo, 
2012). 
Lingering on their minds for over ten days, the plan was eventually put 
into action on Saturday, May 4th, 2013, China’s Youth Day that officially 
commemorates the arousal of national awareness among the general mass 
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of the population during the historic May Fourth Movement. The character 
qing in qingnian that meant youth in Chinese, had the same pronunciation 
with a qing that meant “to clean up”. The character nian shared the same 
pronunciation with another nian in Chinese that referred to “mess”. Huizi 
quickly picked up this homophonic pun during the activity and informed 
the rest of the group. From him, this activity started to be called “Clean up 
the Mess”, as it implied that young adult Beijingers were cleaning up the 
small advertisements that were stuck to walls, poles, and any public 
surfaces.  
For the first activity, they were able to gather another five long term 
Beijingers through social media and personal connections. The nine met at 
Puhuangyu Street, a street in Southern Beijing where small 
advertisements were pervasive. As planned, they cleaned them up along 
both sides of this street, making it a pilot exercise for further activities. 
Guo, and Wei brought shovels and brushes with which they could do the 
cleaning work efficiently. Huizi brought a video recorder, hoping to record 
their actions for future use. Apart from all these preparations, Ting also 
invited two newspaper journalists to join them, with his wife 
accompanying the two journalists and constantly providing answers to 
162 
 
 
their questions. Their story came out in the Beijing Youth Daily the next 
day. 
Inviting journalists to report on the group’s work was a strategy that 
significantly publicized their war on small advertisements, resulting in a 
massive movement of more long term Beijingers to join and participate. 
During the second action in early August 2013, the group increased to 
twenty people who learned about the group action through the newspaper 
and Weibo. The majority of the participants were already friends of Ting, 
Guo, Huizi, and Wei, as they knew one another in the soccer fans 
organization or during the time they defended their education rights. The 
participative response of these “old friends” resulted from their trust in 
and personal closeness with Ting and the other three, although protecting 
the city from the outside invaders was supposedly the original concern.  
This time, Ting was able to invite a correspondent from the Beijing 
Television Station to videotape and present their activity on a legal 
program that often reported crimes committed by outsiders and was 
well-received by many long term Beijingers. In the episode, Huizi 
publicized his personal Weibo account. Seeing the episode of the legal 
program, many long term Beijingers who had also long been annoyed by 
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small advertisements were impressed by the form of action that Ting and 
his friends used to save their home. They started to friend Huizi on Weibo. 
As Huizi would friend everyone back indiscriminately and thus they 
friended one another, sometimes close virtual relations were established 
along with constant chats and comments, making many long term 
Beijingers willing to volunteer in tearing down small advertisements and in 
meeting Huizi as well as other people offline in person.  
During the third action in late August, the number of participants 
reached forty-two. During the two and a half years since May 2013, Ting 
and his volunteers welcomed over eleven media outlets, including seven 
local newspapers, two television stations from other provinces, and a radio 
station. However, most of the media afterwards were not invited by Ting or 
any members. Instead, it was these media who contacted Ting, asking his 
permission for news-reporting and interviews. A year later in May 2014, 
more than 500 people volunteered in the small advertisement elimination 
campaign. By the end of 2015, 192 activities were held in total on a weekly 
basis, and sometimes twice a week; the number of participating volunteers 
reached 1608, with total working hours exceeding 15,000 hours. During 
the activities, Ting’s group not only voluntarily took charge of cleaning 
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small advertisements in the street, but also collected those that were 
scattered in the subway.  
The growing involvement of the media complicated the image of Ting 
and other volunteers and the meaning of the campaign. The focus of media 
coverage shifted from introducing the activity of “Clean up the Mess” itself 
to a promotion of Ting’s charisma and volunteers’ heroism. The turning 
point of the shift was believed to be a feature story that was published on 
November 20th, 2013, a month before the activity was routinized. The 
article called on subway passengers to understand the work of the 
volunteers. When seeing people in teams collecting small advertisements, 
many passengers would misunderstand them as 1) workers hired by the 
subway company, 2) people who wanted to make a profit by selling the 
used small advertisements as printed products, and 3) small 
advertisements distributers’ accomplices who would recycle the small 
advertisements for re-distribution. It also reported in the story that 
volunteers sometime risked being bullied by small advertisement 
distributers. Since then, special attention was given to Ting and his 
volunteers per se. On November 17th, 2013, a Weibo account called “Top 
News” published a post that said, 
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[Volunteers in Beijing Cleaned up Small Advertisements that 
Totaled up to 200 kg in Subway Line 10 within 3 Hours] Yesterday, 64 
volunteers came to Bagou Station at Beijing Subway Line 10 to clean 
up small advertisements. 200 kg of small advertisements were 
collected into trash bags, and were given to subway employees. These 
volunteers are spontaneously organized young Beijingers. They 
always take action at weekends. Where there are small 
advertisements, there is their presence.  
The plot of these later feature stories had a similar description of a messy 
environment with numerous small advertisements in the beginning, an 
unchanging quotation of “there is a group of youths in Beijing…” or “the 
founder of the activity is Ting…” to reveal the conflict between the unlawful 
spread of the advertisements and the group’s positive energy. The rising 
action would always include some of their hard-working scenarios and 
interviews with the volunteers, along with the introduction and 
development of the organization. The climax would sometimes include 
Ting and a few core members confronting small advertisement distributers 
face to face. As for the resolution, there would be a scene of the whole 
volunteer family saying “we love Beijing”, signifying that their campaign 
went on. Among the reports, was a one on one interview with Ting. A 
volunteer, who was a university undergraduate majoring in journalism, 
had her graduation design on this topic and named her project “Clean up 
the Mess in Beijing”.  
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Along with the increasing popularity of Ting and the “Clean up the 
Mess” campaign was the group’s constant pandering to the heroic tone 
which was established by the media. Now that they were lifted to the moral 
high ground, Ting, Guo, and Huizi adjusted the rationale of their activity to 
a discourse of “spreading positive energy around Beijing”. When Ting and 
Guo were asked why they came up with the group action, Ting said, “I read 
the news about an old sanitation worker who was beaten up in April 2013. 
This news firmed up our resolution to kill all the small advertisements. We 
are determined to fight against them. We decided to clean them up”.  
Ting’s response in the interview implied that those who played the 
devils were no longer the assumed outsiders, but small advertisements 
themselves. Thus the highest priority was given to cleaning up small 
advertisements, rather than going after the distributors. Volunteers 
claimed that cleaning up the small advertisements was to demonstrate by 
action their love for the city, while cleaning in a group was for the sake of 
everyone’s safety, so as to prevent Wang’s tragedy from happening again. 
“Love Beijing with actions” and “You are not alone in Beijing” became the 
slogans of these activities. Apparently, tearing off small advertisements 
was interpreted as a concrete demonstration of their devotion to the city, 
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the emphasis of which submerged the original intention of violence and 
conflict. Not only did members in the activities not initiate a single fight, 
none of the volunteers who joined in 2014 had the least hint of an idea that 
Ting, Guo, Huizi, and Wei had even planned for this in the first place. 
When confronting small advertisement distributers face to face, Ting and 
core members would ask them to tear off and clean up what they had just 
plastered or distributed. If the distributors disobeyed, Ting would threaten 
them by calling the police. Volunteers often argued that they joined the 
activity because their home was being ruined so they needed to take such 
actions to protect it. This was argued in front of the media as well as with 
the distributors to whom this was not a concern at all.  
In addition to the media, the relationship with the authorities was also 
a powerful force that pushed Ting, Guo, Wei, and Huizi away from violence 
and pure hatred. As it was getting cold and windy, pursuing the campaign 
outside in the open air for hours became unfeasible for many long term 
Beijingers. Lu, a tall and robust young man in his late twenties, suggested 
to Ting and Guo that they could continue their activity in the subway, 
where countless small advertisements wreaked havoc. Yet unlike those 
plastered outside, small advertisements underground in the subway trains 
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were not stuck to the walls but simply scattered on the window edges, on 
the seats and on the floor, and sometimes dangled through the handles, 
which allowed for volunteers to clean them up more quickly. Besides, they 
did not need tools such as shovels and brushes. They would only need a 
pair of gloves if they wanted to keep their hands clean. All of the tools 
including the volunteer badges were provided by Ting, Guo, and Wei, while 
the volunteers only had to spend 2 yuan (less than 40 US cents) for their 
own subway ticket.  
 
A snapshot of Guo’s wife picking up small advertisements on the 
subway floor.  
Source: Xing Yushi 
In order to carry out any activity legitimately in the subway, 
organizations had to receive permission from the subway company and the 
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subway police. Yet unregistered as it was by October 2013, the 
“Traditional Beijingers” organization was not able to submit their 
application for these activities. Luckily, Ting had a relative working at the 
police force in the subway sub-division. Thus, the first subway activity was 
able to take place under personal consent from this connection. As the 
number of volunteers increased to sixty in November 2013 and they were 
able to hold regular activities every week in the subway, it was clear to Ting 
that sustaining the status quo was heavily depended on their 
harmlessness to the subway authority and the government. “Any action 
that resulted in violence could be destructive to the organization”, said 
Ting (Wang, Wang, Zhu, & Dong, 2013).  
Before each activity started after November 2013, volunteers were 
required to sign a disclaimer within which they were asked not to be 
contentious. After the disclaimers with signatures were collected, a 
mid-level member would emphasize this specific rule to every volunteer 
again and again. That “participants should not start a conflict with anyone” 
was institutionalized by a code of conduct that was initiated by the 
managerial members in July 2014 (Bjtale, 2014). In addition, the code of 
conduct also discouraged volunteers form cleaning small advertisements 
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alone in their free time (ibid). 
Although the subway authority did not pay much attention to the 
campaign in the beginning, after a couple of activities were held, they 
started to acknowledge the achievements of the volunteers as a whole. 
Volunteers were especially spoken highly of by middle aged sanitation 
workers who were hired by the subway company, since it cost these 
workers painstaking physical effort to bend down and pick up the small 
advertisements. Apparently, the emergence of the volunteers saved these 
workers from much work. According to Ting in an interview, during the 
second time when underground “Clean up the Mess” was carried out, 
subway staff welcomed, chatted and took photos with them (Wang, Wang, 
Zhu, & Dong, 2013). The subway authority from its own point of view also 
saw the huge potential of voluntary service, and started to seek 
opportunities to cooperate with “Traditional Beijingers”.  
The subway company was able to make connection with Ting and 
asked him if he could gather a certain number of volunteers and assist 
with some tasks. In December 2013, the Beijing Subway Company put up 
an emergency evacuation drill and invited “Traditional Beijingers” 
volunteers to participate in it. In March 2014, over 20 “Traditional 
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Beijingers” volunteers visited the training base of the Beijing Subway 
Electro-mechanical Company and acquired knowledge of subway 
mechanics. Although the two pieces of news did not show any sign that 
they were organized volunteers but simply interested passengers (Beijing 
Subway, 2013; Beijing Subway, 2014), Ting and Wei regarded the two 
activities as benefits to their volunteers and a good opportunity for team 
building.  
Furthermore, effective measures were taken by the Subway Company, 
which essentially affirmed the contribution that “Traditional Beijingers” 
made. In the latter half of November 2013, more than 400 kilograms or 
270,000 pieces of small advertisements were found and cleaned up by 
subway police and employees in Subway Line 10 where “Traditional 
Beijingers” volunteers were most active, while more than 35 small 
advertisement distributors were handed to the police. Volunteers were 
content to see that their activities were not empty gestures, but ended up 
pushing the authority to take action. In March 2014, Ting and Guo were 
invited by The Legislative Affairs Office of Beijing Municipal People's 
Government to attend a symposium on the legislation of The Regulation of 
the Beijing Municipality on Operational Safety of Rail Transportation. This 
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regulation was finally passed in November 2014 and implemented in May 
2015. According to the regulation, distributing small advertisements was 
strictly prohibited, although no fine or penalty was mentioned.  
Apart from the Subway authority, the Beijing Municipal Commission 
of City Administration and Environment and the police force also took 
measures against small advertisements. From May 2013 to February 2014, 
more than 30,000 police were engaged in capturing small advertisement 
distributers; more than 13,000 distributors were caught among whom 
2500 were held in custody (Ye, 2014). Still in this period, more than five 
million pieces of small advertisements were collected by the police; twelve 
workshops that produced small advertisements were destroyed (Ye, 2014). 
Making the cleaning up of small advertisements the work focus of the year 
in 2014, urban management law enforcement sectors punished over 
48,000 companies or individuals who produced and spread small 
advertisements; 4900 people were held in custody by the police (Wu, 
2015).  
Enjoying official recognition and a cooperative relationship with the 
government, Ting and Guo decided to take a step forward in terms of 
strengthening ties with the authorities. Although “Traditional Beijingers” 
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failed to become registered as a non-profit organization earlier, now that it 
had 500 volunteers in total and over 60 volunteers available for each 
activity, as well as a well-earned reputation from the media, it occurred to 
Ting that registration was unnecessary for the overall development of the 
organization. Instead, “Traditional Beijingers” remained a grassroots 
organization, and since May 2014, it gained the favor of and became 
subordinate to the Beijing Municipal Commission of the China 
Communist Youth League. Despite fundraising being illegal due to its 
“unregistered” status, “Traditional Beijingers” was able to more or less 
sustain itself by selling its service to the Commission.  
“Clean up the Mess” was arranged under a charitable program called 
“Charitable Saturday” that combined over a hundred similar grassroots 
organizations’ Saturday activity projects. Sponsored by the Commission 
and Beijing Youth Association Development Promotion Center, “Charitable 
Saturday” provided each of its projects with some support. Gloves, plastic 
bags, volunteer badges, and masks that had cost Ting, Guo, and Wei more 
than ten thousand yuan (equivalent to almost two thousand USD) on their 
own were now supplied by “Charitable Saturday”. Ting, as well as the 
leaders of other organizations whose activities were under this umbrella, 
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would propose a budget of all the needed materials and submitted it to the 
Commission. The Commission would then pass the combined budget of 
“Charitable Saturday”, and the total amount would be divided among all 
the organizations. 
That Ting managed to elevate “Traditional Beijingers” in such a quick 
and smooth way also echoed the work plan of the Beijing Municipal 
Commission of the China Communist Youth League in 2003. It was 
planned that volunteerism and the philosophy of public service should be 
massively promoted among teenagers and young adults, in order to 
beautify the capital city (China Communist Youth League Beijing 
Committee, 2013). “Through life practice and social perceptions, teenagers 
and young adults shall in large numbers form new life attitudes including 
independence, positivity, responsibility, helping each other, and 
dedication to society” (ibid). Especially in terms of institutionalizing 
volunteerism, the Commission planned to establish an extensive network 
that covered a wide range of organizations and to have over two million 
volunteers register in its online pool, so that volunteers could sign up for 
the activities they wanted to participate in and the system would record 
their volunteer hours.  
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In this way, the participation rate of volunteer service could be 
officially measurable and quantifiable (ibid). In the work plan of 2014, 
“Charitable Saturday” was particularly mentioned as an exemplary 
program that should be promoted the whole year around, as it could 
effectively mobilize citizens into volunteering (China Communist Youth 
League Beijing Committee, 2014). The 2014 plan also proposed to explore 
effective channels and practical measures of social governance at a 
grassroots level, and to increase youth organizations’ participation in the 
social development of the capital city (ibid). 
However, since there were over a hundred grassroots organizations 
that had their activities listed under “Charitable Saturday”, competition 
among these organizations, in order to receive informal support, appeared 
to be crucial to Ting. Taking advantage of the human resources that 
“Traditional Beijingers” absorbed, Ting and Wei started to collaborate with 
the Commission. When the Commission needed to recruit a large number 
of volunteers in a short time, Ting would successfully offer help to the 
Commission by organizing available volunteers. These occasions included 
providing aid to travelers who were going back to their hometown before 
the Chinese New Year and picking up litter in temple fairs during this 
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festival. Volunteers who participated in these activities knew in advance 
that by doing this, they were not making Beijing more beautiful. Still, 
willing to participate, they internalized their participation as a charitable 
gesture and the spread of positive energy.  
Although support from the authority and the media’s publicity 
discouraged Ting and other long term Beijingers who were volunteers of 
the “Clean up the Mess” activities to express their local hostility against 
outsiders openly, these social forces did not at all help attenuate the 
hostility that was embedded in their deep emotions. Instead, long term 
Beijingers seemed to believe that their hostility was justified, by the 
encouraging stance that the authority and the media took. In December 
2015, Huizi forwarded a post on the official Weibo of “Traditional 
Beijingers” that denounced an outsider woman who was breastfeeding her 
baby. The post said that she had inappropriately exposed herself in public. 
Within two days, thousands of Weibo users became furious and started to 
verbally attack the official Weibo.  
As the argument between volunteers who were in support of 
“Traditional Beijingers” and other Weibo users degenerated into a heated 
online debate, Ting received a phone call from an officer with the Beijing 
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Municipal Commission of the China Communist Youth League. Not 
knowing it was actually Huizi who was in charge of the “Traditional 
Beijingers” Weibo account, the officer simply informed Ting that the only 
problem concerning this farce was that they could have used better 
wording to address the woman’s uncivilized behavior. As long as the 
hostile sentiment was not made public, it appeared to these long term 
Beijingers that it was totally legitimate to have and maintain it. 
Long term Beijingers were also able to legitimize their local hostility 
through a series of population control policies and work plans in recent 
years. Strictly controlling population size as well as slowing down 
population growth were made the focus of government plans from 2013 to 
201512. Especially in March 2015, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central 
Committee passed the Beijing Tianjin Hebei Collaborative Development 
Plan, a national strategic move that aimed to dissolve actions that did not 
promote Beijing as a capital city and moving peripheral industries into 
Beijing’s surrounding areas and provinces—Tianjin and Hebei. All these 
policies and their implementation reinforced long term Beijingers’ 
                                                             
12 These plans are found in The Beijing Government Work Report 2013, The Report on the 
Work of Beijing Economic and Social Development 2013, The Beijing Government Work 
Report 2014, and The Beijing Government Work Report 2015. 
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ethno-centric views that outsiders should be removed from the city. 
Whereas the “Clean up the Mess” movement was employed as a strategy to 
stigmatize all outsiders by implicitly referring to small advertisement 
distributors as all coming from this group, these industrial policies that 
made businesses that outsiders worked in as the criterion for their 
removal created hostility between long term Beijingers and outsiders.  
“It is not that they are bad peoples that they must leave; it is because 
their existence in the city does not match the city’s development and 
advancement that they shouldn’t stay.” Some of the long term Beijingers 
believed, “Now they can’t blame us for hating them. Our idea reflects the 
government’s attitude. We are right on this issue.” Thus, what looked like 
a formal support from both the municipal and national government 
policies in fact exonerated long term Beijingers from remorselessly 
demonstrating their antagonism. In other words, the institutionalization of 
exclusion fortified individual hostility which acquired structural 
justification within the system. 
Interestingly, when finding policies or actions that were aligned with 
their local hostility, long term Beijingers would express their appreciation 
for the (exact sectors of the) municipal or national authority at an 
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institutional level. Yet, when realizing implementing certain policies 
clashed with their own interests at times, long term Beijingers would 
choose to complain about the leader, sometimes the mayor or the Party 
leader of the Beijing Committee, or specific experts who came up with the 
policies, who were originally non-Beijing individuals. Long term Beijingers 
stated that it was because these people were not Beijingers in the first 
place, which made them formulate and execute preferential policies for 
outsiders. By blaming experts and officials individually and often at the 
municipal level without proceeding to the national level, long term 
Beijingers cunningly avoided confronting the system as a whole.  
To partially sum up, although discourse adjustments to “spreading 
positive energy” were made to serve as media publicity and to gain 
government support, collaboration with the two institutions was perceived 
by long term Beijingers, as well as founders of the “Traditional Beijingers”, 
as a technique for venting their local hostility. As a consequence, Ting, 
Huizi, and the “Traditional Beijingers” organization were able to 
consistently express antagonism against outsiders; especially Huizi who 
was also in charge of the official Weibo account of “Traditional Beijingers”, 
also who used offensive language to abuse outsiders in a blatant way. Yet, 
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these external factors accounted for the successive development and 
expansion of the organization which was the vehicle for the antagonistic 
sentiment, without explaining why possible hostility was nurtured inside 
the organization. Apart from the realistic concerns that long term 
Beijingers encountered, volunteer cohorts also played an important role in 
introducing and spreading local hostility.  
 
Local hostility rose out of the interior structure of the “Traditional 
Beijingers” organization. On the one hand, long term Beijingers who joined 
the “Clean up the Mess” activity shared similar experiences of losing 
homes as a consequence of social change. On the other hand, as the legacy 
of an equal and free membership, yet rigid stratification, that was first 
formed in the soccer fans organization was still preserved, in order to be 
acknowledged by other Beijing folk, many long term residents would spend 
huge amount of effort getting along with “senior members” who were 
personally close to Ting, Guo, and Huizi, and also held somewhat radical 
views on Beijinger-outsider relations. Weekly contact and online 
communication with these “senior members” reinforced many long term 
Beijingers’ hostile attitudes towards outsiders. Convinced by these “senior 
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members”, some volunteers began to shift their attention from collecting 
small advertisement to blaming small advertisement distributors. 
Although there were a few volunteers withdrawing from the organization 
after a few months of activities, the majority of the volunteers stayed. This 
was either because they found the organization catered to their feelings of 
local hostility or because they gradually made sense of the hostility that 
every other volunteer held. This strongly supported Allport’s 
demonstration that conformity is powerful of acquiring prejudice (Allport, 
1954).  
In addition, realistic issues embedded in symbolism that denoted a 
sense of Beijing would also consolidate long term Beijingers’ local identity. 
No different from those on the walls and on the poles, small 
advertisements in the subway were also perceived as a virus that had 
encroached on the city. However, long term Beijingers generally had a 
stronger rejection for small advertisements in subway trains than those 
advertisements elsewhere. From the summer of 2013, small 
advertisements about real estate began to proliferate in subway trains. 
Critics said their appearance in the subway reflected a stagnation in the 
housing market (Li, 2013).  
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In order to attract potential customers who commuted by subway, 
these small advertisements would always include pictures of castle-like 
mansions with surrounding lakes, huge font in Arabic numerals signifying 
how economical the housing was, and most importantly, how close to or 
convenient to reach downtown Beijing. Apart from this content, a sentence 
that said “you buy the house and we offer you hukou” could also be seen 
on some of the advertisements. According to some volunteers, these 
messages especially aroused their feelings against outsiders, as the 
purchase of these houses connoted the intention of living inside Beijing 
and being a Beijinger, although the credibility of these claims was 
controversial. To many long term Beijingers who regarded this as a threat 
to their material life, Tian said the following that demonstrated his local 
hostility from a unique perspective, 
You know, the more I see these small advertisements, the more 
superior I feel over these outsiders. This superiority makes me feel so 
good. See, I was born a Beijinger; I was able to live in Beijing from the 
day I was born. And they are being fooled by these developers only 
because they want to become a Beijinger and live here! They will never 
become a Beijinger.  
Tian’s hostility did not emerge out of his assumed superiority over 
non-Beijingers, but out of the fragility of this superiority which outsiders 
were ambitiously trying to challenge. To many long term Beijingers, the 
183 
 
 
feeling of superiority, together with their Beijing identity, was an ascribed 
status that nothing could help with its attainment or loss. When asked, 
many said that being born in Beijing and holding a Beijing household 
registration were the two prerequisites of being a Beijinger. Yet, these two 
conditions were not enough. In order to be a true Beijinger, one had to act 
like a Beijinger and do things to make Beijing a better place. Although the 
basketball star Stephon Marbury who helped the Beijing Basketball Team 
win the national Basketball championship three times was not born a 
Beijinger, most of the long term Beijingers would emotionally prefer him to 
any Beijinger who did not make a difference to the city. Long term 
Beijingers added civic participation into the criteria of local membership 
which also included ascribed conditions. The fusion of ascribed status and 
voluntary engagement, in terms of acknowledging one’s identity, resulted 
from such participatory activities and the social forces that accommodated 
these activities. Now that civic participation became a required process to 
demonstrate one’s love of the city, it, however, did not necessarily assist 
with the reduction of prejudice against outsiders.  
 
Still, to a marginal extent, hostility against outsiders was reduced 
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among long term Beijingers who participated in the “Clean up the Mess” 
activity. Before November 2013, as there were less than fifty participants 
each week on average, Wei, who was in charge of the sign-up, would write 
a post every Tuesday and invited anyone who was interested in the activity 
to leave their name and contact information below as a comment. Then, 
Wei would try to figure out whether these candidates were long term 
Beijingers or not, mainly through viewing their Weibo post and sometimes 
asked their ID number whose first three digits would suggest if the holder 
of the number was a Beijinger or not. Wei would only admit those who he 
thought were Beijingers to attend the activity on that Saturday, by 
contacting these admitted volunteers personally on Thursday with the 
gathering time and place.  
As this activity was popularized by the media starting in the late fall of 
2013, a growing number of residents in Beijing started to contact Ting and 
expressed a desire to join the weekly event. It soon became 
time-consuming for Ting and Wei to admit volunteers in this way. Ting 
then upgraded his website with a sign-up system, so as to improve their 
admission efficiency. However, as it went public, this system was 
supposed to welcome all who signed up for the activities. Anyone who was 
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interested in joining the activity must create an account on Website, 
completing their demographic information which included ID number and 
work place. Although the ID number was required information, Ting could 
not justify that their activity was exclusive to Beijingers. Ting and Wei were 
able to tell which candidate was not a Beijinger, and to perhaps inform 
other Beijing volunteers to behave themselves in front of these 
non-Beijingers. But they were not able to show their rejection of these 
non-Beijingers openly, which inevitably opened the gate for outsiders to 
join the activities. It became harder for Ting and Wei to publically not allow 
outsiders to join their activity, especially after their positive image was 
established by media coverage and they were recognized by the 
government authority. 
Every Tuesday, a post was published on their website, saying when 
and where everyone should meet on Saturday and how many people were 
needed for that activity. When people clicked on the sign-up button, their 
names would be listed below chronologically, meaning that everything was 
recorded impersonally and no one could be excluded from the process. 
Then, if the activity was only limited to sixty people in that week, the first 
sixty would be admitted automatically. The webpage would become frozen 
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and the sixty-first person could not to sign up for that week’s activity.  
“Clean up the Mess” was exposed to a number of outsiders through 
media popularization. As existing volunteers only demonstrated the 
“positive energy” side of the story, outsiders had no access to the hostile 
side of the organization. Some believed that since they were now living in 
Beijing, making the city a better place would be part of their duty. Thus, 
whenever the activity was held, there would always be a couple of outsider 
volunteers among the Traditional Beijinger majority. Long term Beijingers 
who often communicated with these outsider volunteers during the 
activities showed less hostility than other long term Beijingers. They said 
that seeing outsiders also participated in these home-loving activities, they 
realized that outsiders should not be regarded as a single category because, 
while the majority was here to take advantage of the city’s resources, there 
were still a group of outsiders altruistically willing to make contribution to 
the city.  
I used to hate all outsiders, with no exception. But after 
participating in the “Clean up the Mess” activities, I met a few 
outsiders who were as active as myself collecting these small 
advertisements. From them, I see their love of the city. I appreciate 
their attitudes and actions. I also feel thankful for Ting and this 
activity which allowed me to know that good outsiders exist. Now I 
think I will at least divide outsiders into good ones and bad ones, 
before hating all outsiders in general.  
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Although the attenuation of local hostility was taken up by only a small 
proportion of Beijing volunteers, this phenomenon indicated that the 
online sign-up system provided a platform for equal status contact 
between Beijingers and outsiders. Despite disparities in education, social 
status, or place of origin, the only formal qualification of membership to 
the “Traditional Beijingers” organization was one’s desire to make Beijing 
free from small advertisements, which disregarded all other background 
factors. In a situation where volunteers actually picked up and destroyed 
small advertisements, or walked inside the subway trains, no special skills 
or expertise, apart from the basic ability that any physically-able person 
should have, was required. This situation was far from a working place 
environment where individuals had unequal status and conflicting 
interests or goals.  
The individualistic perspective that the equal status contact 
hypothesis suggests, as opposed to oversimplifying a given groups is again 
applicable to prejudice reduction when examining interpersonal 
relationships of people within the same group. It exploded the myth of 
collective guilt by showing that sometimes we were no better than they. 
When volunteers began to realize the existence of good outsiders, this 
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Beijingers reduced their prejudice against outsiders. Since the sign-up 
function literally welcomed anyone to join and participate, censorship on 
candidates seemed unreasonable and impossible for Ting and Wei. 
Moreover, as the majority of the volunteers shared the goal of making 
Beijing cleaner and tidier, which was what this activity envisioned, most of 
the volunteers started to believe that every other participant was good by 
nature and could become a potential friend.  
“We are all Beijingers and we have a good heart” was what blinded 
many volunteers, before some of them ended up being cheated or harassed 
by a couple of so-called good-hearted peers. Even though victims reported 
their experience to Wei and Ting, still Wei and Ting could not prohibit 
these “criminals” from attending the activity. There were only informal 
warnings about whom everyone should stay away from. In addition to the 
victims themselves, many other long term Beijingers who also heard of 
these stories started to become disenchanted about the solidary 
collectivity of Beijingers. As they realized that some Beijingers were no 
better than their assumed enemies, local hostility became untenable. 
Selfishness could also be seen from those whose participation only 
served their desire to popularize themselves and to flaunt their own 
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heroism. Some would only sign-up when they learned from Ting that there 
would be newspapers or televisions filming or interviewing them. The 
sharp ethical contrast between the altruistic outsiders and egoistic Beijing 
insiders showed some of the long term Beijingers in this group that their 
presupposed categorization had inherent loopholes which should be 
closed with patches of civic virtue and responsibility.  
 
This chapter examines factors that aggregate and attenuate prejudice 
as a result of group dynamics. First of all, the case of the “Traditional 
Beijingers” supported Allport’s equal contact hypothesis that prejudice 
was reduced when insiders and outsiders performed together in an 
environment where the diversity of status and background did not make a 
difference to achieving a common goal (Allport, 1954). Since equal status 
was shared in the activities, participants were able to regard each other 
from an individualistic approach, which allowed them to find faults with 
other insiders. Thus, prejudice against outsiders would be reduced as the 
assumption of an unparalleled collectivism was empirically put into 
question. However, the reduction of prejudice was not as significant as the 
enlargement of prejudice among long term Beijingers in general. 
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Although equal contact was able to lower prejudice through civic 
participation, participation per se, especially in the current case, did not 
make much of a productive contribution to mitigate inter-group conflict. 
For instance, participation adapted to a positive discourse in the media 
and thus reached and recruited people with similar hostile sentiments. In 
the same relationship with the authorities, local hostility was veiled by 
active participation and was legitimized by the support of the 
superintendent departments and indirectly by some government policies. 
As local hostility was developed from soccer fans organizations to Ting’s 
volunteer organization, it did not seem to abate, even though forms of 
actions that embodied this tension underwent an institutionalized process 
through which hostility against outsiders grew implicit and less open.  
Moreover, the organization of long term Beijingers also led to the 
intensification of prejudice. In order to form friendships with charismatic 
members, new members, as well as those on the periphery of the group, 
adopted the established members’ beliefs and arguments, internalized and 
spread these ideologies as if they originated from themselves. Apart from 
the hierarchical structure, personal connections would also tighten the 
“Traditional Beijingers” network which paved the way for the spread of 
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hostility. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: TO CHANGE OR NOT TO CHANGE? 
In late November 2013 when the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) 
wrote to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Beijing was 
nominated once again as a candidate city of the Olympics, though this 
time the Winter Olympics in 2022. From May to October 2014, the five 
cities in the bidding competition shrank to two, namely Alma-Ata and 
Beijing-Zhangjiakou, as Krakow, Lviv, and Oslo withdrew from the race. 
Even if there were still many Chinese officials and citizens passionate 
about winning the bid, long term Beijingers who could not be more familiar 
with its consequences voiced their rejection to it once again becoming a 
reality. As the 128th IOC Session was approaching, the prevailing 
discourse among “Traditional Beijingers” turned out to be a treasonous 
prayer for Alma-Ata. “Traditional Beijingers” wrote the following posts in 
their social media: 
Cheer for Alma-Ata! Although I know Beijing will definitely again 
win the lottery, I am eager for a surprise.  
Alma-Ata, I cheer for you. Although we are in a competitive 
relationship, I sincerely wish that you will win the bid for the 2022 
Winter Olympics! 
Now that Beijing had become by far the only city in the world that would 
have hosted both the summer and winter Olympics, long term Beijingers 
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felt no pride at all. Some other long term Beijingers expressed their 
admiration for cities such as Krakow and even Boston whose citizens were 
able to make their opposition to hosting the (Summer or Winter) Olympics 
heard and approved by the authorities. This was especially true when 
news came out in June 2015 that both polls conducted separately by the 
IOC and COC showed that more than 90% of the total population 
supported the bidding (Wang, Gao, Lin, & Zhang, 2015), “Traditional 
Beijingers” cried out that they must have been under-represented because 
they “were” a less than 10% minority. 
The reason why long term Beijingers were disgusted with the Olympics 
is obvious in light of their previous experience. What they were afraid of 
was not the Olympics per se, but that all the social changes attached to the 
Olympics would be replayed. For long term Beijingers, the disturbance 
brought to them by the Olympics outweighed any possible benefits. Some 
posted on Weibo that they loathed the Olympics because the Games gave 
them nothing but soaring house prices, an unwilling relocation, crowded 
subways and buses, and millions of unwanted outsiders. And since they 
were experienced at this, they claimed that they did not want to go through 
what they had suffered after 2001 again. Interestingly, as house prices in 
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Zhangjiakou started to climb in early August, immediately after 
Beijing-Zhangjiakou was assured of their victory, “Traditional Beijingers” 
expressed their concern for the local people of Zhangjiakou, worrying that 
they would repeat their experiences. In contrast, some “Traditional 
Beijingers” said that Zhangjiakou local people should not be anticipating 
the benefits of economic development too early, because they would 
definitely regret the decision in the long run.  
 
Figure 5. Population Fluctuation of Beijingers 
Figure 5 compares the percentage of hukou population who are Beijing 
born13 in the total population between that in 1959-2001 and that in 
                                                             
13 There are three ways to acquire Beijing hukou: birth, marriage, and working for 
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2002-2014. I have made 2001 and 2002 as the boundary of the two year 
groups because July 2001 was the time when Beijing won the bid for the 
2008 Summer Olympics. From the Chart, we can still see a significant 
difference of Beijingers’ percentages, despite the problem of the statistical 
validity of a small sample. In 2014, the percentage of Beijing-born 
residents was only around 40% of the total population, let alone those who 
were long term, or multi-generational14. As what the population change 
itself suggests, long term Beijingers believed themselves to already be a 
minority in their own city. Not only is population change one of the 
imposed yet most impressive forms of social change, it also triggers 
changes in other aspects. Long term Beijingers believed that they were the 
ones who paid the price for these social changes.  
Society, social change, and anomie take up Durkheim’s sociological 
focus and transcend all societies. Anomie could be understood as the 
pathological outcome of social relations under social change.  
Social organization periodically undergoes evolutionary changes 
that are independent of man, even though it is man who acts them 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
state-owned or Beijing municipally owned institutions. People who acquire Beijing hukou 
in the latter two ways are considered as outsiders by the locally born population. Thus in 
this chart, I will only show data of hukou population who are Beijing born. 
14 Existing published data does not tell who is multi-generational or/and who is not. So, 
I test on Beijing-born population and imply that multi-generational Beijingers must be 
fewer than Beijing-born Beijingers, because there are Beijing-born Beijingers whose 
parents could be outsiders.  
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out… It follows that corresponding changes in morality are not only 
normal but also necessary, and that the absence of such adjustments 
constitutes a state of pathology. Sometimes the changes in social 
organization proceed so fast that there is a period of lag before the 
morality of society becomes readjusted (Marks, 1971, p. 14). 
Durkheim’s vision of anomie can be applied to long term Beijingers who 
were inertial in terms of their attitudes towards social change. Just as they 
were fanatically against a second Olympics which could engender larger 
and more profound social changes, long term Beijingers had already 
articulated their dissatisfaction with the legacies that they believed were 
introduced by the first Olympics. And in order to locate the source of their 
dissatisfaction, long term Beijingers found a cathartic fix—imputing their 
unfavorable social changes to domestic migrants, or in their terminology, 
“outside cunts”. 
By conducting participatory observation and interviews among a 
group of long term Beijingers who called themselves “Traditional 
Beijingers”, I examined why and how social change facilitated these 
Beijingers’ prejudice against outsiders. As presented in Chapter 4, 5, and 
6, the development of prejudice is respectively correlated with three 
different processes that include 1) the invention of traditions and norm, 2) 
relative deprivation and realistic fears, and 3) civic participation and 
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intra-group relations. These processes are three aspects of macro social 
change. 
In Chapter 4, preparations for the 2008 Beijing Olympics and for 
Beijing later to be a metropolis included cultivating behavioral manners in 
public, especially in subways and buses. Under the supervision of 
government institutions, long term Beijingers obtained these “upgraded” 
behavioral patterns within a few years. And when migrants flooded into 
Beijing in the post-Olympics years, long term Beijingers employed their 
acquired “traditions” as an established civility to distance themselves from 
outsiders who had not been introduced to any of these behavioral 
practices. As a result, the good intention of creating a harmonious national 
image ended up with an unintended consequence that a group of locals 
antagonized the migrant others. In this respect, social change invents 
tradition and thus brought some kind of advantage which was made use of 
in the process of generating prejudice. 
On the other hand, Chapter 5 shows that social change can also give 
rise to (potential) realistic degradations which aroused their nostalgic 
sentiment. Due to a series of urbanization reforms, long term Beijingers 
felt relatively deprived because they were relocated, were mistreated by 
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outsiders in daily life, and were challenged in their socio-economic rights 
and privileges. In response, long term Beijingers missed the “good old days” 
and blamed the in-migrating outsiders for their seemingly downward 
social mobility. Negatively impacted by such social changes, long term 
Beijingers believed whatever existed in the past was better than anything 
at present and sought to reduce every positive thing down to a ground that 
was inherently connected with the old Beijing/Peking. In other words, 
since long term Beijingers perceived social change as unwelcoming and 
disruptive, everything that they valued, especially those that were morally 
and courteously constructive, were ascribed to the old Peking spirit. Long 
term Beijingers denied that certain behavioral patterns that they in reality 
adopted were a result of government cultivation.  
Chapter 6 elucidated the evolution of prejudice in a grassroots 
organization which developed from local hooligan gangs. Believing that the 
love for their city could only be expressed through civic participation and 
actual engagement in making the city better, “Traditional Beijingers” took 
every opportunity that was offered by events happening in the society and 
finally became a full-fledged (although un-registered) organization that 
held routinized activities. However, civic participation did not help reduce 
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prejudice among “Traditional Beijingers”. As the group put on the “Clean 
up the Mess” activity weekly, the positive energy released from it caught 
the eye of the media whose coverage veiled the group’s intended local 
hostility. Cooperative relationships with the government also implied a 
gesture in support of the “Traditional Beijingers”.  
To be noticed, it is the cooperative relationship, as well as 
informal/personal relationships with the authorities that brought a degree 
of freedom to the organization, so that “Traditional Beijingers” were able to 
maintain their hostility; otherwise if the group kept striving for official 
registration as they planned in the beginning, their activities and the 
group could have been totally denied. Hostility did not seem to be abated, 
even though forms of actions that embodied this hostility underwent an 
institutionalized process through which hostility against outsiders grew 
implicit and imperceptible. What was worse, supportive attitudes of the 
government and media exonerated “Traditional Beijingers” from regarding 
their prejudice as something unfriendly and antagonistic. 
On the other hand, intra-group relations also contributed to the 
development of prejudice in the “Traditional Beijingers’” case. Although 
membership of the “Traditional Beijingers” was voluntary and independent, 
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concentric circles of affinity with the founders and core members did exist, 
as movements and activities continued to take place one by one. The more 
actively “Traditional Beijingers” participated in these movements, the more 
highly they would be recognized by the founders and core members, and 
thus the higher their status was in the group. Therefore, the informal 
hierarchy of membership status functioned as an incentive for common 
members to strive for a closer relationship with the core members. In order 
to gain a higher recognition, many “Traditional Beijingers” were inclined to 
parrot the discourses of and to pick up ideas from the core members. 
Besides, equal friendship developed among such members, since they 
shared with each other not only their hostility against outsiders but also 
their personal life experiences. 
Yet, there was still some hint of optimism among the “Traditional 
Beijingers”, although it might not bear any statistical significance. 
Reducing prejudice was not hopeless. The hope lay in equal status contact 
showing a handful of outsiders who were no less passionate about making 
their current city a better place than “Traditional Beijingers”. Under the 
circumstances, it is possible that “Traditional Beijingers” began to favor 
civic local membership over ascribed local membership. Equal status 
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contact also enabled “Traditional Beijingers” to shift their idea of viewing 
persons from a collectivist perspective to an individualistic one. With these 
being said, potential suggestions for reducing prejudice shall be proposed 
on the basis of equal status contact, and a civic-individualistic 
consciousness. Moreover, outsiders should also be encouraged to 
integrate into their host city. Since assimilating outsiders is more or less 
hard to achieve in a city where locals have been outnumbered, cooperation 
and integration must be necessary for the collective solidarity and 
prosperity of the community. 
Social change is inherently fluid yet constant, especially in the 
modernizing world. Even when history may repeat itself today, the exact 
repetition can never be put on without dynamism and transition that 
succeed in pulling the trajectory back to where it was. Like the 2022 
Beijing-Zhangjiakou Winter Olympics, what repeats itself is history but 
more precisely is the history of social change. To adapt to structural 
changes in society, changes of norms and morality should always be able 
to keep up, along with constant negotiation of one’s identity in relation to 
the collective. Otherwise, people will fall into the same abyss that still 
traps long term Beijingers almost eight years after the 2008 Olympics. Now, 
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it seems that many of them are missing their second chance to adjust to 
social change, since they deliberately choose to cling to their “traditional” 
values.  
Although changes in society are normal, prejudice which is 
constructed by social processes does not have to be inevitable. I’m not in 
this thesis promoting the idea that love shall win, or that the better angels 
of our nature shall always prevail, or any discourses that are vulnerable to 
worldly manipulation. Instead, love and hate are products rather than 
causes of our reaction to change.  
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APPENDIX 
R CODE OF FIGURE 5. 
> library(foreign) 
> before<-read.csv(file.choose()) 
> after<-read.csv(file.choose()) 
> perbefore<-before$Percentage.of.hukou.population.who.are.Beijjing.bor
n.in.the.total.population.since.1959 
> summary(perbefore) 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.    NA's  
 0.5996  0.7901  0.8839  0.8489  0.9240  0.9750      10  
> plot(perbefore) 
> mean(perbefore,na.rm=T) 
[1] 0.8489126 
> sd(perbefore,na.rm=T) 
[1] 0.1015914 
> length<-43 
> errbefore <- qt(0.975,df=length-1)*sd(perbefore,na.rm=T)/sqrt(length) 
> leftbefore <- mean(perbefore,na.rm=T)-errbefore 
> rightbefore <- mean(perbefore,na.rm=T)+errbefore 
> leftbefore 
[1] 0.8176473 
> rightbefore 
[1] 0.8801778 
> perafter<-after$Percentage.of.hukou.population.who.are.Beijjing.born.i
n.the.total.population.since.1959 
> summary(perafter) 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.  
 0.3910  0.4018  0.4310  0.4624  0.5447  0.5598  
> plot(perafter) 
> mean(perafter,na.rm=T) 
[1] 0.4624047 
> sd(perafter,na.rm=T) 
[1] 0.07090521 
> length<-13 
> errafter <- qt(0.975,df=length-1)*sd(perafter,na.rm=T)/sqrt(length) 
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> leftafter <- mean(perafter,na.rm=T)-errafter 
> rightafter <- mean(perafter,na.rm=T)+errafter 
> leftafter 
[1] 0.4195572 
> rightafter 
[1] 0.5052523 
> t.test(perbefore, perafter, paired=F, var.equal=F, alternative='two.side
d') 
 
 Welch Two Sample t-test 
 
data:  perbefore and perafter 
t = 15.4387, df = 28.393, p-value = 2.414e-15 
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 
 0.3352578 0.4377579 
sample estimates: 
mean of x mean of y  
0.8489126 0.4624047  
 
> boxplot(perbefore,perafter,ylab="Percentage of hukou population who
 are Beijing born in the total population since 1959", names=c("1959-
2001","2002-2014")) 
 
The “before” file is a CSV excel file that I conducted based on the 
population data from 1949 to 2001. The “after” file is a CSV excel file that 
I conducted based on the population data from 2002 to 2014. The 
limitation of using this figure to demonstrate the significant population 
difference is that the “after” group does not have enough sample. This is 
based on realistic reasons. Hopefully in the years to come, this figure can 
be perfected.  
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TITLES OF MEDIA REPORTS ON THE “CLEAN UP THE MESS” 
MOVEMENT 
Date of 
Publish 
Title Media 
Type of 
Media 
Type of 
Narratives 
5/5/2013 
"Friends" 
Agreed to Tear 
off Small 
Advertisement
s Together 
Beijing Youth 
Daily 
Newspape
r 
Hard news 
8/13/2013 
"Friends" 
Cleaned Small 
Advertisement
s to Retrieve 
the City's 
Beauty 
Beijing 
Television 
Station 
News 
Report in 
A 
Television 
Program 
Hard news 
8/26/2013 
Beijingese 
Youth 
"Clean(ed) up 
the Mess" at 
Weekends 
Beijing Daily 
Newspape
r 
Hard news 
8/27/2013 
Beijingese 
Youth 
"Clean(ed) up 
the Mess" at 
Weekends 
Beijing 
Television 
Station 
News 
Report in 
A 
Television 
Program 
Hard news 
11/17/201
3 
 The "Clean up 
the Mess" 
Movement 
Cleaned 200 kg 
of Small 
Advertisement
s 
Legal Evening 
News 
Newspape
r 
Hard news 
11/20/201
3 
Volunteers 
Hope to Be 
Understood by 
Legal Evening 
News 
Newspape
r 
Hard news 
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Passengers 
11/21/201
3 
Who Should 
"Be the First" 
to Protect the 
Subway 
Environment  
Economic 
Daily 
Newspape
r 
Commentar
y 
12/1/2013 
How Did Small 
Advertisement
s Reduce? 
Legal Evening 
News 
Newspape
r 
Feature 
story 
12/4/2013 
Beijing "Clean 
up the Mess" 
Regiment 
Beijing 
Morning 
News 
Newspape
r 
Feature 
story 
12/17/201
3 
Ting Killing 
Small 
Advertisement
s in the 
Subway 
Legal 
Weekends 
Newspape
r 
Feature 
story 
5/5/2014 
The First 
Anniversary of 
the "Clean up 
the Mess" 
Movement 
Beijing Youth 
Daily 
Newspape
r 
Feature 
story 
    (continued) 
6/5/2014 
 The "Clean up 
the Mess" 
Movement 
People.cn 
(Website 
under 
People's 
Daily) 
Video Clip 
One on one 
interview of 
Ting 
6/11/2014 
 The "Clean up 
the Mess" 
Movement 
Cleaned 
Hundred 
Kilograms of 
Small 
Advertisement
Beijing 
Television 
Station 
News 
Report in 
A 
Television 
Program 
Hard news 
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s in 3 Hours 
6/17/2014 
 The "Clean up 
the Mess" 
Movement 
Cleaned 200 kg 
of Small 
Advertisement
s in 3 Hours 
Beijing Daily 
Messenger 
Newspape
r 
Feature 
story 
7/30/2014 
 The "Clean up 
the Mess" 
Movement 
Beijing Daily 
Newspape
r 
Feature 
story 
8/12/2014 
People who 
Clean up the 
Mess 
Beijing 
Television 
Station 
Television 
Program 
Feature 
story 
12/9/2014 
Stephon 
Marbury 
Showed up in 
the Subway 
and Cleaned 
Small 
Advertisement
s 
Beijing Youth 
Daily 
Newspape
r 
Feature 
story 
1/9/2015 
My University 
Life:  The 
"Clean up the 
Mess" 
Movement 
Di'an 
Campus 
Media 
Television 
Program 
Feature 
story 
2/4/2015 
My 
Documentary: 
The "Clean up 
the Mess" 
Movement 
Hunan 
Television 
Station 
Television 
Program 
Feature 
story 
12/22/201
5 
Stephon 
Marbury 
Became A 
Volunteer of 
Traditional 
Beijing Times 
Newspape
r 
Hard news 
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Beijingers 
Organization 
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